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General Sherman's Memoirs
MEMOIRS OF GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN
By
William T. Sherman
APPENDIX TO VOLUME ONE
CONTENTS
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FROM 1820 TO THE MEXICAN
WAR, 1846
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EARLY
RECOLLECTIONS OF CALIFORNIA—1846-1848
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EARLY
RECOLLECTIONS OF CALIFORNIA—(Continued)—1849-1850
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MISSOURI, LOUISIANA, AND CALIFORNIA—1850-1855
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CALIFORNIA—1855-1857
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CALIFORNIA, NEW YORK, AND KANSAS—1857-1859
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LOUISIANA—1859-1861
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MISSOURI—APRIL AND MAY, 1861
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FROM
THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN TO PADUCAH—1861-1862
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BATTLE OF SHILOH—MARCH AND APRIL, 1862
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SHILOH TO MEMPHIS-APRIL TO JULY, 1862
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MEMPHIS To ARKANSAS POST—JULY, 1862, TO JANUARY, 1863
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VICKSBURG—JANUARY TO JULY, 1863
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CHATTANOOGA AND KNOXVILLE—JULY TO DECEMBER, 1863
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MERIDIAN CAMPAIGN—JANUARY AND FEBRUARY, 1864
APPENDIX TO VOLUME ONE
APPENDIX TO VOLUME I.
CHICKASAW BAYOU.
Report of
Brigadier-General G. W. Morgan.
HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION, RIGHT WING, THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
STEAMER EMPRESS, January 8, 1868.
Major J. H. HAMMOND, Chief of Staff:
SIR: On the 1st instant, while pressed by many arduous
duties, I was requested to report to the commanding general the
operations of my division during the affair of the 27th, the
action of the 28th, and the battle of the 29th ult.
I had not received the report of subordinate commanders, nor had
I time to review the report I have the honor to submit.
Herewith I have the honor to forward these reports, connected
with which I will submit a few remarks.
Brigadier-General Blair speaks of having discovered, while on
his retreat from the enemy's works, a broad and easy road
running from the left of my position to the enemy's lines. The
road is neither broad nor easy, and was advanced over by De
Courcey when leading his brigade to the charge. The road General
Blair speaks of is the one running from Lake's Landing and
intersecting with the Vicksburg road on the Chickasaw Bluffs.
Its existence was known to me on the 28th ult., but it was left
open intentionally by the enemy, and was commanded by a direct
and cross fire from batteries and rifle-pits. The withdrawal of
his brigade from the assault by Colonel De Courcey was justified
by the failure of the corps of A. J. Smith, and the command of
Colonel Lindsey, to advance simultaneously to the assault. Both
had the same difficulties to encounter—impassable bayous. The
enemy's line of battle was concave, and De Courcey advanced
against his centre—hence he sustained a concentric fire, and the
withdrawal of Steele from the front of the enemy's right on the
28th ult. enabled the enemy on the following day to concentrate
his right upon his centre.
I regret to find, from the report of Brigadier-General Thayer,
some one regiment skulked; this I did not observe, nor is it
mentioned by General Blair, though his were the troops which
occupied that portion of the field. As far as my observation
extended, the troops bore themselves nobly; but the Sixteenth
Ohio Infantry was peerless on the field, as it had ever been in
camp or on the march. Lieutenant-Colonel Kershner, commanding,
was wounded and taken prisoner. He is an officer of rare merit,
and deserves to command a brigade. Lieutenant-Colonel Dieter,
commanding the Fifty-eighth Ohio, was killed within the enemy's
works; and Lieutenant-Colonel Monroe, Twenty-second Kentucky,
was struck down at the head of his regiment.
I again express my profound acknowledgments to
Brigadier-Generals Blair and Thayer, and Colonels De Conrcey,
Lindsey, and Sheldon, brigade commanders. Also to Major M. C.
Garber, assistant quartermaster; Captain S. S. Lyon, acting
topographical engineer; Lieutenant Burdick, acting ordnance
officer; Lieutenant Hutchins, acting chief of staff; Lieutenants
H. G. Fisher and Smith, of Signal Corps; Lieutenant E. D.
Saunders, my acting assistant adjutant-general; and Lieutenants
English and Montgomery, acting aides-de-camp, for the efficient
services rendered me.
Nor can I close this report without speaking in terms of high
praise of the meritorious and gallant services of Captains
Foster and Lamphier. Their batteries silenced several of the
enemy's works, and throughout the operations rendered good
service. My sincere acknowledgments are also due to Captain
Griffith, commanding First Iowa Battery, and Captain Hoffman,
commanding Fourth Ohio Battery.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEORGE W. MORGAN, Brigadier-General Volunteers.
CINCINNATI, February
8, 1876.
MY DEAR GENERAL: Regarding the attack at Chickasaw Bayou, my
record shows the position of Steele on the left; Morgan to his
right; Morgan L. Smith to his right, and A. J. Smith on the
extreme right; the latter not expected to accomplish much more
than a diversion, the result to come from the three other
divisions, Morgan having the best opportunity. Saturday night
they were in position; you were at Lake's plantation, right and
rear of Morgan.
The attack for lodgment on the hills was ordered for Sunday
morning, December 28th. I was sent to A. J. Smith before
daylight, and returned to you soon after. You were with Morgan.
You had fully explained to him the importance of his success,
and that he should be present with the attacking column, which
was to be a part of his division, supported by the remainder,
and by Blair's brigade of Steele's division cooperating. The
attack was to be simultaneous, by the four divisions, on a
signal.
Morgan's answer to you was that, when the signal was given, he
would lead his attack, and with his life he would be on the
bluffs in fifteen minutes. He seemed of positive knowledge, and
as sure of success. You then retired to a central point, to be
in easy communication with Steele and Morgan L. Smith. The
attack was made, and developed, in the case of Steele, M. L.
Smith, and A. J. Smith, that to cross the bayou was impossible,
if opposed by any force, and in each they were by a strong one.
Morgan's attacking force succeeded in getting across the
causeway and marsh, but he did not go with it, nor support it
with more men, and a large number were captured from Blair's
brigade after gaining the enemy's last line of works covering
the bayou. At the time everybody blamed and criticised Morgan
with the failure. You felt from the advance of his attack it
must be successful, and, as it pushed forward, you sent me to
urge on M. L. Smith, as Morgan was over, and he, Smith, must aid
by persistent attack, and give Morgan as good a chance as could
be to make his lodgment....
