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General Sherman's Memoirs

MEMOIRS OF GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN
By
William T. Sherman
BATTLE OF SHILOH—MARCH AND APRIL, 1862
CONTENTS
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FROM 1820 TO THE MEXICAN
WAR, 1846
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EARLY
RECOLLECTIONS OF CALIFORNIA—1846-1848
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EARLY
RECOLLECTIONS OF CALIFORNIA—(Continued)—1849-1850
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MISSOURI, LOUISIANA, AND CALIFORNIA—1850-1855
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CALIFORNIA—1855-1857
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CALIFORNIA, NEW YORK, AND KANSAS—1857-1859
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LOUISIANA—1859-1861
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MISSOURI—APRIL AND MAY, 1861
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FROM
THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN TO PADUCAH—1861-1862
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BATTLE OF SHILOH—MARCH AND APRIL, 1862
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SHILOH TO MEMPHIS-APRIL TO JULY, 1862
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MEMPHIS To ARKANSAS POST—JULY, 1862, TO JANUARY, 1863
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VICKSBURG—JANUARY TO JULY, 1863
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CHATTANOOGA AND KNOXVILLE—JULY TO DECEMBER, 1863
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MERIDIAN CAMPAIGN—JANUARY AND FEBRUARY, 1864
APPENDIX TO VOLUME ONE
CHAPTER X.
BATTLE of SHILOH.
MARCH AND APRIL, 1862.
By the end of February, 1862, Major-General
Halleck commanded all the armies in the valley of the Mississippi,
from his headquarters in St: Louis. These were, the Army of the Ohio,
Major-General
Buell, in
Kentucky; the Army of the Tennessee, Major-General
Grant, at Forts Henry and
Donelson; the Army of the Mississippi, Major-General Pope; and that
of General S. R. Curtis, in Southwest Missouri. He posted his chief of
staff, General Cullum, at Cairo, and me at
Paducah, chiefly to expedite and facilitate the important operations
then in progress up the Tennessee, and Cumberland Rivers.
Fort Donelson had surrendered to General Grant on the 16th of
February, and there must have been a good deal of confusion resulting
from the necessary care of the wounded, and disposition of prisoners,
common to all such occasions, and there was a real difficulty in
communicating between St. Louis and Fort Donelson.
General Buell had also followed up the rebel army, which had
retreated hastily from Bowling Green to and through Nashville, a city of
so much importance to the South, that it was at one time proposed as its
capital. Both Generals Grant and Buell looked to its capture as an event
of great importance. On the 21st General Grant sent General Smith with
his division to Clarksville, fifty miles above Donelson, toward
Nashville, and on the 27th went himself to Nashville to meet and confer
with General Buell, but returned to Donelson the next day.
Meantime, General Halleck at St. Louis must have felt that his armies
were getting away from him, and began to send dispatches to me at
Paducah, to be forwarded by boat, or by a rickety telegraph-line up to
Fort Henry, which lay entirely in a hostile country, and was
consequently always out of repair. On the 1st of March I received the
following dispatch, and forwarded it to General Grant, both by the
telegraph and boat:
To General GRANT,
Fort Henry
Transports will be sent you as soon as possible, to move your
column up the Tennessee River. The main object of this
expedition will be to destroy the railroad-bridge over Bear
Creek, near Eastport, Mississippi; and also the railroad
connections at Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt. It is thought
best that these objects be attempted in the order named. Strong
detachments of cavalry and light artillery, supported by
infantry, may by rapid movements reach these points from the
river, without any serious opposition.
Avoid any general engagements with strong forces. It will be
better to retreat than to risk a general battle. This should be
strongly impressed on the officers sent with expeditions from
the river. General C. F. Smith or some very discreet officer
should be selected for such commands. Having accomplished these
objects, or such of them as may be practicable, you will return
to Danville, and move on Paris.
Perhaps the troops sent to Jackson and Humbolt can reach Paris
by land as easily as to return to the transports. This must
depend on the character of the roads and the position of the
enemy. All telegraphic lines which can be reached must be cut.
The gunboats will accompany the transports for their protection.
Any loyal Tennesseeans who desire it, may be enlisted and
supplied with arms. Competent officers should be left to command
Forts Henry and Donelson in your absence. I have indicated in
general terms the object of this.
H. W. HALLECK, Major-General.
Again on the 2d:
Cairo, March 1, 1862
To General GRANT:
General Halleck, February 25th, telegraphs me: "General Grant
will send no more forces to Clarksville. General Smith's
division will come to Fort Henry, or a point higher up on the
Tennessee River; transports will also be collected at Paducah.
Two gunboats in Tennessee River with Grant. General Grant will
immediately have small garrisons detailed for Forts Henry and
Donelson, and all other forces made ready for the field"
From your letter of the 28th, I learn you were at Fort Donelson,
and General Smith at Nashville, from which I infer you could not
have received orders. Halleck's telegram of last night says:
"Who sent Smith's division to Nashville? I ordered it across to
the Tennessee, where they are wanted immediately. Order them
back. Send all spare transports up Tennessee to General Grant."
Evidently the general supposes you to be on the Tennessee. I am
sending all the transports I can find for you, reporting to
General Sherman for orders to go up the Cumberland for you, or,
if you march across to Fort Henry, then to send them up the
Tennessee.
G. W. CULLUM, Brigadier-General.
On the 4th came this dispatch:
To Major-General U.
S. GRANT
You will place Major-General C. F. Smith in command of
expedition, and remain yourself at Fort Henry. Why do you not
obey my orders to report strength and positions of your command?
H. W. HALLECK, Major-General.
Halleck was evidently working himself into a passion, but he was too
far from the seat of war to make due allowance for the actual state of
facts. General Grant had done so much, that General Halleck should have
been patient. Meantime, at Paducah, I was busy sending boats in every
direction—some under the orders of General Halleck, others of General
Cullum; others for General Grant, and still others for General Buell at
Nashville; and at the same time I was organizing out of the new troops
that were arriving at Paducah a division for myself when allowed to take
the field, which I had been promised by General Halleck. His purpose was
evidently to operate up the Tennessee River, to break up Bear Creek
Bridge and the railroad communications between the Mississippi and
Tennessee Rivers, and no doubt he was provoked that Generals Grant and
Smith had turned aside to Nashville. In the mean time several of the
gunboats, under Captain Phelps, United States Navy, had gone up the
Tennessee as far as Florence, and on their return had reported a strong
Union feeling among the people along the river. On the 10th of March,
having received the necessary orders from General Halleck, I embarked my
division at Paducah. It was composed of four brigades. The First,
commanded by Colonel S. G. Hicks, was composed of the Fortieth Illinois,
Forty-sixth Ohio, and Morton's Indiana Battery, on the boats Sallie
List, Golden Gate, J. B. Adams, and Lancaster.
