[Happened After:
Goliad
Massacre]
The period roughly between the fall of the Alamo, and the Victory at
San
Jacinto is known as "The Runaway Scrape." During this time, there was
mass confusion and panic across Texas. The citizenry was in
complete chaos, and the Texas Army was discontent, and disagreement
existed between Sam Houston and the governing body. Below, we will
describe this fascinating period of Texas History in some detail.
The Runaway Scrape:
SANTA
ANNA, having received intelligence of the
capture
of Fannin and his command, was still more confirmed in the idea that
the war in Texas was ended, and in his determination to depart for the
capital. With this view, he ordered General Urrea to scour all the
country between Victoria and Galveston, his left wing to be sustained by
the command under General Sesma. On the 24th of March, General Gaona set
out for Nacogdoches with the two battalions, two four-pounders, twenty
frontier dragoons, and fifty convicts, set apart for his command, the
whole amounting to seven hundred and twenty-five men. These several
commanders had strict orders to shoot all the prisoners taken!
As the dictator considered his army unnecessarily large to complete what
remained to be done in Texas, he ordered that the brigade of cavalry
commanded by Colonel Juan Jose Andrade—the property belonging to the
battalions of Guerrero, Matamoras, and Ximines, to the regular militia
of Queretaro, and to the first battalion of Mexico—also the artillery
which existed in the general quarters and that had been brought from
Mexico, and likewise the thirty-two hired wagons—should be got ready to
leave on the first of April for San Luis Potosi. As for himself, he
proposed to set out immediately—going by sea from Copano or Matagorda to
Tampico, and thence by land to San Luis Potosi.
General Filisola, on whom the chief command would now devolve, looking
around at his approaching responsibility, discovered that no impression
had as yet been made upon the colonists; and that those already
conquered, at so great a cost, were mostly volunteers only, but lately
arrived in the country, while the main body of Texans was still intact.
As the measures of Santa Anna did not accord with the views of Filisola,
the latter took frequent occasion to intimate his opinions as to future
operations. His suggestions, however, had no effect; but knowing that
Santa Anna paid great respect to any representation of Colonel Almonte,
he went in search of that officer; and, with the map of Texas before
them, he observed to Almonte that, after leaving garrisons at Bexar,
Goliad, and Copano, the remaining forces should keep together until they
had beaten the main body of the Texans. This advice, accompanied by a
timely letter from General Sesma, dated from the right bank of the
Colorado, on the 15th of March, induced Santa Anna to suspend the return
of the cavalry to Mexico, and to direct General Sesma, by an order,
dated the 25th of March, to change his course, after crossing the
Colorado at Bastrop, to San Felipe. He also commanded General Urrea to
pass the Colorado at Matagorda, and march to Brasoria - thus concluding
to concentrate his forces, and to finish in person the few remaining
military operations necessary to the reduction of Texas. On the 29th of
March, two battalions, with five pieces of artillery, and a month's
rations, under the command of Colonel Amat, set out from Bexar for
Gonzales; and, on the 31st, Santa Anna and his staff, with General
Filisola, departed on the same road.
Houston at Gonzales
To return to the Texans.
General
Houston arrived at Gonzales, at four o'clock in the afternoon, on
the 11th of March, 1836. Previous thereto, Colonels Burleson and Neill
had been using the most earnest and patriotic efforts to raise a force
for the relief of
Travis.
It is proper to state that Captain John
W. Smith, after conducting the thirty-two Texans from Gonzales to the
Alamo, returned on the 4th of March, and started again on the 7th with
fifty more from the same point; but it was too late. — Smith to the
President of the Convention., March 7, 1836.
It was Houston's intention to combine the forces of
Fannin
and Neill, and march to the aid of Travis; and he so ordered on the 9th,
in advance of his arrival at Gonzales.
In the handwriting of Colonel G. W.
Hockley, is found a memorandum dated "Burnham's, Colorado, March 9,
1836," as follows: " This day a letter was forwarded by return express
from this place to Colonel J. C. Neill, commanding at Gonzales, ordering
the original to be forwarded to Colonel Fannin, commanding at Goliad,
and a copy to be kept, as follows: 'Colonel Fannin to march immediately
with all his effective force (except one hundred and twenty men, to be
left for the protection of his post), to cooperate with the command of
Colonel Neill, at some point to be designated by him, to the relief of
Colonel Travis, now in
the Alamo.
Colonel N. to recommend a route to Colonel F. from
Goliad
to the point of cooperation. Colonel F. to bring two light pieces of
artillery, and no more ; fifty muskets, with thirty to forty rounds
ball-cartridge for each. Both to use immediate dispatch — Colonel F.
with ten days' provisions.'
"A letter to General Burleson, requesting
him to unite with Colonel Neill in recommending the route—forming
battalion, or regiment, according to the number of troops at Gonzales."
Colonel Neill, in a letter to Houston,
dated Gonzales, March 10, 1836, says : "I have received with great
satisfaction your communication of the 9th inst. .. . . I shall forward
your communication to Colonel Fannin by express, agreeably to your
instructions, giving him due time to concentrate his forces with mine at
the time and place I shall designate." Of course, this movement would
have been too late.
The news received there of the
fall of
the Alamo, changed his purpose, and he therefore dispatched the
order to Colonel Fannin to retreat to Victoria, sending one third of his
troops to Gonzales.