I am, etc., L. M. DAYTON Late Colonel of the Staff, now of
Cincinnati, Ohio General W. T. SHERMAN, St. Louis, Missouri
[COPY.]
" . . . . The expedition was wonderfully well provided with
provisions, transportation, and munitions, and even axes, picks,
and shovels, so much in use later in the war, evidenced the
forethought that governed this force. The boats, from their open
lower deck construction, proved admirable for transports, but
their tinder-box construction made fire-traps of them, requiring
unremitting vigilance. These points were well understood, and
the readiness with which the troops adapted themselves to
circumstances was a constant source of wonder and
congratulations.
"The fleet collected at Friar's Point for final orders, and
there the order of sailing was laid down with great minuteness,
and private instructions issued to commanders of divisions, all
of whom had personal interviews with the commanding general, and
received personal explanations on pretty much every point
involved. Our headquarters boat, the Forest Queen, was not very
comfortable, nor well provided, but General Sherman submitted
cheerfully, on the grounds of duty, and thought Conway a fine
fellow. I was only able to concede that he was a good steamboat
captain....
"Our camp appointments were Spartan in the extreme, and in their
simplicity would have met the demands of any demagogue in the
land. The nights were cold and damp, and General Sherman
uncomfortably active in his preparations, so that the assistant
adjutant-general had no very luxurious post just then. We were
surrounded with sloughs. The ground was wet, and the water,
although in winter, was very unwholesome. Many of our men, to
this day, have reminders of the Yazoo in ague, fevers, and
diseases of the bowels. Cavalry was useless. One battalion of
Illinois cavalry was strongly suspected of camping in the
timber, until time passed enough to justify the suspicion of
having been somewhere. Really the strength of Vicksburg was in
being out of reach of attack....
"My orders were to learn and report what was going on on the
right, particularly to try and form an idea of the enemy's force
in front of M. L. Smith's division, and at the sand-bar. Leaving
my horse close in the rear of the Sixth Missouri, when the fire
became too heavy for riding, I succeeded, by taking frequent
cover, in reaching unhurt the verge of the bayou among the
drift-logs. There, by concert of action with Lieutenant-Colonel
Blood, of the Sixth Missouri, his regiment, and the Thirteenth
Regular Infantry, kept up a heavy fire on everything that showed
along the levee and earthworks in front. The enemy were behind
the embankment, not over one hundred and fifty yards across the
bayou. Several officers, including Colonel Blood, Colonel Kilby
Smith, and myself, managed, by getting on the piles of drift, to
see over the levee through the cleared fields beyond, even to
the foot of the bluff. The chips and twigs flew around lively
enough, but we staid up long enough to make sure that the enemy
had as many men behind the levee as could get cover. We saw,
also, a line of rifle-pits in the rear, commanding the rear of
the levee, and still beyond, winding along the foot of the
bluff, a road worn by long use deep into the side-hill, and with
the side next us strengthened with a good earthwork, affording a
covered line of communication in the rear. The fire of our men
was so well maintained that we were able to see all these
things, say a minute or more. Some of those who ventured were
wounded, but those mentioned and myself escaped unhurt. I
advised that men enough to hold the position, once across—say
three hundred—should make a rush (protected as our lookout had
been by a heavy fire) across the sand-bar, and get a footing
under the other bank of the bayou, as the nucleus of an
attacking force, if General Sherman decided to attack there, or
to make a strong diversion if the attack was made at the head of
Chickasaw Bayou, in front of Morgan. General A. J. Smith,
commanding First and Second Divisions, approved of this. While
returning to General Sherman, I passed along the Second and part
of the Third Division. On the left of the Second I found a new
Illinois regiment, high up in numbers, working its way into
position. The colonel, a brave but inexperienced officer, was
trying to lead his men according to the popular pictorial idea,
viz., riding in advance waving his sword. I was leading my
horse, and taking advantage of such cover as I could find on my
course, but this man acted so bravely that I tried to save him.
He did not accept my expostulations with very good grace, but
was not rough about it. While I was begging him to dismount, he
waved his sword and advanced. In a second he was shot, through
the chest, and dropped from his horse, plucky to the last. He
died, I was told, within the hour. Many of the regiments were
new and inexperienced, but as a rule behaved well. The fire
along the bayou was severe, but not very fatal, on account of
the cover. I was constantly asked what news from Grant, for from
the moment of our arrival in the Yazoo we were in expectation of
either hearing his guns in the rear, or of having communication
with him. This encouraged the men greatly, but the long waiting
was disappointing, as the enemy was evidently in large force in
the plenty of works, and a very strong position. Careful
estimates and available information placed their force at
fifteen to twenty thousand men. I returned to headquarters about
the middle of the afternoon, and made my report to the general.