The Second Brigade, Colonel D. Stuart, was composed of the
Fifty-fifth Illinois, Seventy-first Ohio, and Fifty-fourth Ohio;
embarked on the Hannibal, Universe, Hazel Dell, Cheeseman, and Prairie
Rose.
The Third Brigade, Colonel Hildebrand, was composed of the
Seventy-seventh Ohio, Fifty-seventh Ohio, and Fifty-third Ohio; embarked
on the Poland, Anglo-Saxon, Ohio No. Three, and Continental.
The Fourth Brigade, Colonel Buckland, was composed of the
Seventy-second Ohio, Forty-eighth Ohio, and Seventieth Ohio; embarked on
the Empress, Baltic, Shenango, and Marrengo.
We steamed up to Fort Henry, the river being high and in splendid
order. There I reported in person to General C. F. Smith, and by him was
ordered a few miles above, to the remains of the burned railroad bridge,
to await the rendezvous of the rest of his army. I had my headquarters
on the Continental.
Among my colonels I had a strange character—Thomas Worthington,
colonel of the Forty-sixth Ohio. He was a graduate of West Point, of the
class of 1827; was, therefore, older than General Halleck, General
Grant, or myself, and claimed to know more of war than all of us put
together. In ascending the river he did not keep his place in the
column, but pushed on and reached Savannah a day before the rest of my
division. When I reached that place, I found that Worthington had landed
his regiment, and was flying about giving orders, as though he were
commander-in-chief. I made him get back to his boat, and gave him to
understand that he must thereafter keep his place. General C. F. Smith
arrived about the 13th of March, with a large fleet of boats, containing
Hurlbut's division, Lew. Wallace's division, and that of himself, then
commanded by Brigadier-General W. H. L. Wallace.
General Smith sent for me to meet him on his boat, and ordered me to
push on under escort of the two gunboats, Lexington and Tyler, commanded
by Captains Gwin and Shirk, United States Navy. I was to land at some
point below Eastport, and make a break of the Memphis & Charleston
Railroad, between Tuscumbia and Corinth. General Smith was quite unwell,
and was suffering from his leg, which was swollen and very sore, from a
mere abrasion in stepping into a small boat. This actually mortified,
and resulted in his death about a month after, viz., April 25, 1862. He
was adjutant of the Military Academy during the early part of my career
there, and afterward commandant of cadets. He was a very handsome and
soldierly man, of great experience, and at Donelson had acted with so
much personal bravery that to him many attributed the success of the
assault.
I immediately steamed up the Tennessee River, following the two
gunboats, and, in passing Pittsburg Landing, was told by Captain Gwin
that, on his former trip up the river, he had found a rebel regiment of
cavalry posted there, and that it was the usual landing-place for the
people about Corinth, distant thirty miles. I sent word back to General
Smith that, if we were detained up the river, he ought to post some
troops at Pittsburg Landing. We went on up the river cautiously, till we
saw Eastport and Chickasaw, both of which were occupied by rebel
batteries and a small rebel force of infantry.
We then dropped back quietly to the mouth of Yellow River, a few
miles below, whence led a road to Burnsville, a place on the Memphis &
Charleston road, where were the company's repair-shops. We at once
commenced disembarking the command: first the cavalry, which started at
once for Burnsville, with orders to tear up the railroad-track, and burn
the depots, shops, etc; and I followed with the infantry and artillery
as fast as they were disembarked. It was raining very hard at the time.
Daylight found us about six miles out, where we met the cavalry
returning. They had made numerous attempts to cross the streams, which
had become so swollen that mere brooks covered the whole bottom; and my
aide-de-camp, Sanger, whom I had dispatched with the cavalry, reported
the loss, by drowning, of several of the men. The rain was pouring in
torrents, and reports from the rear came that the river was rising very
fast, and that, unless we got back to our boats soon, the bottom would
be simply impassable. There was no alternative but to regain our boats;
and even this was so difficult, that we had to unharness the
artillery-horses, and drag the guns under water through the bayous, to
reach the bank of the river. Once more embarked, I concluded to drop
down to Pittsburg Landing, and to make the attempt from there. During
the night of the 14th, we dropped down to Pittsburg Landing, where I
found Hurlbut's division in boats. Leaving my command there, I steamed
down to Savannah, and reported to General Smith in person, who saw in
the flooded Tennessee the full truth of my report; and he then
instructed me to disembark my own division, and that of General Hurlbut,
at Pittsburg Landing; to take positions well back, and to leave room for
his whole army; telling me that he would soon come up in person, and
move out in force to make the lodgment on the railroad, contemplated by
General Halleck's orders.
Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson, of General C. F. Smith's, or rather
General Halleck's, staff, returned with me, and on the 16th of March we
disembarked and marched out about ten miles toward Corinth, to a place
called Monterey or Pea Ridge, where the rebels had a cavalry regiment,
which of course decamped on our approach, but from the people we learned
that trains were bringing large masses of men from every direction into
Corinth. McPherson and I reconnoitred the ground well, and then returned
to our boats. On the 18th, Hurlbut disembarked his division and took
post about a mile and a half out, near where the roads branched, one
leading to Corinth and the other toward Hamburg. On the 19th I
disembarked my division, and took post about three miles back, three of
the brigades covering the roads to Purdy and Corinth, and the other
brigade (Stuart's) temporarily at a place on the Hamburg Road, near Lick
Creek Ford, where the Bark Road came into the Hamburg Road. Within a few
days, Prentiss's division arrived and camped on my left, and afterward
McClernand's and W. H. L. Wallace's divisions, which formed a line to
our rear. Lew Wallace's division remained on the north side of Snake
Creek, on a road leading from Savannah or Cramp's Landing to Purdy.
General C. F. Smith remained back at Savannah, in chief command, and
I was only responsible for my own division. I kept pickets well out on
the roads, and made myself familiar with all the ground inside and
outside my lines. My personal staff was composed of Captain J. H.
Hammond, assistant adjutant-general; Surgeons Hartshorn and L'Hommedieu;
Lieutenant Colonels Hascall and Sanger, inspector-generals; Lieutenants
McCoy and John Taylor, aides-de-camp. We were all conscious that the
enemy was collecting at Corinth, but in what force we could not know,
nor did we know what was going on behind us. On the 17th of March,
General U. S. Grant was restored to the command of all the troops up the
Tennessee River, by reason of General Smith's extreme illness, and
because he had explained to General Halleck satisfactorily his conduct
after Donelson; and he too made his headquarters at Savannah, but
frequently visited our camps. I always acted on the supposition that we
were an invading army; that our purpose was to move forward in force,
make a lodgment on the Memphis & Charleston road, and thus repeat the
grand tactics of Fort Donelson, by separating the rebels in the interior
from those at Memphis and on the Mississippi River. We did not fortify
our camps against an attack, because we had no orders to do so, and
because such a course would have made our raw men timid. The position
was naturally strong, with Snake Creek on our right, a deep, bold
stream, with a confluent (Owl Creek) to our right front; and Lick Creek,
with a similar confluent, on our left, thus narrowing the space over
which we could be attacked to about a mile and a half or two miles.