On the 12th of March, in pursuance of orders, Colonel Neill made a
report of the number of troops at Gonzales, and they were found to
amount in all to three hundred and seventy-four effective men. They had
not two days' provisions; many were without arms, and others destitute
of ammunition. To remedy these defects as far as possible, and place the
troops in a state of organization, orders were issued for an election of
field-officers of the volunteers on the 13th, and requiring all
volunteers who should come into camp to attach themselves to some
company. A camp was formed on the east bank of the Guadalupe, and the
organization extended to the lowest division of the company. At the same
time, Captain Larrison was dispatched to Victoria for fifty kegs of lead
and one thousand pounds of powder, for the use of the army.
Houston Receives News of the Fall of the Alamo
It was on the night General Houston reached Gonzales, that two Mexicans
brought the first news of the
fall of
the Alamo, and the death of all its defenders. The scene produced in
the town by these sad tidings can not be described. At least a dozen
women with their children, in that place alone, had thus been left
widows and orphans. In fact, there was scarcely a family in the town but
had to mourn the loss of one or more of its members. " For
four-and-twenty hours," says Captain Handy, " after the news reached us,
not a sound was heard, save the wild shrieks of women, and the
heart-rending screams of their fatherless children. Little groups of men
might be seen in various corners of the town, brooding over the past,
and speculating of the future ; but they scarcely spoke above a whisper.
The public and private grief were alike heavy. It sank deep into the
heart of the rudest soldier." To soften, as much as possible the unhappy
effect of the intelligence, Houston caused the two Mexicans to be
arrested and kept under guard, as spies. The fact that Travis had agreed
to fire signal-guns, and that none had been heard since the Sunday
previous, confirmed the statement made by the Mexicans ; yet, in order
to ascertain the truth of the matter, Deaf Smith, Henry Karnes, and R.
E. Handy, were dispatched to Bexar, or as near to that place as they
could safely go, to learn the facts, and return in three days. After
proceeding about twenty miles, they met Mrs. Dickinson, with her child,
accompanied by Sam, the servant of Travis, and Ben, a free negro, the
servant of Almonte. Mrs. Dickinson brought with her a boasting
proclamation of Santa Anna, which she had received from the hands of
General Sesma, then at the Cibola, on his route, with the advance of the
enemy, to Gonzales. Mrs. Dickinson having fully confirmed the
intelligence brought by the two Mexicans, Karnes, who was mounted on the
best horse, returned in haste to Gonzales with the information and the
proclamation of Santa Anna, while Smith and Handy remained to escort her
to the Texan army.
Captain Karnes reached Gonzales between eight and nine o'clock on the
night of the 13th. The intelligence brought by him produced a general
panic. Since Santa Anna first approached San Antonio, the American
settlers had been removing eastward ; and, as he advanced into the
country, and developed his bloodthirsty disposition, the emigration
became more hasty and universal. At length, with the departure of Sesma
from Bexar with his advance of seven hundred and twenty-five men, the
emigration became a flight, not of a part, but all —men, women,
children, and servants—some carrying with them their goods and stock,
others leaving everything. The volunteers in the Texan army, seeing
their wives and relatives exposed to the vandalism of the Mexican
soldiery, were constantly leaving—some with and some without permission
— to look after and conduct to a place of safety those who were so near
and dear to them. This was a natural result of their exposed situation.
The Texan commander, not having a sufficient force to repel the enemy
before he reached the settlements, and being without artillery and
munitions, was compelled to fall back. The information brought by Mrs.
Dickinson had, moreover, magnified the force under Sesma.
Houston Retreats from Gonzales
Having determined on a retreat, General Houston and his forces set out
before midnight on the 13th, leaving behind his spies, who were
reinforced by some volunteers from Peach creek. It may be stated, as a
proof of the poverty of the materiel in the Texan army, that,
when they set out on their retreat, they had in camp two public wagons,
two yoke of oxen, and a few poor horses! The flying citizens had carried
with them every species of conveyance. The Texan army reached the
Navidad on the 14th, where they rested one day, while a guard was sent
back for a widow woman and her children, whose residence, being off the
road, was passed without knowledge of her. Some of the party who had
remained behind at Gonzales conducted the family on to the army, while
the three spies before named, and Reese, remained to burn the town. It
was set on fire in many places at once, so that the flying inhabitants,
looking back, saw the light of their burning dwellings. By early dawn
the place was reduced to ashes, and its only inhabitants were the four
faithful Texan spies previously mentioned.
Houston, having decided to make the Colorado the line of defense,
dispatched his aide-de-camp, Colonel William T. Austin, to the Brazos
for artillery, and marched to Burnham's, on the right bank of the
Colorado. He reached this point on the evening of the 17th. His force
had by this time increased to six hundred men, including a rear-guard,
who were bringing with them some families.
Panic Across Texas
There had, up to this time, been some twenty who had left the Texan army
without permission, and, as they traveled east-ward, spread over the
country such exaggerated accounts of the large force of the enemy, their
unheard-of cruelties, and the small numbers of the Texans, that the
panic became universal and overwhelming. The voice of sorrow and
despondency that came from the flying inhabitants touched the hearts of
the small band who had ventured everything in this last effort for life
and liberty. It did more—it prevented volunteers from coming from the
east. The panic, as it traveled in that direction, had greatly
increased. Citizens east of the Neches believed their danger more
imminent than those west of the Trinity. Hence, able-bodied men were
retained to defend families and neighborhoods. To add to the terror and
distress, particularly in eastern Texas, there were some bad men who
spread false alarms for the sake of plunder. It was understood, and
perhaps with some truth, that all Americans, whether combatants or not,
were to be driven from the country, and that the women brought by Santa
Anna with his army were to join his soldiers in forming the advance of a
Mexican population that was to occupy the province.