We were busy till after midnight, and again early in the morning
of the 29th, in preparing orders for the attack. These were
unusually minute in detail. It seemed as though no contingency
was left unprovided for. Urgent orders and cautions as to
rations and ammunition were given. Drawings of the line of
attack, orders for supports, all and everything was foreseen and
given in writing, with personal explanations to commanders of
divisions, brigades, and even commanders of regiments. Indeed,
the commanding general, always careful as to detail, left
nothing to chance, and with experienced and ordinate officers we
would have succeeded, for the troops were good. The general plan
involved a feint on our left toward Haines's Bluff, by the navy,
under Admiral Porter, with whom we were in constant
communication, while between him and General Sherman perfect
harmony existed. On the right a demonstration by A. J. Smith was
to be made. The Second Division (Stuart's) was to cross the
sand-bar, and the Third (General Morgan's) was to cross on a
small bridge over the dough at the head of Chickasaw Bayou, and,
supported by Steele, was to push straight for the Bluff at the
nearest spur where there was a battery in position, and to
effect a lodgment there and in the earthworks. General Sherman
gave his orders in person to Morgan and Steele. I understood
Morgan to promise that he would lead his division in person, and
he seemed to expect an easy victory, and expressed himself
freely to that effect. The aides were sent out, until I was left
alone with the general and a couple of orderlies. He located
himself in a position easy of access, and the most convenient
afforded to the point of attack. He directed me to see what I
could, and report if I met anything that he should know. I
galloped as fast as possible to the right, and found part of the
Sixth Missouri pushing over the sand-bar covered by the
Thirteenth Regulars with a heavy fire. We supposed, if once
across, they could get up the bank and turn the levee against
the enemy, and left with that impression. Being in heavy timber,
I was not quite sure of my way back to the general, his location
being new, and therefore pushed full gallop for Morgan's front,
catching a good many stray shots from the sharpshooters behind
the levee, as I was compelled to keep in sight of the bayou to
hold direction. Something over half-way along Morgan's division
front, the commander of a Kentucky regiment hailed me and said
he must have support, as he was threatened by a masked battery,
and the enemy was in force in his front, and might cross any
moment. I answered, rather shortly, 'How the devil do you know
there is a masked battery? If you can't get over, how can the
rebels get at you?' He insisted on the battery, and danger. I
finally told him the bayou was utterly impassable there, but, if
he insisted the enemy could cross, I would insist on an advance
on our side at that point. Hurrying on to make up lost time, I
soon reached Morgan. He was making encouraging speeches in a
general way, but stopped to ask me questions as to Steele's
rank, date of commission, etc. I was very much disturbed at
this, fearing want of harmony, and rode on to Steele, whom I
found cursing Morgan so fiercely that I could not exactly make
out the source of the trouble, or reason why; but saw want of
concert clearly enough. I hastened back to General Sherman, and
endeavored to impress my ideas on him and my fears; but, while
he admitted the facts, he could not be made to believe that any
jealousy or personal quarrel could lead to a failure to support
each other, and a neglect of duty. The signal for attack had
already been given, and the artillery had opened, when I left
him again for Morgan's front. I found Morgan where I left him,
and the troops advancing. I had understood that he was to lead
his division, and asked about it, but, getting no satisfaction,
pushed for the front, crossing the slough at the little bridge
at the head of the bayou. I found the willows cut off eighteen
inches or two feet long, with sharp points above the mud, making
it slow and difficult to pass, save at the bridge. I overtook
the rear of the advance about two or three hundred feet up the
gentle slope, and was astonished to find how small a force was
making the attack. I was also surprised to find that they were
Steele's men instead of Morgan's. I also saw several regiments
across the bayou, but not advancing; they were near the levee. A
heavy artillery and infantry fire was going on all this time.
While making my way along the column, from which there were very
few falling back, a shell burst near me, and the concussion
confused me at the time and left me with a headache for several
months. When I got my wits about me again I found a good many
coming back, but the main part of the force was compact and
keeping up the fight. I did not get closer to the woods than
about five hundred feet, and found that a large number had
penetrated into the enemy's works. When our men fell back, very
few ran, but came slowly and sullenly, far more angry than
frightened. I found General Frank Blair on foot, and with him
Colonel Sea, of Southwest Missouri, and learned that Colonel
Thomas Fletcher, afterward Governor of Missouri, was captured
with many of his men. They both insisted there on the spot, with
those around us, that if all the men ordered up had gone up, or
even all that crossed the bayou had moved forward, we could have
readily established ourselves in the enemy's works. I was firmly
of the same opinion at the time on the ground; and, an entrance
effected, we could have brought the whole force on dry ground,
and had a base of operations against Vicksburg—though probably,
in view of later events, we would have had to stand a siege from
Pemberton's army. After explanations with Blair, I rode to where
the men were, who had crossed the bayou, but had not advanced
with the others. I found them to be De Courcey's brigade; of
Morgan's division, which General Sherman supposed to be in
advance. In fact, it was the intended support that made the
attack. A correspondence and controversy followed between
General Blair and Colonel De Courcey, most of which I have, but
nothing came of it. On reaching the bayou, I found that Thayer's
brigade, of Steele's division, had in some way lost its
direction and filed off to the right. Remembering the masked
battery, I suspected that had something to do with the matter,
and, on following it up, I learned that the Kentucky colonel
before mentioned had appealed for aid against the masked battery
and invisible force of rebels, and that a regiment had been
ordered to him. This regiment, filing off into the timber, had
been followed by Thayer's brigade, supposing it to be advancing
to the front, and thus left a single brigade to attack a
superior force of the enemy in an intrenched and naturally
strong position. By the time the mistake could be rectified, it
was too late. Our loss was from one hundred and fifty to two
hundred killed, and about eleven hundred prisoners and wounded.
During the afternoon I went with a flag of truce, with reference
to burying the dead. I saw between eighty and one hundred of our
men dead, all stripped. There were others closer into the
enemy's works than I was allowed to go. On going later to where
the Sixth Missouri crossed, I found that they were under the
bank, and had dug in with their hands and bayonets, or anything
in reach, to protect themselves from a vertical fire from the
enemy overhead, who had a heavy force there. With great
difficulty they were withdrawn at night. Next day arrangements
were made to attempt a lodgment below Haines's Bluff: This was
to be done by Steele's command, while the rest of the force
attacked again where we had already tried. During the day
locomotives whistled, and a great noise and fuss went on in our
front, and we supposed that Grant was driving in Pemberton, and
expected firing any moment up the Yazoo or in the rear of
Vicksburg. Not hearing this, we concluded that Pemberton was
throwing his forces into Vicksburg. A heavy fog prevented Steele
from making his movement. Rain began to fall, and our location
was not good to be in after a heavy rain, or with the river
rising. During the night (I think) of January, 1, 1863, our
troops were embarked, material and provisions having been loaded
during the day. A short time before daylight of the 2d, I went
by order of the general commanding, to our picket lines and
carefully examined the enemy's lines, wherever a camp-fire
indicated their presence. They were not very vigilant, and I
once got close enough to hear them talk, but could understand
nothing. Early in the morning I came in with the rear-guard, the
enemy advancing his pickets and main guards only, and making no
effort at all to press us. Once I couldn't resist the temptation
to fire into a squad that came bolder than the rest, and the two
shots were good ones. We received a volley in return that did
come very close among us, but hurt none of my party. Very soon
after our rear-guard was aboard, General Sherman learned from
Admiral Porter that McClernand had arrived at the mouth of the
Yazoo. He went, taking me and one other staff-officer, to see
McClernand, and found that, under an order from the President,
he had taken command of the Army of the Mississippi. He and his
staff, of whom I only remember two-Colonels Scates and Braham,
assistant adjutant-general and aide-de-camp—seemed to think they
had a big thing, and, so far as I could judge, they had just
that. All hands thought the country expected them to cut their
way to the Gulf; and to us, who had just come out of the swamp,
the cutting didn't seem such an easy job as to the new-comers.