At a later period of the war, we could have rendered this position
impregnable in one night, but at this time we did not do it, and it may
be it is well we did not. From about the 1st of April we were conscious
that the rebel cavalry in our front was getting bolder and more saucy;
and on Friday, the 4th of April, it dashed down and carried off one of
our picket-guards, composed of an officer and seven men, posted a couple
of miles out on the Corinth road. Colonel Buckland sent a company to its
relief, then followed himself with a regiment, and, fearing lest he
might be worsted, I called out his whole brigade and followed some four
or five miles, when the cavalry in advance encountered artillery. I
then, after dark, drew back to our lines, and reported the fact by
letter to General Grant, at Savannah; but thus far we had not positively
detected the presence of infantry, for cavalry regiments generally had a
couple of guns along, and I supposed the guns that opened on the evening of Friday, April 4th, belonged to the cavalry that was hovering
along our whole front.
Saturday passed in our camps without any unusual event, the weather
being wet and mild, and the roads back to the steamboat landing being
heavy with mud; but on Sunday morning, the 6th, early, there was a good
deal of picket-firing, and I got breakfast, rode out along my lines,
and, about four hundred yards to the front of Appler's regiment,
received from some bushes in a ravine to the left front a volley which
killed my orderly, Holliday. About the same time I saw the rebel lines
of battle in front coming down on us as far as the eye could reach. All
my troops were in line of battle, ready, and the ground was favorable to
us. I gave the necessary orders to the battery (Waterhouse's) attached
to Hildebrand's brigade, and cautioned the men to reserve their fire
till the rebels had crossed the ravine of Owl Creek, and had begun the
ascent; also, sent staff-officers to notify Generals McClernand and
Prentiss of the coming blow. Indeed, McClernand had already sent three
regiments to the support of my left flank, and they were in position
when the onset came.
In a few minutes the battle of "Shiloh" began with extreme fury, and
lasted two days. Its history has been well given, and it has been made
the subject of a great deal of controversy. Hildebrand's brigade was
soon knocked to pieces, but Buckland's and McDowell's kept their
organization throughout. Stuart's was driven back to the river, and did
not join me in person till the second day of the battle. I think my
several reports of that battle are condensed and good, made on the spot,
when all the names and facts were fresh in my memory, and are herewith
given entire:
HEADQUARTERS FIRST
DIVISION
PITTSBURG LANDING, March 17, 1862
Captain Wm. McMICHAEL, Assistant Adjutant-General to General C.
F SMITH, Savannah, Tennessee.
SIR: Last night I dispatched a party of cavalry, at 6 p.m.,
under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Heath, Fifth Ohio
Cavalry, for a strong reconnoissance, if possible, to be
converted into an attack upon the Memphis road. The command got
off punctually, followed at twelve o'clock at night by the First
Brigade of my division, commanded by Colonel McDowell, the other
brigades to follow in order.
About one at night the cavalry returned, reporting the road
occupied in force by the enemy, with whose advance-guard they
skirmished, driving them back—about a mile, taking two
prisoners, and having their chief guide, Thomas Maxwell, Esq.,
and three men of the Fourth Illinois wounded.
Inclosed please find the report of Lieutenant-Colonel Heath;
also a copy of his instructions, and the order of march. As soon
as the cavalry returned, I saw that an attempt on the road was
frustrated, and accordingly have placed McDowell's brigade to
our right front, guarding the pass of Snake Creek; Stuart's
brigade to the left front, to watch the pass of Lick Creek; and
I shall this morning move directly out on the Corinth road,
about eight miles to or toward Pea Ridge, which is a key-point
to the southwest.
General Hurlbut's division will be landed to-day, and the
artillery and infantry disposed so as to defend Pittsburg,
leaving my division entire for any movement by land or water.
As near as I can learn, there are five regiments of rebel
infantry at Purdy; at Corinth, and distributed along the
railroad to Inca, are probably thirty thousand men; but my
information from prisoners is very indistinct. Every road and
path is occupied by the enemy's cavalry, whose, orders seem to
be, to fire a volley, retire, again fire and retire. The force
on the Purdy road attacked and driven by Major Bowman yesterday,
was about sixty strong. That encountered last night on the
Corinth road was about five companies of Tennessee cavalry, sent
from Purdy about 2 p.m. yesterday.
I hear there is a force of two regiments on Pea Ridge, at the
point where the Purdy and Corinth roads come together.
I am satisfied we cannot reach the Memphis & Charleston road
without a considerable engagement, which is prohibited by
General Halleck's instructions, so that I will be governed by
your orders of yesterday, to occupy Pittsburg strongly, extend
the pickets so as to include a semicircle of three miles, and
push a strong reconnoissance as far out as Lick Creek and Pea
Ridge.
I will send down a good many boats to-day, to be employed as you
may direct; and would be obliged if you would send a couple of
thousand sacks of corn, as much hay as you can possibly spare,
and, if possible, a barge of coal.
I will send a steamboat under care of the gunboat, to collect
corn from cribs on the river-bank.
I have the honor to be your obedient servant,
W. T. SHERMAN,
Brigadier-General, commanding First Division.
HEADQUARTERS,
STEAMBOAT CONTINENTAL, Pittsburg, March 18, 1882.
Captain RAWLINS, Assistant Adjutant-General to General GRANT.
SIR: The division surgeon having placed some one hundred or
more sick on board the Fanny Bullitt, I have permitted her to
take them to Savannah. There is neither house nor building of
any kind that can be used for a hospital here.
I hope to receive an order to establish floating hospitals, but
in the mean time, by the advise of the surgeon, allow these sick
men to leave. Let me hope that it will meet your approbation.
The order for debarkation came while General Sherman was absent
with three brigades, and no men are left to move the effects of
these brigades.
The landing, too, is small, with scarcely any chance to increase
it; therefore there is a great accumulation of boats. Colonel
McArthur has arrived, and is now cutting a landing for himself.
General Sherman will return this evening. I am obliged to
transgress, and write myself in the mean time,
Respectfully your obedient servant,
J. H. HAMMOND, Assistant Adjutant-General.
P. S—4 p.m.—Just back; have been half-way to Corinth and to
Purdy. All right. Have just read this letter, and approve all
but floating hospitals; regimental surgeons can take care of all
sick, except chronic cases, which can always be sent down to
Paducah.
Magnificent plain for camping and drilling, and a military point
of great strength. The enemy has felt us twice, at great loss
and demoralization; will report at length this evening; am now
much worn out.
W. T. SHERMAN, Brigadier-General.
HEADQUARTERS FIRST
DIVISION
Pittsburg Landing, March 19, 1862.