"It pains my heart," says the commander-in-chief, writing to the
chairman of the military committee—" it pains my heart that such
consternation should have been spread by the few deserters from camp. .
. . Our own people, if they would act, are enough to expel every Mexican
from Texas. Do let it be known that, on close examination, and upon
reflection, the force of Santa Anna has been greatly overrated. . . . If
you can, by any means, soothe the people, and get them to remain, they
shall have notice, if I deem it necessary. Let them entertain no fears
for the present. We can raise three thousand men in Texas, and fifteen
hundred can defeat all that Santa Anna can send to the Colorado."
The Texan army remained two days at Burnham's, waiting for the families
to pass safely over, when it also crossed to the left bank, and,
marching down the river, took position opposite Beason's. Here they
remained until the 26th, awaiting the arrival of artillery and
reinforcements. It is true that most of the reports made of the
advancing force of the enemy over-rated their numbers. The first body,
under Sesma and Woll, was seven hundred and twenty-five ; the second,
under General Tolsa, which probably reached the Colorado about the time
the Texans took position opposite Beason's, numbered some six
hundred—making an aggregate of thirteen hundred and twenty-five, of
which ninety were cavalry, with two six-pounders. Yet it was understood
in the Texan camp that they had at least twice that number on the right
bank of the river, with heavy reinforcements coming up. At all events,
without artillery and ammunition, it would not have been prudent to
hazard a battle when there was so much at stake. Such was the view taken
of the matter by the commander-in-chief, and he was fully supported by
the convention. " It is deemed useless," says the president of that
body, in his letter of the 16th of March, " to suggest to you the
importance of giving all possible information, in various directions
around you through the country, of the movements of the enemy, and to
retard his progress as far as practicable without hazarding a battle,
without a tolerable certainty of victory. But annoy him in situations
which will admit of it, so as to save your men until a force can collect
to enable you to make a successful attack upon him."
The troops that were expected from eastern Texas did not come. As early
as the 5th of March, General Houston had dispatched Major John Forbes,
of his staff, to Velasco, to act with Colonel John A. Wharton, the
adjutant-general, in forwarding troops and munitions-of-war to the army,
directing that supplies and munitions should be sent no farther south
than Dimitt's landing.
Colonel William T. Austin, in pursuance of orders, proceeded directly to
Brasoria, and applied to Colonel Wharton for the required artillery and
grape and canister. That officer was then on his way to the army with
one hundred and fifty troops from Velasco, and informed Colonel Austin
that he had already sent all the guns suitable for field-service,
consisting of two six-pounders and one mortar, with shot and shells, to
Bell's landing, and would take them to the army. At the same time the
adjutant-general sent Colonel Austin to Velasco, to forward munitions
and stores to Bell's landing. Previous to leaving Burnham's, orders were
dispatched to all points west of the Colorado, directing that families
should be in readiness to move east of that stream, and that stock of
all kinds should be driven over it.
The government ad interim, on entering upon the discharge of its
functions on the 17th of March, exerted itself to increase the force
under the Texan flag. President Burnett issued a strong appeal to the
people east of the Brazos, expressing grief and surprise that, under the
influence of idle rumors, they were leaving their homes, and, by the
circulation of false news, preventing others from repairing to the
standard of their country, where alone their homes and families were to
be defended. At the same time a resolution was taken to remove the seat
of government to Harrisburg. Agents were likewise sent eastward to quiet
the public mind, and two thirds of the militia were called into service.
Colonel
Rusk, the secretary of war, was untiring in his efforts to forward
supplies of all kinds. At the ferry at Washington he stationed an
officer, with orders to let no man pass eastward who had a rifle, and to
take by impressments and forward to the army all the powder, lead, and
horses, he could. These were strong measures, but such as the times
required.
On the 20th of March, Captain Karnes, with five men, met with and
defeated a party of twelve Mexicans at Rocky creek, twelve miles west of
Beason's, killing one, taking another prisoner, and capturing three
horses. In addition to the protection of the crossing at Beason's,
forces were stationed above at Mosely's, and at the Atasco sito
crossing below. The force at Mosely's captured and sent to headquarters,
on the 23d, three more of the enemy. From a separate examination of
these prisoners, it was ascertained that the main body of the troops
under Sesma were near the west bank of the river. The Texan force was at
this time over seven hundred strong, in high spirits, under strict
discipline, and anxious to meet the foe. The enemy had taken his
position on the west bank of the river, on an elevation near the
Robertson crossing, about two miles above Beason's. At that crossing the
river was fordable; and the Texan commander placed there a detachment of
about one hundred and fifty men under Lieutenant-Colonel Sherman and
Captain Patton, aide-de-camp. This force was intended as a guard to the
ford, and also as an ambuscade, should the Mexicans endeavor to pass the
river. They did make an attempt to send over fifty of their cavalry, but
one of the guard having indiscreetly fired at them as they were going
into the water, they retreated, and made no further attempt at that
point.