Making due allowance for the elevation they seemed to feel in
view of their job, everything passed off pleasantly, and we
learned that General Grant's communications had been cut at
Holly Springs by the capture of Murphy and his force (at Holly
Springs), and that he was either in Memphis by that time or
would soon be. So that, everything considered, it was about as
well that we did not get our forces on the bluff's of Walnut
Hill."
The above statement was sent to General Sherman in a letter
dated "Chicago, February 5,1876," and signed "John H. Hammond."
Hammond was General Sherman's assistant adjutant-general at the
Chickasaw Bayou.
J. E. TOURTELOTTE, Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.
On 29th December, 1862, at Chickasaw Bayou, I was in command
of the Thirty-first Missouri Volunteer Infantry, First Brigade,
First Division, Fifteenth Army Corps (Blair's brigade). Colonel
Wyman, of the Thirteenth Illinois Volunteer Infantry, having
been killed, I was the senior colonel of the brigade. General
Blair rode up to where my regiment lay, and said to me:
"We are to make a charge here; we will charge in two lines; your
regiment will be in the first line, and the Twenty-ninth (Cavender's)
will support you. Form here in the timber, and move out across
the bayou on a double-quick, and go right on to the top of the
heights in your front." He then told me to await a signal. I
then attempted to make a reconnaissance of the ground over which
we would have to charge, and rode out to the open ground in my
front, and saw that there was water and soft mud in the bayou,
and was fired upon by the sharp-shooters of the enemy, and
turned and went back into the woods where my command lay. Soon
after that General Blair came near me, and I told him there was
water and mud in the bayou, and I doubted if we could get
across. He answered me that General Morgan told him there was no
water nor mud to hinder us. I remarked that I had seen it
myself, and General Morgan, or any one else, could see it if he
would risk being shot at pretty lively. I then told General
Blair that it was certain destruction to us if we passed over
the abatis upon the open ground where there had once been a
corn-field; that we could never reach the base of the hill. He
turned to me and said, "Can't you take your regiment up there?"
I told him, "Yes, I can take my regiment anywhere, because the
men do not know any better than to go," but remarked that old
soldiers could not be got to go up there. General Blair then
said, "Tom, if we succeed, this will be a grand thing; you will
have the glory of leading the assault." He then went on to say
that General Morgan's division would support us, and they were
heroes of many battles, and pointed to the Fifty-eighth Ohio,
then forming in the rear of the Thirteenth Illinois on my right,
and said: "See these men? They are a part of Morgan's division,
and are heroes of many battles." I laughingly said that they
might be heroes, but the regiment did not number as many as one
of my companies. He again assured me we would be supported by
Morgan's division, and all I had to do was to keep right on and
"keep going till you get into Vicksburg." I took my position in
advance of my regiment and awaited the signal. When we heard it,
we raised a shout, and started at a double-quick, the Thirteenth
Illinois on my right. I saw no troops on my left. When we
emerged from the woods, the enemy opened upon us; crossing the
bayou under fire, and many of the men sinking in the mud and
water, our line was very much disordered, but we pretty well
restored it before reaching the abatis. Here we were greatly
disordered, but somewhat restored the line on reaching the
plateau or corn-field. The Twenty-ninth Missouri came on,
gallantly supporting us. The Thirteenth Illinois came out upon
the corn-field, and the Fifty-eighth Ohio followed close upon
it. There was firing to my left, and as I afterward learned was
from the Fourth Iowa of Thayer's brigade (and I believe of
Steele's division). I was struck and fell, and my regiment went
back in great disorder. The fire was terrific. I saw beyond the
Thirteenth Illinois, to my right, a disordered line, and learned
afterward it was the Sixteenth Ohio. When I was taken from the
field by the enemy and taken into Vicksburg, I found among the
wounded and prisoners men and officers of the Sixteenth and
Fifty-eighth Ohio, and of the Twenty-ninth and Thirty-first
Missouri, and Thirteenth Illinois. After I was exchanged and
joined my command, General Blair laughingly remarked to me that
I had literally obeyed his order and gone "straight on to
Vicksburg." He lamented the cutting to pieces of our force on
that day. We talked the whole matter over at his headquarters
during the siege of Vicksburg. He said that if the charge had
been made along our whole line with the same vigor of attack
made by his brigade, and if we had been supported as Morgan
promised to do, we might have succeeded. I dissented from the
opinion that we could even then have succeeded. I asked him what
excuse Morgan gave for failing to support us, and he said that
Colonel or General De Courcey was in some manner to blame for
that, but he said Morgan was mistaken as to the nature of the
ground and generally as to the feasibility of the whole thing,
and was responsible for the failure to afford us the support he
had promised; that he and General Sherman and all of them were
misled by the statements and opinions of Morgan as to the
situation in our front, and Morgan was, on his part, deceived by
the reports of his scouts about other matters as well as the
matter of the water in the bayou.
THOMAS C. FLETCHER
ARKANSAS POST.
Extracts from Admiral Porter's Journal.
Sherman and I had made arrangements to capture
Arkansas Post.
On the 31st of December, while preparing to go out of the Yazoo,
an army officer called to see me, and said that he belonged to
General McClernand's staff, and that the general was at the
mouth of the Yazoo River, and desired to see me at once. I sent
word to the general that if he wished to see me he could have an
opportunity by calling on board my flag-ship.
A few moments after I had heard the news of McClernand'a
arrival, I saw Sherman pulling about in a boat, and hailed him,
informing him that McClernand was at the mouth of the Yazoo.
Sherman then came on board, and, in consequence of this
unexpected news, determined to postpone the movement out of the
Yazoo River, and let McClernand take that upon himself.
General McClernand took my hint and came on board the flag-ship,
but I soon discovered that any admiral, Grant, Sherman, or all
the generals in the army, were nobody in his estimation. Sherman
had been at McClernand's headquarters to see him and state the
condition of affairs, and he then suggested to the latter the
plan of going to Arkansas Post.