Captain RAWLINS, Assistant Adjutant-General to General GRANT,
Savannah, Tennessee.
SIR: I have just returned from an extensive reconnoissance
toward Corinth and Purdy, and am strongly impressed with the
importance of this position, both for its land advantages and
its strategic position. The ground itself admits of easy defense
by a small command, and yet affords admirable camping-ground for
a hundred thousand men. I will as soon as possible make or cause
to be made a topographical sketch of the position. The only
drawback is that, at this stage of water, the space for landing
is contracted too much for the immense fleet now here
discharging.
I will push the loading and unloading of boats, but suggest that
you send at once (Captain Dodd, if possible) the best
quartermaster you can, that he may control and organize this
whole matter. I have a good commissary, and will keep as few
provisions afloat as possible. Yours, etc.,
W. T. SHERMAN, Brigadier-General commanding.
HEADQUARTERS
SHERMAN'S DIVISION
Camp Shiloh, near Pittsburg Landing, Tennessee, April 2,
1862 Captain J. A. RAWLINS, Assistant Adjutant-General to
General GRANT.
SIR: In obedience to General Grant's instructions of March
31st, with one section of Captain Muench's Minnesota Battery,
two twelve-pound howitzers, a detachment of Fifth Ohio Cavalry
of one hundred and fifty men, under Major Ricker, and two
battalions of infantry from the Fifty-seventh and
Seventy-seventh Ohio, under the command of Colonels Hildebrand
and Mungen, I marched to the river, and embarked on the steamers
Empress and Tecumseh. The gunboat Cairo did not arrive at
Pittsburg, until after midnight, and at 6 p.m. Captain Bryant,
commanding the gunboat, notified me that he was ready to proceed
up the river. I followed, keeping the transports within about
three hundred yards of the gunboat. About 1 p.m., the Cairo
commenced shelling the battery above the mouth of Indian Creek,
but elicited no reply. She proceeded up the river steadily and
cautiously, followed close by the Tyler and Lexington, all
throwing shells at the points where, on former visits of the
gunboats, enemy's batteries were found. In this order all
followed, till it was demonstrated that all the enemy's
batteries, including that at Chickasaw, were abandoned.
I ordered the battalion of infantry under Colonel Hildebrand to
disembark at Eastport, and with the other battalion proceeded to
Chickasaw and landed. The battery at this point had evidently
been abandoned some time, and consisted of the remains of an old
Indian mound, partly washed away by the river, which had been
fashioned into a two-gun battery, with a small magazine. The
ground to its rear had evidently been overflowed during the late
freshet, and led to the removal of the guns to Eastport, where
the batteries were on high, elevated ground, accessible at all
seasons from the country to the rear.
Upon personal inspection, I attach little importance to
Chickasaw as a military position. The people, who had fled
during the approach of the gunboats, returned to the village,
and said the place had been occupied by one Tennessee regiment
and a battery of artillery from Pensacola. After remaining at
Chickasaw some hours, all the boats dropped back to Eastport,
not more than a mile below, and landed there. Eastport Landing
during the late freshet must have been about twelve feet under
water, but at the present stage the landing is the best I have
seen on the Tennessee River.
The levee is clear of trees or snags, and a hundred boats could
land there without confusion.
The soil is of sand and gravel, and very firm. The road back is
hard, and at a distance of about four hundred yards from the
water begin the gravel hills of the country. The infantry scouts
sent out by Colonel Hildebrand found the enemy's cavalry
mounted, and watching the Inca road, about two miles back of
Eastport. The distance to Inca is only eight miles, and Inca is
the nearest point and has the best road by which the Charleston
& Memphis Railroad can be reached. I could obtain no certain
information as to the strength of the enemy there, but am
satisfied that it would have been folly to have attempted it
with my command. Our object being to dislodge the enemy from the
batteries recently erected near Eastport, and this being
attained, I have returned, and report the river to be clear to
and beyond Chickasaw.
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
W. T. SHERMAN,
Brigadier-General commanding Division.
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH
DIVISION
CAMP SHILOH, April 5, 1862.
Captain J. A. RAWLINS, Assistant Adjutant-General, District of
Western Tennessee.
SIR: I have the honor to report that yesterday, about 3 p.m.,
the lieutenant commanding and seven men of the advance pickets
imprudently advanced from their posts and were captured. I
ordered Major Ricker, of the Fifth Ohio Cavalry, to proceed
rapidly to the picket-station, ascertain the truth, and act
according to circumstances. He reached the station, found the
pickets had been captured as reported, and that a company of
infantry sent by the brigade commander had gone forward in
pursuit of some cavalry. He rapidly advanced some two miles, and
found them engaged, charged the enemy, and drove them along the
Ridge road, till he met and received three discharges of
artillery, when he very properly wheeled under cover, and
returned till he met me.
As soon as I heard artillery, I advanced with two regiments of
infantry, and took position, and remained until the scattered
companies of infantry and cavalry had returned. This was after
night.
I infer that the enemy is in some considerable force at Pea
Ridge, that yesterday morning they crossed a brigade of two
regiments of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and one battery
of field-artillery, to the ridge on which the Corinth road lies.
They halted the infantry and artillery at a point abort five
miles in my front, sent a detachment to the lane of General
Meeks, on the north of Owl Creek, and the cavalry down toward
our camp. This cavalry captured a part of our advance pickets,
and afterward engaged the two companies of Colonel Buckland's
regiment, as described by him in his report herewith inclosed.
Our cavalry drove them back upon their artillery and Infantry,
killing many, and bringing off ten prisoners, all of the First
Alabama Cavalry, whom I send to you.
We lost of the pickets one first-lieutenant and seven men of the
Ohio Seventieth Infantry (list inclosed); one major, one
lieutenant, and one private of the Seventy-second Ohio, taken
prisoners; eight privates wounded (names in full, embraced in
report of Colonel Buckland, inclosed herewith).
We took ten prisoners, and left two rebels wounded and many
killed on the field.
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
W. T. SHERMAN,
Brigadier-General, commanding Division.
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH
DIVISION
Camp Shiloh, April 10, 1862. Captain J. A. RAWLINS, Assistant
Adjutant-General to General GRANT.
SIR: I had the honor to report that, on Friday the 4th inst.,
the enemy's cavalry drove in our pickets, posted about a mile
and a half in advance of my centre, on the main Corinth road,
capturing one first-lieutenant and seven men; that I caused a
pursuit by the cavalry of my division, driving them back about
five miles, and killing many. On Saturday the enemy's cavalry
was again very bold, coming well down to our front; yet I did
not believe they designed any thing but a strong demonstration.
On Sunday morning early, the 6th inst., the enemy drove our
advance-guard back on the main body, when I ordered under arms
all my division, and sent word to General McClernand, asking him
to support my left; to General Prentiss, giving him notice that
the enemy was in our front in force, and to General Hurlbut,
asking him to support General Prentiss. At that time—7 a.m.—my
division was arranged as follows:
First Brigade, composed of the Sixth Iowa, Colonel J. A.