With a view to meet the enemy, Captain Karnes was sent over the river
with one hundred and fifty troops, fifty of whom were mounted, with
orders to station the foot in a ravine parallel to the route to the
Mexican camp ; then to proceed with the mounted force, to draw out the
enemy, and retreat. The orders were obeyed : the Mexicans fired a
discharge of grape at the Texan cavalry, but did not advance. Karnes,
not deeming it prudent to march nearer against so large a force,
recrossed the river without effecting anything. It was the intention of
the Texan commander to cross over at Beason's on the night of the 27th
of March with all his force except a camp-guard, and attack the enemy on
the south and east of his camp. But, on the evening of the 25th, Peter
Kerr brought the disastrous though not altogether unexpected news of the
defeat and surrender of Fannin and his command at the Coleta, and the
capitulation of Ward and his forces near Dimitt's landing. This
intelligence was most unfortunate, and produced a chilling effect upon
the army. To allay in some degree its effects, Kerr was arrested and
placed under guard, as a publisher of false news, and a spy. This,
together with the fact that the artillery expected had not arrived ;
that the check already given to Sesma had doubtless induced him to send
for reinforcements ; that the defeat of Fannin would leave Urrea at
liberty to come to the relief of Sesma ; that the defeat of the advance
under the latter would serve only to concentrate the Mexican army,
which, with its various corps thus united, could overrun Texas in spite
of the force then in the field to resist it—these considerations induced
the Texan commander to retreat, hoping for a more favorable occasion to
decide the fortunes of the infant republic in a battle. It was his
policy to keep the enemy divided, and, when the blow was given, to
strike at a vital part. The small army under his command was the last
hope of Texas, and the prize too important to be hazarded without a
certainty of success.
Houston Continues his Retreat
In announcing this retreat to the government, General Houston says : " I
held no councils of war. If I err, the blame is mine." That
reinforcements would arrive, he had every reason to expect. The
government, having reached Harrisburg on the 22d, informed him the next
day that " orders were in execution for the mustering into service of
two thirds of the militia of the country. "These," said the secretary of
war, with the aid from the United States, will, if you can hold the
enemy in check long enough for their concentration, present an
insurmountable barrier to the progress of the enemy into the country.
"One great object should be," observes the secretary of war, in a letter
of the same date, " to hold him in check until reinforcements and
supplies can reach you. Every means has been put into requisition for
the purpose of forwarding on both."
On the evening of the 26th, the army commenced the retreat in good
order. It was, however, a subject of regret that the houses of Messrs.
Burnham and Dewees, on the left bank of the Colorado, were burnt by the
Texan picket-guard, on the approach of the enemy. The Texan forces,
after a march of five miles, halted for the night at a lake in the
prairie. As they left the woods skirting the Colorado, they were
reinforced by the three companies of Captains Amasa Turner, William S.
Fisher, and Richard Roman, under the command of Major John Forbes of the
staff, who, after untiring exertions, and the cheerful aid of the people
on the route, had succeeded in conducting them safely from the mouth of
the Brazos. Never was a reinforcement more welcome. The companies,
however, were small, the aggregate being only one hundred and thirty
men. On the 27th, the army resumed its march, and reached the timbers of
the Brazos; and, on the 28th, it arrived at San Felipe, on the west bank
of that river.
To provide for the protection of the new line of defense, Colonel Edward
Harcourt was ordered to proceed to Velasco, or some eligible position on
the coast or below Columbia, and fortify it, having placed at his
disposal such resources as he could find there. Captain Mosely Baker was
directed to take post with his command on the east bank of the Brazos,
opposite San Felipe, and obstruct the passage of the enemy. All troops
coming from below were ordered to fall back to the Brazos ; at the same
time, Colonel A. Huston was directed to remove the public stores from
Coxe's point to Galveston bay, and Colonel J. Morgan to defend the
island.
At San Felipe some discontent arose as to the future movements of the
army, some wishing to march below and others up the river. The
commander-in-chief proceeded up the Brazos, and, crossing Mill creek,
encamped. The rains had set in, and the roads became exceedingly bad,
and marching toilsome to the troops. It rained all night. The soldiers,
having but few tents or coverings, suffered severely. The
commander-in-chief spent the night sitting on his saddle, with a blanket
over him, and his feet on a piece of wood.
With few exceptions, neither officers nor
men had any tents during that severe campaign. Houston's baggage
consisted of a pair of saddle-wallets, carried by his servant, and
containing his official papers and a change of linen. As to a military
chest, the army had none at all. The only moneys used by the general
during the campaign were two hundred dollars of his own private funds.
As an incident of those times, while the army was crossing the Colorado,
a woman was found sitting with another female on a log near the river.
Her husband had fallen in the Alamo ; she had no resources, no
protector, or means of conveyance. Houston, learning her condition,
furnished her out of his slender means fifty dollars. He saw no more of
her. In after-years, when Texas had become a state of the American
Union, she wrote to him, stating that she had laid out his donation in
the purchase of cattle, the increase of which had made her family
independent.
On the evening of the 31st of March, after a most fatiguing march, the
Texans reached the Brazos timber opposite Groce's. Here they encamped in
a secure position, having excellent water in a lake immediately in
advance of them, and within three fourths of a mile of the timber. The
steamboat " Yellowstone," Captain Ross, then at Groce's ferry, and
nearly loaded with cotton, was pressed into the public service, and was
afterward found to be almost indispensable. On the 31st, the soldiers
buried the only one of their comrades who died a natural death during
the campaign. After remaining a day at this point, the army marched into
the Brazos bottom, nearer the river, where it remained until the 13th of
April. The river having overflowed its banks, the water surrounded them,
and left them on an island.
On the 2nd of April, Colonel Zavala joined the camp, bringing
information that a visit might soon be expected from Colonel Rusk, the
secretary of war. About the same time, eighty volunteers from the
Red-river lands arrived. Houston was occupied for some days in
reorganizing his army, and restoring it to that discipline and round of
camp-duty which had been somewhat neglected during the retreat from the
Colorado. At San Felipe, on the 29th of March, on the supposed approach
of the Mexicans, the citizens fired the town, and burnt it to ashes.
This, though without orders, was only anticipating the enemy.