I had a number of fine maps hanging up in my cabin, and when
McClernand came on board he examined them all with the eye of a
connoisseur. He then stated to me as a new thing the plan he
proposed!!! of going to Arkansas Post and stirring up our
troops, which had been "demoralized by the late defeat" (Sherman
was present, looking daggers at him). I answered, "Yes, General
Sherman and myself have already arranged for going to Arkansas
Post." Sherman then made some remark about the disposition of
the troops in the coming expedition, when McClernand gave him
rather a curt answer. McClernand then remarked, "If you will let
me have three gunboats, I will go and take the place." Now
General McClernand had about as much idea of what a gunboat was,
or could do, as the man in the moon. He did not know, the
difference between an ironclad and a "tin-clad." He had heard
that gunboats had taken Fort Henry, and that was all be knew
about them. I said to him: "I'll tell you what I will do,
General McClernand. If General Sherman goes in command of the
troops, I will go myself in command of a proper force, and will
insure the capture of the post." McClernand winced under this,
and Sherman quietly walked off into the after-cabin. He beckoned
me to come there, while McClernand was apparently deeply engaged
in studying out a chart, making believe he was interested, in
order to conceal his temper. Sherman said to me: "Admiral, how
could you make such a remark to McClernand? He hates me already,
and you have made him an enemy for life."
"I don't care," said I; "he shall not treat you rudely in my
cabin, and I was glad of the opportunity of letting him know my
sentiments." By this time, General McClernand having bottled up
his wrath, or cooled down, I went in to him and we discussed the
matter. He consented that Sherman should go in command of the
troops, and the interview ended pleasantly enough.
The above extracts from Admiral Porter's journal were sent by
the admiral to General Sherman, inclosed in a letter dated
"Washington, May 29, 1875," and signed "David D. Porter."
J. E. TOURTELOTTE.
After leaving the Yazoo, the Army of the Mississippi
rendezvous was at Milliken's Bend. During the night of January
4th or 5th, General McClernand came on board the Forest Queen,
and with General Sherman went to the Black Hawk flag-boat. There
an interview took place, during which the expedition to Arkansas
Post took shape. General Sherman having asked leave to take the
post, and Admiral Porter having decided to go along, McClernand
thought best to go with his entire army, although the enemy were
supposed to have only about four or five thousand men, and the
fort was little more than a large earthwork commanding the
river.
General Sherman's command was then entitled the Second Corps,
Army of the Mississippi, and was comprised of the First
Division, Blair's, Hovey's, and Thayer's brigades, commanded by
Steele; and the Second Division, commanded by David Stuart, with
Colonels Giles A. and Kilby Smith commanding brigades.
Our fleet was convoyed by three ironclads and several other
gunboats. The weather was bitterly cold for that latitude; we
were four days getting into the Arkansas River, which we entered
by the White River cut-off; and my recollection is, that our
passing the mouth of the main river deceived the enemy as to our
destination. The entrance through the cut-off was feasible by
reason of high water, and I think made our appearance a surprise
to the force at the post. We disembarked on the morning of the
10th of January. Stuart's division first encountered the enemy
behind an earthwork about four miles from the fort, running
across the solid ground from the river to a swamp. General
Sherman in person took Steele's division, and followed a road
leading to the rear of the earthwork just mentioned. We had got
fairly under way when the rebels fell back to the fort, and
McClernand, coming up, ordered us to fall back, and march up the
river. It seemed to me then, and afterward, that it would have
been better to have marched straight to the rear of the fort, as
we started to do. We soon overtook Stuart and closed in, General
Sherman on the right, Morgan's force on the left, reaching to
the river, where the gunboats were, while Sherman reached from
the road which connected the post with the back country, toward
where the earthworks reached the river above the fort, and
threatened their communications with Little Rock. The night was
cold and cloudy, with some snow. There were a good many
abandoned huts to our rear, but our forces in position lay on
the frozen ground, sheltered as best they could, among the
bushes and timber. We were so close that they could have reached
us any time during the night with light artillery. The gun-boats
threw heavy shells into the fort and behind the earthworks all
night, keeping the enemy awake and anxious. The heavy boom of
the artillery was followed by the squeak, squeak of Admiral
Porter's little tug, as he moved around making his arrangements
for the morrow. The sounds were ridiculous by comparison.
General Sherman and staff lay on the roots of an old oak-tree,
that kept them partly clear of mud. The cold was sharp, my right
boot being frozen solid in a puddle in the morning. About
half-past two or three o'clock, General Sherman, with another
and myself, crept in as close as possible and reconnoitred the
position. The general managed to creep in much closer than the
rest of us—in fact, so close as to cause us anxiety. The enemy
worked hard all night on their abatis and intrenchments, and in
the morning we found a ditch and parapet running clear across
the point on which the post was situated. This point was cut by
a road from the back country, across which was a heavy earthwork
and a battery. This road was at the extremity of our left.
General McClernand kept his head-quarters on his boat, the
Tigress. He came up in the morning to a place in the woods in
our rear. One of his staff, a cavalry-officer, climbed a tree to
report movements; but from that point there was very little to
be seen. Between ten and eleven o'clock the fire opened from the
fleet, and we opened along the whole line from infantry and
field-guns. Our men soon worked in close enough to keep down the
fire of the enemy to a very marked degree.
After reporting to General Sherman, and while explaining the
position of the fleet, the smoke-stacks and flags appeared above
the fort. What firing was going on in our immediate front
ceased. A good many rebels were in plain sight, running away
from the fort and scattering. While we were still surprised, the
cry was raised that a white flag was hung out. I did not see it,
but in a few minutes saw others along the line, and just as the
general started for the fort I saw the flag not far from the
white house, near the parapet. Orders were given to cease
firing. Captain Dayton was sent to the fort where the first flag
was raised. Some shots were fired and some men hurt after this.
The first rebel officer we encountered was Colonel or General
Garland, commanding brigade, who was ordered to put his men in
line and stack arms, which was done. I was directed to pass
along the line to the right, and cause the prisoners to stack
arms and form our men in line, just outside the work. This I did
till I reached Deshler's brigade, on our extreme right, or
nearly so, and who was opposed to the right of Steele's force.