McDowell;
Fortieth Illinois, Colonel Hicks; Forty-sixth Ohio, Colonel
Worthington; and the Morton battery, Captain Behr, on the
extreme right, guarding the bridge on the Purdy road over Owl
Creek.
Second Brigade, composed of the Fifty-fifth Illinois, Colonel D.
Stuart; the Fifty-fourth Ohio, Colonel T. Kilby Smith; and the
Seventy-first Ohio, Colonel Mason, on the extreme left, guarding
the ford over Lick Creek.
Third Brigade, composed of the Seventy-seventh Ohio, Colonel
Hildebrand; the Fifty-third Ohio, Colonel Appler; and the
Fifty-seventh Ohio, Colonel Mungen, on the left of the Corinth
road, its right resting on Shiloh meeting-house.
Fourth Brigade, composed of the Seventy-second Ohio, Colonel
Buckland; the Forty-eighth Ohio, Colonel Sullivan; and the
Seventieth Ohio, Colonel Cookerill, on the right of the Corinth
road, its left resting on Shiloh meeting-house.
Two batteries of artillery—Taylor's and Waterhouse's—were
posted, the former at Shiloh, and the latter on a ridge to the
left, with a front-fire over open ground between Mungen's and
Appler's regiments. The cavalry, eight companies of the Fourth
Illinois, under Colonel Dickey, were posted in a large open
field to the left and rear of Shiloh meeting-house, which I
regarded as the centre of my position.
Shortly after 7 a.m., with my entire staff, I rode along a
portion of our front, and when in the open field before Appler's
regiment, the enemy's pickets opened a brisk fire upon my party,
killing my orderly, Thomas D. Holliday, of Company H, Second
Illinois Cavalry. The fire came from the bushes which line a
small stream that rises in the field in front of Appler's camp,
and flows to the north along my whole front.
This valley afforded the enemy partial cover; but our men were
so posted as to have a good fire at them as they crossed the
valley and ascended the rising ground on our side.
About 8 a.m. I saw the glistening bayonets of heavy masses of
infantry to our left front in the woods beyond the small stream
alluded to, and became satisfied for the first time that the
enemy designed a determined attack on our whole camp.
All the regiments of my division were then in line of battle at
their proper posts. I rode to Colonel Appler, and ordered him to
hold his ground at all hazards, as he held the left flank of our
first line of battle, and I informed him that he had a good
battery on his right, and strong support to his rear. General
McClernand had promptly and energetically responded to my
request, and had sent me three regiments which were posted to
protect Waterhouse's battery and the left flank of my line.
The battle opened by the enemy's battery, in the woods to our
front, throwing shells into our camp. Taylor's and Waterhouse's
batteries promptly responded, and I then observed heavy
battalions of infantry passing obliquely to the left, across the
open field in Appler's front; also, other columns advancing
directly upon my division. Our infantry and artillery opened
along the whole line, and the battle became general. Other heavy
masses of the enemy's forces kept passing across the field to
our left, and directing their course on General Prentiss. I saw
at once that the enemy designed to pass my left flank, and fall
upon Generals McClernand and Prentiss, whose line of camps was
almost parallel with the Tennessee River, and about two miles
back from it. Very soon the sound of artillery and musketry
announced that General Prentiss was engaged; and about 9 A. M. I
judged that he was falling back. About this time Appler's
regiment broke in disorder, followed by Mungen's regiment, and
the enemy pressed forward on Waterhouse's battery thereby
exposed.
The three Illinois regiments in immediate support of this
battery stood for some time; but the enemy's advance was so
vigorous, and the fire so severe, that when Colonel Raith, of
the Forty-third Illinois, received a severe wound and fell from
his horse, his regiment and the others manifested disorder, and
the enemy got possession of three guns of this (Waterhouse's)
battery. Although our left was thus turned, and the enemy was
pressing our whole line, I deemed Shiloh so important, that I
remained by it and renewed my orders to Colonels McDowell and
Buckland to hold their ground; and we did hold these positions
until about 10 a.m., when the enemy had got his artillery to the
rear of our left flank and some change became absolutely
necessary. Two regiments of Hildebrand's brigade—Appler's and
Mungen's—had already disappeared to the rear, and Hildebrand's
own regiment was in disorder. I therefore gave orders for
Taylor's battery—still at Shiloh—to fall back as far as the
Purdy and Hamburg road, and for McDowell and Buckland to adopt
that road as their new line. I rode across the angle and met
Behr's battery at the cross-roads, and ordered it immediately to
come into battery, action right. Captain Behr gave the order,
but he was almost immediately shot from his horse, when drivers
and gunners fled in disorder, carrying off the caissons, and
abandoning five out of six guns, without firing a shot. The
enemy pressed on, gaining this battery, and we were again forced
to choose a new line of defense. Hildebrand's brigade had
substantially disappeared from the field, though he himself
bravely remained. McDowell's and Buckland's brigades maintained
their organizations, and were conducted by my aides, so as to
join on General McClernand's right, thus abandoning my original
camps and line. This was about 10 1/2 a.m., at which time the
enemy had made a furious attack on General McClernand's whole
front. He straggled most determinedly, but, finding him pressed,
I moved McDowell's brigade directly against the left flank of
the enemy, forced him back some distance, and then directed the
men to avail themselves of every cover-trees, fallen timber, and
a wooded valley to our right. We held this position for four
long hours, sometimes gaining and at others losing ground;
General McClernand and myself acting in perfect concert, and
struggling to maintain this line. While we were so hard pressed,
two Iowa regiments approached from the rear, but could not be
brought up to the severe fire that was raging in our front, and
General Grant, who visited us on that ground, will remember our
situation about 3 p.m.; but about 4 p.m. it was evident that
Hurlbut's line had been driven back to the river; and knowing
that General Lew Wallace was coming with reinforcements from
Cramp's Landing, General McClernand and I, on consultation,
selected a new line of defense, with its right covering a bridge
by which General Wallace had to approach. We fell back as well
as we could, gathering in addition to our own such scattered
forces as we could find, and formed the new line.
During this change the enemy's cavalry charged us, but were
handsomely repulsed by the Twenty-ninth Illinois Regiment. The
Fifth Ohio Battery, which had come up, rendered good service in
holding the enemy in check for some time, and Major Taylor also
came up with another battery and got into position, just in time
to get a good flank-fire upon the enemy's column, as he pressed
on General McClernand's right, checking his advance; when
General McClernand's division made a fine charge on the enemy
and drove him back into the ravines to our front and right. I
had a clear field, about two hundred yards wide, in my immediate
front, and contented myself with keeping the enemy's infantry at
that distance during the rest of the day. In this position we
rested for the night.