While the Texan army was lying in the Brazos bottom, Houston, through
the spies, learned the movements of the enemy. A more efficient corps of
spies was never attached to any army. They hung about the enemy's camp,
and watched all his movements.
Deaf Smith went out one day, early in
April, in search of the enemy. His sight had become dim, and, for better
observation, he took with him young Chenowith. The Mexicans had
collected a large number of cattle, and sent them on in advance of their
army, in the direction of San Felipe. The spies came in sight of them,
and Smith, relying upon Chenowith's eyes, returned and reported a large
number of the enemy as an advanced guard. This produced quite an
excitement in the Texan camp, until the arrival of "Jim Wells," who,
having better eyes and less fancy, reported them truly. Deaf Smith was
much hurt, and declared that Chenowith should go with him no more. As a
spy, Smith was inimitable. He rode a good horse, and had the faith to
believe that no other steed could keep up with him. But, if overtaken,
he would turn and fight, and with a coolness, courage, and judgment,
that were irresistible.
Yet it is somewhat remarkable that the Texans did not certainly
ascertain, until the night of the 19th of April, that Santa Anna was
with the invading army.
Colonel Rusk Joins Houston on the Brazos
Colonel Rusk, the secretary of war, left Harrisburg on the 1st of April,
to join the army. Previous to his departure, he issued a last strong
appeal to the people of Texas to march to the defense of the country.
His arrival in camp was most welcome, for he was a safe adviser, and a
firm and able friend of Texas in her struggle.
We now return to the operations of the enemy. It will be remembered that
Santa Anna had directed a general movement of his forces in the
direction of San Felipe. Had he persevered in this combination, it would
have been well for him ; but past victories, a flying enemy, and an
impatience to hear any opinion contrary to his own, inspired him with a
false confidence, which ended only in his ruin. General Sesma succeeded,
four days after the retreat of Houston from the Colorado, in
transporting a portion of his army across that river. Of this fact he
advised Santa Anna, at the same time giving him notice that the river
was greatly swollen, and the means of crossing it very scarce. On the
2nd of April, Santa Anna arrived at the Guadalupe, which he found
likewise very high. He immediately crossed, with his staff and a picket
of cavalry, on a raft; and, leaving General Filisola to attend to the
passage of the remainder of the army, he hurried on to join General
Sesma, at the Colorado. On the 5th of April, he reached the Atasco
sito crossing of that river. Here he directed General Woll to remain
and construct rafts for transporting across the stream the artillery,
wagons, and forces, under Filisola, and, with the division under Sesma
and Tolsa, proceeded to San Felipe, where he arrived on the 7th of
April. On the 2nd of April, Houston sent out Major Patton with a
detachment to reconnoiter the enemy. On the 3rd, he reinforced Captain
Mosely Baker with Captain Kimbrough's command, and directed Captain
Baker to require all persons at his camp to enroll themselves as
volunteers, and none to leave it without express permission. These were
strong measures, but the emergency was pressing.
About this time, the idea began to prevail, not only in the Texan camp,
but with the government at Harrisburg, that the enemy would not cross
the Brazos, but would attempt to fall down and get possession of the
coast and seaports. To meet this state of things, orders were given
through Colonel A. Huston, quartermaster-general, and Colonel W. D. C.
Hall, to remove all the stores and munitions from Coxe's point,
Matagorda, Velasco, Bell's landing, and Columbia, to the east end of
Galveston island. The means of doing this were quite limited, for all
the vessels had been engaged by merchants and emigrants who were
retiring with their effects.
Panic Continues Across Texas
The extent of alarm and confusion arising from the flight of the
citizens was at this time most distressing. Samuel P. Carson, the
secretary of the navy, writing to President Burnett from Liberty, says:
" I have issued orders to two different persons—one for Trinity and one
for the Neches—to press boats, &c., to aid the people in crossing. The
panic has reached this place, and the people are all leaving Trinity
from the opposite (west) side, and preparations making by many on this.
The river is rising rapidly, and I fear by tonight it will be impassable
for any kind of carriage. The 'slues' on this side are belly-deep. There
must be three hundred families— I know not the number of wagons, carts,
carriages, &c. Destruction pervades the whole country. I must speak
plainly—the relations existing between us, and the responsibility which
rests on us, make it my duty. Never till I reached Trinity have I
desponded—I will not say, despaired. If Houston has retreated, or
been whipped, nothing can save the people from themselves: their own
conduct has brought this calamity on them ! If Houston retreats, the
flying people may be covered in their escape. He must be advised of the
state of the waters, and the impossibility of the people crossing."
At the same time, Captain Morehouse, with a detachment of volunteers and
regulars, was conducting a number of families from Matagorda to
Columbia. In fact, on every road leading eastward in Texas, were found
men, women, and children, moving through the country over swollen
streams and muddy roads, strewing the way with their property, crying
for aid, and exposed to the fierce northers and rains of spring. The
scene was distressing indeed ; and, being witnessed by the small but
faithful army of Texans, whose wives and families they were, thus
exposed and suffering, nerved their arms and hearts for the contest then
not distant.
It was on the 7th of April that Major Wylie Martin received, through his
spies, indirect information that Santa Anna was with the advancing army
of the enemy. This intelligence was immediately sent from Martin's camp
(on the east bank of the Brazos, opposite Fort Bend) to Houston. From
all the discoveries that could be made through the spies, Houston
believed that the enemy had crossed the Brazos below his position, and
so expressed himself to Secretary Rusk, suggesting the propriety of
crossing likewise.*
* The following order shows that the
enemy's arrival at San Felipe was immediately known in the Texan camp
" HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, CAMP WEST OF BRAZOS, April 7, 1836.