Steele's men had rushed up to the very foot of the parapet, and
some were on it, though they did not fire. The commander of the
enemy (Deshler) refused to obey my orders to stack arms, and
asked a good many questions as to "how it happened;" said he was
not whipped, but held us in check, etc. I told him there were
eight or nine thousand men right there, that a shot from me, or
a call, would bring down on him, and that we had entire
possession of the place. After sending two officers from the
nearest troops to explain the condition to Steele, and to warn
every officer they met to pass the word for everybody to be on
the sharp lookout, I arranged with Deshler to keep quiet until I
could bring his own commander, or orders from him. Returning to
General Sherman, I found a party of young rebel officers,
including Robert Johnston's son (rebel Senate) and Captain Wolf,
quartermaster, of New Orleans, who declined to surrender except
to gentlemen. Some German Missouri soldiers didn't relish the
distinction, and were about clubbing them over the head, when I
interfered and received their surrender. Hurrying back to the
general, I reported the dangerous condition of things. He and
General Churchill, commanding officer of the enemy, started for
Deshler's brigade; meeting Garland, a quarrel and some
recrimination followed between him and Churchill, as to where
the fault of the surrender belonged, which was rather promptly
silenced by General Sherman, who hurried to the scene of
trouble. There, after some ill-natured talk, Deshler ordered his
men to lay down their arms. I rode into the fort, and found the
parapet badly torn up by the fire from the fleet. On going to
the embrasure where I had seen the gun while on the river-bank
talking to Captain Shirk, the piece was found split back about
eighteen inches, and the lower half of the muzzle dropped out. A
battered but unexploded shell lying with the piece explained
that it must have struck the gun in the muzzle, almost squarely.
On passing along the inside I saw from the torn condition of the
earthworks how tremendous our fire was, and how the fire of the
enemy was kept down. The fire of the navy had partly torn down
the side of the fort next the river. A good many sailors were in
the fort. General A. J. Smith, Admiral Porter, and General
Burbridge were there—all in high spirits, but in some contention
as to who got in first. Toward dark, or nearly so, an Arkansas
regiment came in as reenforcements, but surrendered without any
trouble. About the same time General Sherman received orders to
put General A. J. Smith in charge of the fort, and stay outside
with his men. As his troops were nearly all inside, and had
four-fifths of the prisoners in charge, these orders were not
very clear, and the general left for headquarters to find out
what was meant. I went on collecting arms, and as our men were
scattering a good deal and were greatly excited, I took the
precaution to pass along the line and march the prisoners far
enough from the stacked arms to be out of temptation. I was
especially urged to this by hearing several rebel officers speak
of their guns being still loaded. It was dark before all the
prisoners were collected and under guard, including the regiment
that arrived after the fight. I am confident that all the
prisoners were under guard by General Sherman's troops.
Everything being secure, the staff-officers, all of whom had
been busily engaged, scattered to compare notes and enjoy the
victory. I found my way onboard the Tigress, where every one was
greatly excited, and in high feather regarding our victory, the
biggest thing since Donelson. I also obtained some food and
small comforts for a few rebel officers, including young
Johnston, Wolfe, and the Colonel Deshler already mentioned. Then
hunted up General Sherman, whom I found sitting on a cracker-boa
in the white house already mentioned, near where the white flag
first appeared. Garland was with him, and slept with him that
night, while the rest of us laid around wherever we could. It
was a gloomy, bloody house, and suggestive of war. Garland was
blamed by the other Confederate officers for the white flag, and
remained with us for safety. Next day was very cold. We worked
hard at the lists of prisoners—nearly five thousand in
number—all of whom were sent to St. Louis, in charge of our
inspector-general, Major Sanger. Our loss was less than one
hundred. The enemy, although behind intrenchments, lost more
than double what we did. Their wounded were much worse hurt than
ours, who were mostly hit around the head and arms.
The losses were nearly all in General Sherman's wing of the
army. The loss in the fleet amounted to little, but their
service was very valuable, and deserved great credit, though
they received little. There was a good deal of sympathy between
our part of the forces and the fleet people, and I then thought,
and still think, if we had been on the left next the river, that
in connection with the tremendous fire from the navy, we could
have carried the work in an hour after we opened on it. Their
missiles traversed the whole fortification, clear through to the
hospitals at the upper end, and I stood five minutes in
rifle-range of the fort next the river—not hit, and but seldom
shot at, and no one hit near me.
On the 18th we embarked, in a snow-storm; collected at Napoleon,
which seemed to be washing away; and steamed to Milliken's Bend,
were we arrived on January 21st, and soon after went to Young's
plantation, near Vicksburg.
The above statement from General Hammond was received by General
Sherman, inclosed in a letter dated "Chicago, February 5, 1876"
and signed "John H. Hammond," who was adjutant-general to
General Sherman during the winter of 1862-'83.
J. E. TOURTELLOTTE
CINCINNATI, February 3, 1876
MY DEAR GENERAL: At Arkansas Post the troops debarked from
steamer January 9th, from one o'clock to dark, in the vicinity
of Notrib's farm, and on the 10th moved out to get position;
Steele to the right, crossing the low ground to the north, to
get a higher ground, avoid crowding the moving columns, and gain
the left (our right) and rear of the "post," and the river-bank
above the post. Stuart took the river-road the movement
commencing at 11 o'clock a.m.. After crossing the low ground
covered with water, you were called back with Steele, as Stuart
had driven out the enemy's rifle-trench pickets, this giving
more and feasible room for moving. Stuart was pushed forward,
and by dark he and Steele were well up to their expected
positions. Before daylight on the 11th you directed me to
accompany you for a personal inspection of the ground to your
front, which we made on foot, going so far forward that we could
easily hear the enemy at work and moving about. Discovering the
open fields, you at once directed Steele to move to the right
and front, and pushed Stuart out so as to fully command them and
the field-work of the enemy extending from the fort, to prevent
farther strengthening, as it was evident these works were the
product of a recent thought. Stuart and Steele were prompt in
taking position, but Morgan's command (not under your control)
did not seem to work up, or keep in junction with you. At ten
o'clock you sent me to McClernand to ascertain why the delay of
attack. He attributed it to Admiral Porter, which was really
unjust. The attack began at 1 p.m., by Admiral Porter, and the
sound of his first gun had not died till your men were
engaged—Wood's, Barrett's, and the Parrott batteries and
infantry. It was lively for a time, and Stuart pushed clear up
to the enemy's rifle-trenches, and forced them to keep
sheltered. Hammond was mostly with Steele; Sanger sent to
McClernand, and McCoy, myself, and John Taylor were with you and
Stuart. At about half-past three I got your permission to go to
Giles Smith's skirmish-line, and, thinking I saw evidence of the
enemy weakening, I hurried back to you and reported my
observations. I was so confident that a demand for it would
bring a surrender, that I asked permission to make it, and, as
you granted me, but refused to let another member of your staff,
at his request, go with me, I rode directly down the road with
only an orderly. Colonel Garland, commanding a brigade, was the
first officer I saw, to whom, for you, I made the demand. All
firing ceased at once, or in a few moments. I sent the orderly
back to you, and you rode forward. It was then four o'clock.