My command had become decidedly of a mixed character. Buckland's
brigade was the only one that retained its organization. Colonel
Hildebrand was personally there, but his brigade was not.
Colonel McDowell had been severely injured by a fall off his
horse, and had gone to the river, and the three regiments of his
brigade were not in line. The Thirteenth Missouri, Colonel
Crafts J. Wright, had reported to me on the field, and fought
well, retaining its regimental organization; and it formed a
part of my line during Sunday night and all Monday. Other
fragments of regiments and companies had also fallen into my
division, and acted with it during the remainder of the battle.
General Grant and Buell visited me in our bivouac that evening,
and from them I learned the situation of affairs on other parts
of the field. General Wallace arrived from Crump's Landing
shortly after dark, and formed his line to my right rear. It
rained hard during the night, but our men were in good spirits,
lay on their arms, being satisfied with such bread and meat as
could be gathered at the neighboring camps, and determined to
redeem on Monday the losses of Sunday.
At daylight of Monday I received General Grant's orders to
advance and recapture our original camps. I dispatched several
members of my staff to bring up all the men they could find,
especially the brigade of Colonel Stuart, which had been
separated from the division all the day before; and at the
appointed time the division, or rather what remained of it, with
the Thirteenth Missouri and other fragments, moved forward and
reoccupied the ground on the extreme right of General
McClernand's camp, where we attracted the fire of a battery
located near Colonel McDowell's former headquarters. Here I
remained, patiently waiting for the sound of General Buell's
advance upon the main Corinth road. About 10 a.m. the heavy
firing in that direction, and its steady approach, satisfied me;
and General Wallace being on our right flank with his
well-conducted division, I led the head of my column to General
McClernand's right, formed line of battle, facing south, with
Buckland's brigade directly across the ridge, and Stuart's
brigade on its right in the woods; and thus advanced, steadily
and slowly, under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery. Taylor
had just got to me from the rear, where he had gone for
ammunition, and brought up three guns, which I ordered into
position, to advance by hand firing. These guns belonged to
Company A, Chicago Light Artillery, commanded by Lieutenant P.
P. Wood, and did most excellent service. Under cover of their
fire, we advanced till we reached the point where the Corinth
road crosses the line of McClernand's camp, and here I saw for
the first time the well-ordered and compact columns of General
Buell's Kentucky forces, whose soldierly movements at once gave
confidence to our newer and less disciplined men. Here I saw
Willich's regiment advance upon a point of water-oaks and
thicket, behind which I knew the enemy was in great strength,
and enter it in beautiful style. Then arose the severest
musketry-fire I ever heard, and lasted some twenty minutes, when
this splendid regiment had to fall back. This green point of
timber is about five hundred yards east of Shiloh meeting-home,
and it was evident here was to be the struggle. The enemy could
also be seen forming his lines to the south. General McClernand
sending to me for artillery, I detached to him the three guns of
Wood's battery, with which he speedily drove them back, and,
seeing some others to the rear, I sent one of my staff to bring
them forward, when, by almost providential decree, they proved
to be two twenty-four pound howitzers belonging to McAlister's
battery, and served as well as guns ever could be.
This was about 2 p.m. The enemy had one battery close by Shiloh,
and another near the Hamburg road, both pouring grape and
canister upon any column of troops that advanced upon the green
point of water-oaks. Willich's regiment had been repulsed, but a
whole brigade of McCook's division advanced beautifully,
deployed, and entered this dreaded wood. I ordered my second
brigade (then commanded by Colonel T. Kilby Smith, Colonel Smart
being wounded) to form on its right, and my fourth brigade,
Colonel Buckland, on its right; all to advance abreast with this
Kentucky brigade before mentioned, which I afterward found to be
Rousseau's brigade of McCook's division. I gave personal
direction to the twenty-four pounder guns, whose well-directed
fire first silenced the enemy's guns to the left, and afterward
at the Shiloh meeting-house.
Rousseau's brigade moved in splendid order steadily to the
front, sweeping every thing before it, and at 4 p.m. we stood
upon the ground of our original front line; and the enemy was in
full retreat. I directed my several brigades to resume at once
their original camps.
Several times during the battle, cartridges gave out; but
General Grant had thoughtfully kept a supply coming from the
rear. When I appealed to regiments to stand fast, although out
of cartridges, I did so because, to retire a regiment for any
cause, has a bad effect on others. I commend the Fortieth
Illinois and Thirteenth Missouri for thus holding their ground
under heavy fire, although their cartridge-boxes were empty.
I am ordered by General Grant to give personal credit where I
think it is due, and censure where I think it merited. I concede
that General McCook's splendid division from Kentucky drove back
the enemy along the Corinth road, which was the great centre of
this field of battle, where Beauregard commanded in person,
supported by Bragg's, Polk's, and Breckenridge's divisions. I
think Johnston was killed by exposing himself in front of his
troops, at the time of their attack on Buckland's brigade on
Sunday morning; although in this I may be mistaken.
My division was made up of regiments perfectly new, nearly all
having received their muskets for the first time at Paducah.
None of them had ever been under fire or beheld heavy columns of
an enemy bearing down on them as they did on last Sunday.
To expect of them the coolness and steadiness of older troops
would be wrong. They knew not the value of combination and
organization. When individual fears seized them, the first
impulse was to get away. My third brigade did break much too
soon, and I am not yet advised where they were during Sunday
afternoon and Monday morning. Colonel Hildebrand, its commander,
was as cool as any man I ever saw, and no one could have made
stronger efforts to hold his men to their places than he did. He
kept his own regiment with individual exceptions in hand, an
hour after Appler's and Mungen's regiments had left their proper
field of action. Colonel Buckland managed his brigade well. I
commend him to your notice as a cool, intelligent, and judicious
gentleman, needing only confidence and experience, to make a
good commander. His subordinates, Colonels Sullivan and
Cockerill, behaved with great gallantry; the former receiving a
severe wound on Sunday, and yet commanding and holding his
regiment well in hand all day, and on Monday, until his right
arm was broken by a shot. Colonel Cookerill held a larger
proportion of his men than any colonel in my division, and was
with me from first to last.
Colonel J. A. McDowell, commanding the first brigade, held his
ground on Sunday, till I ordered him to fall back, which he did
in line of battle; and when ordered, he conducted the attack on
the enemy's left in good style. In falling back to the next
position, he was thrown from his horse and injured, and his
brigade was not in position on Monday morning. His subordinates,
Colonels Hicks and Worthington, displayed great personal
courage. Colonel Hicks led his regiment in the attack on Sunday,
and received a wound, which it is feared may prove mortal. He is
a brave and gallant gentleman, and deserves well of his country.