"ARMY ORDERS. — The advance of the enemy is at San Felipe. The
moment, for which we have waited with anxiety and interest, is fast
approaching. The victims of the Alamo, and the manes of those who were
murdered at Goliad, call for cool, deliberate vengeance. Strict
discipline, order, and subordination, will insure us the victory.
"The army will. be in readiness for
action at a moment's warning. The field-officers have the immediate
execution of this order in charge for their respective commands.
" SAM HOUSTON, Commander-in-Chief. "
Colonel Rusk concurred in this view; and the passage accordingly
commenced at ten o'clock on the morning of the 12th. The river being
very high, the steamboat " Yellowstone" and the yawl were the only means
of transporting the army, cattle, and baggage. By one o'clock in the
afternoon of the 13th, all was safely landed on the eastern bank, and
the troops took position at Groce's.
The conclusion that the enemy had crossed the Brazos was correct. Santa
Anna, arriving at San Felipe on the 7th, endeavored to pass the river at
that point ; but he was received with such determined resistance by
Captain Mosely Baker and his command, that, after contending for two
days, he abandoned the attempt, and set out with four companies of
infantry and fifty cavalry in search of another crossing. It was on the
evening of the 9th that they left San Felipe. After a march of sixteen
miles, they reached the San Bernard a little after midnight, and sent
out a scout to reconnoiter the ferry at Fort Bend. The scout having
returned, Santa Anna again proceeded on his march, and arrived at nine
o'clock, on the night of the 10th, in the neighborhood of Fort Bend. At
two o'clock on the following morning, the Mexicans set out again, all on
foot— leaving their cavalry and baggage behind—to surprise the guard at
the river before daylight ; but, mistaking the distance, the early dawn
found them a mile from the river. Thus frustrated, Santa Anna placed his
men in ambush.
On the 12th, shortly after sunrise, the enemy appeared in force opposite
the camp of Major Wylie Martin, at Thompson's ferry. They opened a heavy
fire on the small force of forty-six men on the east bank, which
continued until the afternoon. Very early on the 12th, Martin had sent
three men to Morton's crossing, to sink a small boat which had been left
for the use of five families there. Before they arrived, a negro had
taken the boat and crossed over to the western bank. The negro, was
captured by the enemy, and conducted them to the boat. A sufficient
number of Mexicans having passed over to disperse the families there,
did so after a short contest. Major Martin, hearing the firing,
dispatched Lieutenant Jones with ten men to learn the cause. By the time
they reached there, one hundred and fifty of the enemy had effected a
crossing. Thus Major Martin, being overpowered, retreated toward the
main army.*
* Report of Major Martin, April 13, 1836.
The Mexican account of this affair is somewhat different. In fact, as
the small boat was concealed above Morton's ferry, there is little doubt
but, as Almonte states, some of the enemy crossed in it, and slept on
the left bank of the river on the 11th, without being discovered. When
the enemy reached San Felipe, Almonte rode up in advance, and called out
to the Texans on the east side, "Bring over that boat—the Mexicans are
coming!" This was said in good English; and the enemy cannonaded Baker's
breastworks for some time, but still did not get the boat. — Memoranda
of Rev. A. J. McGown. It was a successful ruse on the part of the
Mexicans to keep up a firing at Thompson's ferry, while they were
crossing at Morton's, three miles distant.
Having possession of the ferry, Santa Anna sent an express to Sesma to
advance to that point.
Houston had given orders that all the means of crossing along the river
should be secured or sunk, and that all the cattle should be driven to
the east side ; believing that, by thus delaying the Mexicans, they
would fall short of provisions. Such, in fact, was the case, as the
advance had only half rations of bread. On the 11th of April, the
effective force of the Texan army was five hundred and twenty-three men,
exclusive of detachments at the different crossings. When it was
ascertained that the enemy had passed the river, orders were immediately
sent to all these detachments to concentrate at Donoho's, three miles
from Groce's, on the 16th. It was at Donoho's that the road from Groce's
to Harrisburg crossed that from San Felipe to eastern Texas.
Affairs had now reached a crisis, as was obvious to all. That a conflict
would soon occur was devoutly desired, perhaps by the enemy as well as
the Texans. Santa Anna, having crossed the Brazos at Fort Bend,
proceeded, on the 14th of April, with a force amounting to a little over
seven hundred men, and one twelve-pounder, on the road to Harrisburg,
where he arrived on the 15th.
On the day that Santa Anna reached Harrisburg, his army was sufficiently
scattered for its destruction in detail. Urrea was at Matagorda, with
some twelve hundred men ; Gaona lost in the country between Bastrop and
San Felipe, with seven hundred and twenty-five ; Sesma at Fort Bend,
with about one thousand ; and Filisola between San Felipe and Fort Bend,
with nearly eighteen hundred more. These, with the exception of the
troops stationed in Bexar, Goliad, Copano, Matagorda, &c., constituted
the force of the enemy in Texas—numbering originally about seven
thousand five hundred men, but reduced by killed and disabled to some
five thousand five hundred.
When information was received of the enemy having crossed the Brazos, it
was not known but they would advance on the road from San Felipe to
eastern Texas; hence the concentration of the Texan force at Donoho's.