During the attack, nobody seemed to think McClernand had any
clear idea of what or how it was to be done. During the day he
gave you no directions, nor came where you were; he was well to
the rear, with his "man up a tree," who in the capacity of a
lookout gave McClernand information, from which he based such
instructions as he made to his subordinates. He was free to
express himself as being a man of "destiny," and his "star" was
in the ascendance. I am, etc.,
L. M. DAYTON, late Colonel of the Staff, now of Cincinnati,
Ohio.
General W. T. SHERMAN.
MERIDIAN CAMPAIGN.
[Special Field
Orders, No. 11.]
HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE
MEMPHIS, January 27, 1864
V. The expedition is one of celerity, and all things must
tend to that. Corps commanders and staff-officers will see that
our movements are not encumbered by wheeled vehicles improperly
loaded. Not a tent, from the commander-in-chief down, will be
carried. The sick will be left behind, and the surgeons can find
houses and sheds for all hospital purposes.
VI. All the cavalry in this department is placed under the
orders and command of Brigadier-General W. S. Smith, who will
receive special instructions.
By order of Major-General W. T. SHERMAN
L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp.
NOTE.-That same evening I started in a steamboat for Vicksburg.
W. T. S.
St. Louis, 1885.
HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE
MEMPHIS, January 27, 1864
Brigadier-General W. S. SMITH, commanding Cavalry, etc.,
present.
DEAR GENERAL: By an order issued this day I have placed all
the cavalry of this department subject to your command. I
estimate you can make a force of full seven thousand men, which
I believe to be superior and better in all respects than the
combined cavalry which the enemy has in all the State of
Mississippi. I will in person start for Vicksburg to-day, and
with four divisions of infantry, artillery, and cavalry move out
for Jackson, Brandon, and Meridian, aiming to reach the latter
place by February 10th. General Banks will feign on Pascagoula
and General Logan on Rome. I want you with your cavalry to move
from Colliersville on Pontotoc and Okolona; thence sweeping down
near the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, disable that road as much as
possible, consume or destroy the resources of the enemy along
that road, break up the connection with Columbus, Mississippi,
and finally reach me at or near Meridian as near the date I have
mentioned as possible. This will call for great energy of action
on your part, but I believe you are equal to it, and you have
the best and most experienced troops in the service, and they
will do anything that is possible. General Grierson is with you,
and is familiar with the whole country. I will send up from
Haines's Bluff an expedition of gunboats and transports
combined, to feel up the Yazoo as far as the present water will
permit. This will disconcert the enemy. My movement on Jackson
will also divide the enemy, so that by no combination can he
reach you with but a part of his force. I wish you to attack any
force of cavalry you meet and follow them southward, but in no
event be drawn into the forks of the streams that make up the
Yazoo nor over into Alabama. Do not let the enemy draw you into
minor affairs, but look solely to the greater object to destroy
his communication from Okolona to Meridian, and thence eastward
to Selma. From Okolona south you will find abundance of forage
collected along the railroad, and the farmers have corn standing
in the fields. Take liberally of all these, as well as horses,
mules, cattle, etc. As a rule, respect dwellings and families as
something too sacred to be disturbed by soldiers, but mills,
barns, sheds, stables, and such like things use for the benefit
or convenience of your command. If convenient, send into
Columbus, Mississippi, and destroy all machinery there, and the
bridge across the Tombigbee, which enables the enemy to draw the
resources of the east side of the valley, but this is not of
sufficient importance to delay your movement. Try and
communicate with me by scouts and spies from the time you reach
Pontotoc. Avoid any large force of infantry, leaving them to me.
We have talked over this matter so much that the above covers
all points not provided for in my published orders of to-day. I
am, etc.,
W. T. SHERMAN, Mayor-General, commanding.
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE,
January 27, 1864.
Brigadier-General J. P. HATCH, in charge of Cavalry Bureau, St.
Louis, Missouri.
SIR: Your favor of the 21st inst. is just received. Up to the
present time eight hundred and eighteen horses have arrived here
since Captain Hudson's visit to St. Louis. I wrote you upon his
return several days ago that it would not be necessary to divert
shipments to this point which could not reach us before February
1st. We shall certainly get off on our contemplated expedition
before that time. The number of horses estimated for in this
department by its chief quartermaster was two thousand, and this
number, including those already sent, will, I think, completely
mount all the dismounted cavalry of this department. Recruits
for cavalry regiments are arriving freely, and this will swell
our requisitions for a couple of months to come. I will as far
as possible procure horses from the regions of country traversed
by our cavalry.
Yours truly, W. SOOY SMITH, Brigadier-General,
Chief of Cavalry, Military Division of the Mississippi.
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE,
January 28, 1864
Brigadier-General GEORGE CROOK, commanding Second Cavalry
Division, Huntsville, Alabama.
I start in about three days with seven, thousand men to
Meridian via Pontotoc. Demonstrate on Decatur, to hold Roddy.
W. SOOY SMITH, Brigadier-General, Chief of Cavalry, Military
Division of the Mississippi.
MAYWOOD, ILLINOIS,
July 9,1875
General W. T. SHERMAN, Commander-in-Chief, United States Army.
SIR: Your letter of July 7th is just received.
Your entire statement in the "Memoirs" concerning my part in the
Meridian campaign is incorrect.
You overstate my strength, placing it at seven thousand
effective, when it was but six. The nominal strength of my
command was seven thousand.
You understate the strength of my enemy, putting Forrest's force
at four thousand. On our return to Nashville, you stated it, in
General Grant's presence, to have been but twenty-five hundred.
Before and during my movement I positively knew Forrest's
strength to be full six thousand, and he has since told me so
himself.
Instead of delaying from the 1st to the 11th of February for
"some regiment that was ice-bound near Columbus, Kentucky," it
was an entire brigade, Colonel Waring's, without which your
orders to me were peremptory not to move. I asked you if I
should wait its arrival, and you answered: "Certainly; if you go
without it, you will be, too weak, and I want you strong enough
to go where you please."