Lieutenant-Colonel Walcutt, of the Ohio Forty-sixth, was
severely wounded on Sunday, and has been disabled ever since. My
second brigade, Colonel Stuart, was detached nearly two miles
from my headquarters. He had to fight his own battle on Sunday,
against superior numbers, as the enemy interposed between him
and General Prentiss early in the day. Colonel Stuart was
wounded severely, and yet reported for duty on Monday morning,
but was compelled to leave during the day, when the command
devolved on Colonel T. Kilby Smith, who was always in the
thickest of the, fight, and led the brigade handsomely.
I have not yet received Colonel Stuart's report of the
operations of his brigade during the time he was detached, and
must therefore forbear to mention names. Lieutenant-Colonel
Kyle, of the Seventy-first, was mortally wounded on Sunday, but
the regiment itself I did not see, as only a small fragment of
it was with the brigade when it joined the division on Monday
morning. Great credit is due the fragments of men of the
disordered regiments who kept in the advance. I observed and
noticed them, but until the brigadiers and colonels make their
reports, I cannot venture to name individuals, but will in due
season notice all who kept in our front line, as well as those
who preferred to keep back near the steamboat-landing. I will
also send a full list of the killed, wounded, and missing, by
name, rank, company, and regiment. At present I submit the
result in figures:
[Summary of General Sherman's
detailed table:]
Killed ........................
|
318 |
Wounded .......................
|
1275 |
Missing .......................
|
441 |
Aggregate loss in the division:
|
2034 |
The enemy captured seven of our guns on Sunday, but on Monday
we recovered seven; not the identical guns we had lost, but
enough in number to balance the account. At the time of
recovering our camps our men were so fatigued that we could not
follow the retreating masses of the enemy; but on the following
day I followed up with Buckland's and Hildebrand's brigade for
six miles, the result of which I have already reported.
Of my personal staff, I can only speak with praise and thanks. I
think they smelled as much gunpowder and heard as many
cannon-balls and bullets as must satisfy their ambition. Captain
Hammond, my chief of staff, though in feeble health, was very
active in rallying broken troops, encouraging the steadfast and
aiding to form the lines of defense and attack. I recommend him
to your notice. Major Sanger's intelligence, quick perception,
and rapid execution, were of very great value to me, especially
in bringing into line the batteries that cooperated so
efficiently in our movements. Captains McCoy and Dayton,
aides-de-camp, were with me all the time, carrying orders, and
acting with coolness, spirit, and courage. To Surgeon Hartshorne
and Dr. L'Hommedieu hundreds of wounded men are indebted for the
kind and excellent treatment received on the field of battle and
in the various temporary hospitals created along the line of our
operations. They worked day and night, and did not rest till all
the wounded of our own troops as well as of the enemy were in
safe and comfortable shelter. To Major Taylor, chief of
artillery, I feel under deep obligations, for his good sense and
judgment in managing the batteries, on which so much depended. I
inclose his report and indorse his recommendations. The cavalry
of my command kept to the rear, and took little part in the
action; but it would have been madness to have exposed horses to
the musketry-fire under which we were compelled to remain from
Sunday at 8 a.m. till Monday at 4 p.m. Captain Kossack, of the
engineers, was with me all the time, and was of great
assistance. I inclose his sketch of the battlefield, which is
the best I have seen, and which will enable you to see the
various positions occupied by my division, as well as of the
others that participated in the battle. I will also send in,
during the day, the detailed reports of my brigadiers and
colonels, and will indorse them with such remarks as I deem
proper.
I am, with much respect, your obedient servant,
W. T. SHERMAN,
Brigadier-General commanding Fifth Division.
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH
DIVISION
Tuesday, April 8,1862
Sir: With the cavalry placed at my command and two brigades
of my fatigued troops, I went this morning out on the Corinth
road. One after another of the abandoned camps of the enemy
lined the roads, with hospital flags for their protection; at
all we found more or less wounded and dead men. At the forks of
the road I found the head of General T. J. Wood's division of
Buell's Army. I ordered cavalry to examine both roads leading
toward Corinth, and found the enemy on both. Colonel Dickey, of
the Fourth Illinois Cavalry, asking for reenforcements, I
ordered General Wood to advance the head of his column
cautiously on the left-hand road, while I conducted the head of
the third brigade of my division up the right-hand road. About
half a mile from the forks was a clear field, through which the
road passed, and, immediately beyond, a space of some two
hundred yards of fallen timber, and beyond that an extensive
rebel camp. The enemy's cavalry could be seen in this camp;
after reconnoisance, I ordered the two advance companies of the
Ohio Seventy-seventh, Colonel Hildebrand, to deploy forward as
skirmishers, and the regiment itself forward into line, with an
interval of one hundred yards. In this order we advanced
cautiously until the skirmishers were engaged. Taking it for
granted this disposition would clear the camp, I held Colonel
Dickey's Fourth Illinois Cavalry ready for the charge. The
enemy's cavalry came down boldly at a charge, led by General
Forrest in person, breaking through our line of skirmishers;
when the regiment of infantry, without cause, broke, threw away
their muskets, and fled. The ground was admirably adapted for a
defense of infantry against cavalry, being miry and covered with
fallen timber.
As the regiment of infantry broke, Dickey's Cavalry began to
discharge their carbines, and fell into disorder. I instantly
sent orders to the rear for the brigade to form line of battle,
which was promptly executed. The broken infantry and cavalry
rallied on this line, and, as the enemy's cavalry came to it,
our cavalry in turn charged and drove them from the field. I
advanced the entire brigade over the same ground and sent
Colonel Dickey's cavalry a mile farther on the road. On
examining the ground which had been occupied by the
Seventy-seventh Ohio, we found fifteen of our men dead and about
twenty-five wounded. I sent for wagons and had all the wounded
carried back to camp, and caused the dead to be buried, also the
whole rebel camp to be destroyed.
Here we found much ammunition for field-pieces, which was
destroyed; also two caissons, and a general hospital, with about
two hundred and eighty Confederate wounded, and about fifty of
our own wounded men. Not having the means of bringing them off,
Colonel Dickey, by my orders, took a surrender, signed by the
medical director (Lyle) and by all the attending surgeons, and a
pledge to report themselves to you as prisoners of war; also a
pledge that our wounded should be carefully attended to, and
surrendered to us to-morrow as soon as ambulances could go out.
I inclose this written document, and request that you cause
wagons or ambulances for our wounded to be sent to-morrow, and
that wagons' be sent to bring in the many tents belonging to us
which are pitched along the road for four miles out. I did not
destroy them, because I knew the enemy could not move them. The
roads are very bad, and are strewed with abandoned wagons,
ambulances, and limber-boxes. The enemy has succeeded in
carrying off the guns, but has crippled his batteries by
abandoning the hind limber-boxes of at least twenty caissons. I
am satisfied the enemy's infantry and artillery passed Lick
Creek this morning, traveling all of last night, and that he
left to his rear all his cavalry, which has protected his
retreat; but signs of confusion and disorder mark the whole
road. The check sustained by us at the fallen timber delayed our
advance, so that night came upon us before the wounded were
provided for and the dead buried, and our troops being fagged
out by three days' hard fighting, exposure, and privation, I
ordered them back to their camps, where they now are.