Texans get "The Twin Sisters"
As the Texans were crossing the Brazos, they were reinforced by two
six-pounders, known as the "Twin-Sisters." These notable pieces of
artillery, for the good they did in the cause of Texan independence,
deserve some further notice. A. meeting was held in Cincinnati, Ohio, in
1835, for the purpose of aiding Texas in her struggle. On the suggestion
of Robert F. Lyttle, it was concluded to furnish these two pieces of
"hollow ware." A committee was chosen to carry out the resolution ; and
through the instrumentality of William M. Corry, Willis Tatan, Pulaski
Smith, David Bolles, and others, the cannon were manufactured, mounted,
supplied with shot at the foundry of Messrs. Greenwood and Webb, and
dispatched to New Orleans; thence, by the Texan agents, to Brasoria. To
this point General Houston sent twice for them; but the want of means
for transportation, the wretched condition of the roads, and ultimately
the proximity of the enemy, made it hazardous to forward them by that
route. They were then shipped by Colonel A. Huston, the
quartermaster-general, on board the schooner "Pennsylvania" to Galveston
island, and thence to Harrisburg. At this place, horses were pressed to
haul them, and they were started on the 9th of April, under care of
Captain Smith, to the army. They were placed in charge of Colonel
Hockley, who kept them in efficient order. Texas will never cease to be
grateful to Cincinnati for that valuable present.
The Texas Navy
It is proper here to state, in order to bring up the current of events
in this busy period of Texan history, that the authorities had managed,
through the kindness of good friends, to pick up a small navy of three
vessels, viz.: the Invincible, Captain L. Brown ; the Brutus,
Captain Hurd ; and the Independence, Captain Hawkins. These
vessels were not idle, but were of infinite service to Texas in
preventing the enemy from receiving supplies. In the first days of April
the Invincible sailed on a cruise off Brazos Santiago, and fell in with
the Montezuma, Captain Thompson. After a fight of two hours, the Mexican
vessel was driven on shore, and left in a sinking condition. After
repairing his rigging (the only injury he received), Captain Brown stood
out from the harbor, and fell in with the brig Pocket, from New Orleans
to Matamoras, freighted with flour, lard, rice, and biscuit, for the
Mexican army, under contract with a house in the former city. The Pocket
was brought into Galveston. From letters found on board, it was
ascertained that Santa Anna's object was to secure the sea-ports, and
place a thousand men on Galveston island. All this information was
communicated to Houston about the time he crossed the Brazos river. This
intelligence, and the near approach of the enemy, determined the
government to fortify Galveston island. For this purpose, several pieces
of artillery were brought from the seaports south ; and the Independence
was detained in the bay to aid in commencing the work. The citizens
there volunteered their assistance, and placed themselves under the
command of Colonel Morgan.
Houston Urged to Fight
The acting secretary of war, in his letter to the commander-in-chief of
the 12th of April, after referring to the fact that the enemy had
crossed the Brazos at Fort Bend, says : " There is nothing to stop his
march to this place [Harrisburg], or Galveston, in twenty-four hours.
There are a number of families here and in the neighborhood, who came
here under the belief that they would be safe, who are now exposed to
the attack of the enemy. You have assured the government that the enemy
should never cross the Brazos : they have relied on your assurance, but
they find your pledges not verified, and numberless families exposed to
the ravages of the enemy. The country expects something from you ; the
government looks to you for action. The time has now arrived to
determine whether we are to give up the country, and make the best of
our way out of it, or to meet the enemy, and make at least one struggle
for our boasted independence. The government does not intend to control
your movements; but it is expected that, without delay, you will take
measures to check those of the enemy."
This letter was received by the commander-in-chief on the 13th, at a
moment when he was pressed by business, and making his arrangements for
offensive operations. He, however, considered the taunts and suggestions
in the secretary's letter as gratuitous, because he was harassed with
difficulties which the government could not appreciate. His answer,
under the circumstances, was mild, and went into a summary of past
events. There was hardly a time during the campaign when the enemy's
force was not ten times as great as his own — a well-appointed army,
composed mostly of veteran troops, supplied with artillery, arms, and
munitions, and commanded by a general who, up to that period, had never
known defeat. The Texan army, on the contrary, was a hasty collection of
farmers, paid and fed upon promises, poorly armed, and with every
variety of weapon, and up to that time without a single piece of
artillery. Add to this that their wives and children, objects dear to
them, were homeless wanderers—flying, without food or shelter,
unprotected by the stalwart arm of their natural defenders from the
ravages of a barbarous foe—and we must admire the sagacity and address
that kept so many of them together so long.
Indian Threat
Complaints have been made of the apathy of eastern Texas, as though the
people of that section did not love their country as well as those of
the west. We should first look at their condition, and have the same
understanding of affairs that they did, before we condemn. It was known
to them that General Gaona, with a well-appointed division of the
Mexican army, was on his way to Nacogdoches, with orders from Santa Anna
to shoot all who were taken with arms in their hands, and to drive the
others out of the country. His route lay along the frontiers, passing
the Trinity at the upper or
Comanche crossing. The order directing him
to change his course to San Felipe was unknown to the Texans. The
country through which he marched was thronged with Indians, already
stirred up by the emissaries of the Mexicans, and naturally disposed to
join them; for it is to the credit of the latter that they had ever
excelled the Americans in kindness toward the aboriginal tribes. Of
their motive for this we need not stop to inquire. The people of eastern
Texas, then, felt that their danger was imminent. This apparent danger
was increased by the threats and movements of the Indians. To ascertain
the facts, the committee of vigilance at Nacogdoches dispatched agents
to the Indians. C. H. Sims and William Sims, who were sent to the
Cherokees, reported them to be hostile, and making preparations for war
; that they were drying beef and preparing meal, and said they were
about sending off their women and children; that they had murdered
Brooks Williams, an American trader among them ; that they said a large
body of Indians, composed of Caddoes, Keechies, Ionies, Twowokanies,
Wacoes, and Comanches, were expected to attack the American settlements
; that the Cherokees gave every indication of joining them; that the
number of warriors embodied on the Trinity was estimated at seventeen
hundred; and that Bolles, the principal Cherokee chief, advised the
agents to leave the country, as there was danger. M. B. Menard, who was
sent to the Shawanee, Delaware, and Kickapoo tribes, reported that,
while these tribes were friendly, they had been visited by Bolles, who
urged them to take up arms against the Americans.
