
The Missouri Compromise
Missouri Compromise, THE. In 1817
the inhabitants of the Territory of Missouri petitioned Congress for
admission into the Union as a State. A bill was introduced into Congress
(Feb. 13, 1819) for that purpose, when James Tallmadge, Jr., of New
York, moved to insert a clause prohibiting any further introduction of
slaves within its domains, and granting freedom to the children of those
already there, on their attaining the age of twenty-five years. This
motion brought the slavery question again before Congress most
conspicuously. After a three days' vehement debate, it was carried, 87
to 76. As a companion to the Missouri bill, an-other to organize the
Territory of Arkansas was introduced (Feb. 16).When it was taken up, John W. Taylor, of New York, moved to add a
provision that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude should
hereafter be introduced into any part of the Territories of the United
States north of lat. 36° 30' N., the northern boundary of the proposed
new Territory of Arkansas. Arthur Livermore, of New Hampshire, who had
been zealous for the Missouri restrictions, conceived that this
proposition had been made " in the true spirit of compromise," but
thought that line of division not sufficiently favorable to freedom.
Gen. W. H. Harrison agreed to the necessity of some such partition, but
he proposed a line due west from the mouth of the Des Moines River, thus
giving up to slavery the State of Missouri and all territory south of
that latitude. This partition policy was warmly opposed by a large
number of members of Congress from the North and the South, declaring
themselves hostile to any compromise whatever.
Slavery was either
right or wrong, and there could be no compromise. Taylor withdrew his
motion.
The proposition for a compromise which was finally agreed to was
originated by a Northern member, and not by Henry Clay, of Kentucky, as
is generally supposed. This Missouri bill caused one of the most
exciting debates on the slavery question ever before known in the
national legislature. Extreme doctrines and foolish threats were uttered
on both sides. Southern members threatened a dissolution of the Union.
There was much adroit management by the party leaders, who used great
dexterity in trying to avoid a compromise—for one party insisted upon
Missouri entering, if at all, as a free-labor State, and the other party
insisted that it should enter as a slave-labor State. But compromise
seemed to be the only door through which Missouri might enter; and, by
adroit management, a compromise bill was carried, March 2, 1820, by a
vote of 134 against 42. John Randolph denounced it as " a dirty
bargain," and the eighteen Northern men who voted for it as "
dough-faces." There was an almost solid North against admitting Missouri
as a slave-labor State. President Monroe consulted his cabinet
concerning the constitutionality of the act. The matter was allowed to
go over until the next session, and it occupied much time during that
session. At length Henry Clay moved a joint committee (February, 1821)
to consider whether or not it was expedient to admit Missouri into the
Union; and if not, what provision adapted to her actual condition ought
to be made. The motion prevailed—101 to 55—all of the Southern members,
excepting Randolph and two or three followers, voting for it. The
committee was appointed, and soon reported. The closing decision on the
Missouri question was finally reached by the adoption of a compromise,
Feb. 27, 1821, substantially as proposed by Taylor, of New York, in
1819—namely, that in all territory north of lat. 36° 30' N. (outside the
boundary of the State of Missouri) slavery should not exist, but should
be forever prohibited in the region north of that line. But Missouri was
admitted as a slave-labor State. In the course of the later debates
there was much angry feeling displayed, and unwise men, North and South,
uttered the cry of disunion. A member from Georgia said, pathetically,
in the course of the debate: " A fire has been kindled which all the
waters of the ocean cannot put out, and which only seas of blood can
extinguish." The " seas of blood " shed in the
Civil War did alone
extinguish it.
When President Monroe hesitated about signing the Missouri Compromise
act, and laid the matter before his cabinet, he submitted two questions
to his advisers: Has Congress the power to prohibit slavery in a
Territory? and was the term " forever," in the prohibitive clause in the
bill, to be understood as referring only to the territorial condition of
the district to which it related, or was it an attempt to extend the
prohibition of slavery to such States as might be erected therefrom? The
cabinet was unanimous in the affirmative on the first question. On the
second question, John Quincy Adams (Secretary of State) thought the term
meant forever, and not to be limited to the existence of the territorial
condition of the district. Others limited it to the territorial
condition—a territorial " forever "—and not interfering with the right
of any State formed from it to establish or prohibit slavery. Calhoun
wished not to have this question mooted, and at his suggestion the
second question was modified into the mere inquiry, Is the provision, as
it stands in the bill, constitutional or not? This was essentially a
different question. To it all could answer yes, and did so answer in
writing. This writing was ordered to be deposited in the archives of
state, but it afterwards mysteriously disappeared. The act was then
signed by the President, but with a different understanding from that
which had been adopted by Congress. |