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
W.T. SHERMAN Brigadier-General commanding Division.
General Grant did not make an official report of the
battle of Shiloh, but all its incidents and events were covered by
the reports of division commanders and Subordinates. Probably no single
battle of the war gave rise to such wild and damaging reports. It was
publicly asserted at the North that our army was taken completely by
surprise; that the rebels caught us in our tents; bayoneted the men in
their beds; that General Grant was drunk; that Buell's opportune arrival
saved the Army of the Tennessee from utter annihilation, etc. These
reports were in a measure sustained by the published opinions of
Generals Buell, Nelson, and others, who had reached the
steamboat-landing from the east, just before nightfall of the 6th, when
there was a large crowd of frightened, stampeded men, who clamored and
declared that our army was all destroyed and beaten. Personally I saw
General Grant, who with his staff visited me about 10 a.m. of the 6th,
when we were desperately engaged. But we had checked the headlong
assault of our enemy, and then held our ground. This gave him great
satisfaction, and he told me that things did not look as well over on
the left. He also told me that on his way up from Savannah that morning
he had stopped at Crump's Landing, and had ordered
Lew Wallace's division to cross over Snake Creek, so as to come up
on my right, telling me to look out for him. He came again just before
dark, and described the last assault made by the rebels at the ravine,
near the steamboat-landing, which he had repelled by a heavy battery
collected under Colonel J. D. Webster and other officers, and he was
convinced that the battle was over for that day. He ordered me to be
ready to assume the offensive in the morning, saying that, as he had
observed at Fort Donelson at the crisis of the battle, both sides seemed
defeated, and whoever assumed the offensive was sure to win. General
Grant also explained to me that General Buell had reached the bank of
the Tennessee River opposite Pittsburg Landing, and was in the act of
ferrying his troops across at the time he was speaking to me.
About half an hour afterward General Buell himself rode up to where I
was, accompanied by Colonels Fry, Michler, and others of his staff. I
was dismounted at the time, and General Buell made of me a good many
significant inquiries about matters and things generally. By the aid of
a manuscript map made by myself, I pointed out to him our positions as
they had been in the morning, and our then positions; I also explained
that my right then covered the bridge over Snake Creek by which we had
all day been expecting Lew Wallace; that McClernand was on my left,
Hurlbut on his left, and so on. But Buell said he had come up from the
landing, and had not seen our men, of whose existence in fact he seemed
to doubt. I insisted that I had five thousand good men still left in
line, and thought that McClernand had as many more, and that with what
was left of Hurlbut's, W. H. L. Wallace's, and Prentiss's divisions, we
ought to have eighteen thousand men fit for battle. I reckoned that ten
thousand of our men were dead, wounded, or prisoners, and that the
enemy's loss could not be much less. Buell said that Nelson's, McCook's,
and Crittendens divisions of his army, containing eighteen thousand men,
had arrived and could cross over in the night, and be ready for the next
day's battle. I argued that with these reenforcements we could sweep the
field. Buell seemed to mistrust us, and repeatedly said that he did not
like the looks of things, especially about the boat-landing,—and I
really feared he would not cross over his army that night, lest he
should become involved in our general disaster. He did not, of course,
understand the shape of the ground, and asked me for the use of my map,
which I lent him on the promise that he would return it. He handed it to
Major Michler to have it copied, and the original returned to me, which
Michler did two or three days after the battle. Buell did cross over
that night, and the next day we assumed the offensive and swept the
field, thus gaining the battle decisively. Nevertheless, the controversy
was started and kept up, mostly to the personal prejudice of General
Grant, who as usual maintained an imperturbable silence.
After the battle, a constant stream of civilian surgeons, and
sanitary commission agents, men and women, came up the Tennessee to
bring relief to the thousands of maimed and wounded soldiers for whom we
had imperfect means of shelter and care. These people caught up the
camp-stories, which on their return home they retailed through their
local papers, usually elevating their own neighbors into heroes, but
decrying all others: Among them was Lieutenant-Governor Stanton, of
Ohio, who published in Belfontaine, Ohio, a most abusive article about
General Grant and his subordinate generals. As General Grant did not and
would not take up the cudgels, I did so. My letter in reply to Stanton,
dated June 10, 1862, was published in the Cincinnati Commercial soon
after its date. To this Lieutenant-Governor Stanton replied, and I
further rejoined in a letter dated July 12, 1862. These letters are too
personal to be revived. By this time the good people of the North had
begun to have their eyes opened, and to give us in the field more faith
and support. Stanton was never again elected to any public office, and
was commonly spoken of as "the late Mr. Stanton." He is now dead, and I
doubt not in life he often regretted his mistake in attempting to gain
popular fame by abusing the army-leaders, then as now an easy and
favorite mode of gaining notoriety, if not popularity. Of course,
subsequent events gave General Grant and most of the other actors in
that battle their appropriate place in history, but the danger of sudden
popular clamors is well illustrated by this case.
The battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing, was one of the most
fiercely contested of the war. On the morning of April 6, 1862, the five
divisions of McClernand, Prentiss, Hurlbut, W. H. L. Wallace, and
Sherman, aggregated about thirty-two thousand men. We had no
intrenchments of any sort, on the theory that as soon as Buell arrived
we would march to Corinth to attack the enemy. The rebel army, commanded
by General Albert Sidney Johnston, was, according to their own reports
and admissions, forty-five thousand strong, had the momentum of attack,
and beyond all question fought skillfully from early morning till about
2 a.m., when their commander-in-chief was killed by a Mini-ball in the
calf of his leg, which penetrated the boot and severed the main artery.
There was then a perceptible lull for a couple of hours, when the attack
was renewed, but with much less vehemence, and continued up to dark.
Early at night the division of Lew Wallace arrived from the other side
of Snake Creek, not having fired a shot. A very small part of General
Buell's army was on our side of the Tennessee River that evening, and
their loss was trivial.
During that night, the three divisions of
McCook, Nelson, and Crittenden, were ferried across the Tennessee, and
fought with us the next day (7th). During that night, also, the two
wooden gunboats, Tyler, commanded by Lieutenant Groin, and Lexington,
Lieutenant Shirk, both of the regular navy, caused shells to be thrown
toward that part of the field of battle known to be occupied by the
enemy. Beauregard afterward reported his entire loss as ten thousand six
hundred and ninety-nine. Our aggregate loss, made up from official
statements, shows seventeen hundred killed, seven thousand four hundred
and ninety-five wounded, and three thousand and twenty-two prisoners;
aggregate, twelve thousand two hundred and seventeen, of which
twenty-one hundred and sixty-seven were in Buell's army, leaving for
that of Grant ten thousand and fifty. This result is a fair measure of
the amount of fighting done by each army. |