With these facts before them, the committee of vigilance and the people
of Nacogdoches were ready to credit the rumor that the combined Mexicans
and Indians were already within a few miles of the town. On the 9th of
April, the alcalde, Hoffman, ordered every able-bodied Mexican,
within the municipality of Nacogdoches, to take up the line of march to
the army within ten days, or to cross the Sabine. The companies of
Captains Ratliff, Smith, and Chesher, on their way to the army, were
detained, to aid in protecting the place. Such was the supposed
emergency, that horses were pressed into the public service for the use
of the civic forces. Judge Quitman, with a few companions, corning into
the town, was called upon to give his aid in protecting the families on
their way to the Sabine, which he cheerfully agreed to do.
In answer to Houston's strong appeal to the people of eastern Texas to
turn out and hasten to his assistance, three companies, commanded by
Captains Ratliff, Smith, and Chesher, with an aggregate of two hundred
and twenty men, were ready to set out on the march for headquarters as
early as the 9th of April; but on account of the supposed pressing
danger at Nacogdoches, as previously mentioned, they were detained till
the 16th before they marched. In a few days more, a like number were
ready to leave. But all this aid was too late. "The citizens of
Nacogdoches," says Henry Raguet, chairman of the committee of vigilance,
under date of the 17th of April, "were induced to believe, only a few
days since, that the enemy in large force was within a few miles of this
place. Under this belief, the volunteer companies, commanded by Captains
Chesher, Ratliff, and Smith, were detained until yesterday. In addition
to the cause above stated, Rumor, with her thousand tongues, had created
the belief that the Mexicans of this municipality were embodying
themselves for the purpose of attacking the Americans. This committee
have taken every means in their power to allay the panic, and, if
possible, to bring men to their sober senses. When the committee found
themselves in possession of the facts in relation to the disaffection of
the Mexicans, they took prompt measures to prevent a rupture, which
threatened serious consequences to the welfare and safety of our
citizens ; and they are happy to state that the difficulty has been most
happily terminated."
Thus the affairs in eastern Texas had disappointed the government as
well as the commander-in-chief: for, if the latter had made pledges that
were not verified, the government had done the same. The levy of two
thirds of the militia never came. The supply of arms, provisions, &c.,
only reached the Texan army after it had crossed the Brazos. While
neither possessed the power of ubiquity and omnipotence, neither could
be responsible for matters beyond their control. It is perhaps enough to
say—and truth will justify so much—that, under all the circumstances,
both parties did what they could for their adopted country. She was
poor; her people were poor —and not only so, but deeply distressed.
Their affairs were such, and so dark was the cloud hanging over them,
that they could not afford merely to check the enemy; it was essential
that he should be whipped. Texas could not survive two battles; the work
had to be done in one, and well done.
"After the army had crossed the Brazos,
the companies below, in pursuance of orders, joined the main body at
Donoho's. Houston rode along their lines, and, in a short address, said
that ' he had been blamed by some because the Texans were not permitted
to meet the enemy; but that, so soon as circumstances would permit it to
be done to advantage, we should have it to our satisfaction.' I remember
it well, from the fact that there was in the ranks a large man, by the
name of Harman, celebrated for his good nature and good humor, who, in
answer to this speech, said, ' General, let it be an easy-going fight !
- Memoranda of Rev. A. J. McGown
Among other difficulties with which Texas had to contend was the
presence of a considerable number of persons of no country or
sympathy—treacherous to all—who were busily engaged in spreading alarm,
and increasing the public confusion. To this list should be added a
class of a still worse character, who fattened upon the stolen plunder
of the flying inhabitants. Then there were others, in the Mexican
interest, who were spies in the Texan ranks. Of these several classes,
many arrests were made, and their persons secured until the danger was
over. It is not unlikely that some were thus confined who ought not to
have been. Among those arrested was Colonel Ellis P. Bean. He had been
appointed a member of the committee of vigilance of Nacogdoches, but, as
it appears, took no part in their affairs. At the beginning of the war,
in the fall of 1835, he had applied to Colonel John Forbes to place him
in arrest, the better to enable him to draw his pay as colonel in the
Mexican army ; but Colonel Forbes declined to do so, unless for some
offence. It appears that in April, 1836, some report had come into
circulation relative to an alleged correspondence of Bean with the
enemy, which induced the secretary of war to order his arrest. As the
truth of the report was very questionable, he was ordered into custody,
and detained only as a Mexican officer and alien of the republic. But
when the enemy retreated, nothing further was heard on the subject.
[See Next:
The
Battle of San Jacinto]
There is little doubt but Bean's real
feelings were in favor of the Texans. In 1833, while he was commandant
at Nacogdoches, he addressed the following letter to Houston : —
" February 4, 1833.
" From the Commander of Nacogdoches :
"As it appears that it is the wish of the citizens of this country that
you should be a member of the committee [the convention of 1833 he
refers to], to form this eastern part into a state—formerly governed by
Coahuila—I feel myself willing to support you so far as my military
orders will permit me to do.
"Your obedient servant, E. P. BEAN,
" General HOUSTON." |