The time set for our arrival at Meridian, the 10th of February,
had arrived before it was possible for me, under your orders, to
move from Memphis, and I would have been entirely justifiable if
I had not started at all. But I was at that time, and at all
times during the war, as earnest and anxious to carry out my
orders, and do my full duty as you or any other officer could
be, and I set out to make a march of two hundred and fifty miles
into the Confederacy, having to drive back a rebel force equal
to my own. After the time had arrived for the full completion of
my movement, I drove this force before me, and penetrated one
hundred and sixty miles into the Confederacy—did more hard
fighting, and killed, wounded, and captured more of the enemy
than you did during the campaign—did my work most thoroughly, as
far as I could go without encountering the rebel cavalry set
loose by your return from Meridian, and brought off my command,
with all the captured property and rescued negroes, with very
small loss, considering that inflicted on the enemy, and the
long-continued and very severe fighting. If I had disobeyed your
orders, and started without Waring's brigade, I would have been
"too weak," would probably have been defeated, and would have
been subjected to just censure. Having awaited its arrival, as I
was positively and distinctly ordered to do, it only remained
for me to start upon its arrival, and accomplish all that I
could of the work allotted to me. To have attempted to penetrate
farther into the enemy's country, with the cavalry of Polk's
army coming up to reenforce Forrest, would have insured the
destruction of my entire command, situated as it was. I cannot
now go into all the particulars, though I assure you that they
make the proof of the correctness of my conduct as conclusive as
I could desire it to be. I was not headed off and defeated by an
inferior force near West Point. We had the fighting all our own
way near West Point, and at all other points except at Okalona,
on our return, when we had the worst of it for a little while,
but finally checked the enemy handsomely, and continued our
return march, fighting at the rear and on both flanks, repulsing
all attacks and moving in perfect order. And so my movement was
not a failure, except that I did not reach Meridian as intended,
for the reason stated, and for many more which it is not
necessary for me to detail here. On the other hand, it was a
very decided success, inflicting a terrible destruction of
supplies of every kind, and a heavy loss of men upon the enemy.
You should have so reported it in the beginning. You should so
amend your report, and "Memoirs" now. This, and no less than
this, is due from one soldier to another. It is due to the
exalted position which you occupy, and, above all, it is due to
that truthfulness in history which you claim to revere. If you
desire it, I will endeavor to visit you, and in a friendly
manner "fight our battles o'er again," and endeavor to convince
you that you have always been mistaken as to the manner in which
my part in the "Meridian campaign" was performed. But I will
never rest until the wrong statements regarding it are fully and
fairly corrected. Yours truly,
WILLIAM SOOY SMITH
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF
THE UNITED STATES
St. Louis, Missouri, July 11, 1875.
General J. D. WEBSTER, Chicago, Illinois
DEAR GENERAL: General W. Sooy Smith feels aggrieved and
wronged by my account of his part in the Meridian campaign, in
my "Memoirs," pages 394, 395, and properly appeals to me for
correction. I have offered to modify any words or form of
expression that he may point out, but he asks me to completely
change the whole that concerns him. This, of course, I will not
do, as his part was material to the whole, and cannot be omitted
or materially altered without changing the remainder, for his
failure to reach Meridian by February 10th was the reason for
other movements distant from him. I now offer him, what seems to
me fair and liberal, that we submit the points at issue to you
as arbitrator. You are familiar with the ground, the coincident
history, and most, if not all, the parties.
I propose to supply you with
1. Copy of my orders placing all the cavalry under General
Smith's orders (with returns).
2. My letter of instructions to him of January 27th.
3. My official report of the campaign, dated Vicksburg, March 7,
1864.
4. General W. Sooy Smith's report of his operations, dated
Nashville, Tennessee, March 4, 1864.
After reading these, I further propose that you address us
questions which we will answer in writing, when you are to make
us a concise, written decision, which I will have published in
close connection with the subject in controversy. If General
Smith will show you my letter to him of this date, and also
deliver this with his written assent, I will promptly furnish
you the above documents, and also procure from the official
files a return of the cavalry force available at and near
Memphis on the date of my orders, viz., January 27, 1864.
With great respect, your friend and servant,
W. T. SHERMAN, General.
NOTE:—General Smith never submitted his case to the arbitration
offered. The whole will be made clear by the publication of the
official records, which are already in print, though not yet
issued. His orders were in writing, and I have no recollection
of the "peremptory" verbal orders to which he refers, and quotes
as from me.
ST. Louis, Missouri, 1895. W. T. S.
MAYWOOD, ILLINOIS,
July 14, 1875.
General W. T. SHERMAN, Commander-in-Chief, etc.
DEAR GENERAL: Your letter of the 11th of July reaches me just
as I am starting to spend the first vacation I have ever allowed
myself —in the Territories, with my wife and son.
It indicates a spirit of fairness from which we have better
things than an arbitration to hope for. Though, if we should
reach such a necessity, there is no one living to whom our
differences might more properly be referred than to General
Webster. I make no objection to your writing your "Memoirs,"
and, as long as they refer to your own conduct, you are at
liberty to write them as you like; but, when they refer to mine,
and deal unjustly with my reputation, I, of right, object.
Neither do I wish to write my "Memoirs," unless compelled to do
so to vindicate my good name. There were certain commands which
were to make up mine. These, Waring's brigade included, were
spoken of by us in the long conversation to which you refer.
This brigade we knew was having a hard time of it in its
movement from Columbus to Memphis. I asked you if I should move
without it if it did not arrive, and you answered me as stated
in my last letter to you. Those who immediately surrounded me
during the painful delay that occurred will inform you how
sorely I chafed under the restraint of that peremptory order.
In the conversation that occurred between us at Nashville, while
all the orders, written and verbal, were still fresh in your
memory, you did not censure me for waiting for Waring, but for
allowing myself to be encumbered with fugitive negroes to such
an extent that my command was measurably unfit for active
movement or easy handling, and for turning back from West Point,
instead of pressing on toward Meridian. Invitations had been
industriously circulated, by printed circulars and otherwise, to
the negroes to come into our lines, and to seek our protection
wherever they could find it, and I considered ourselves pledged
to receive and protect them. Your censure for so doing, and your
remarks on that subject to me in Nashville, are still fresh in
my memory, and of a character which you would now doubtless
gladly disavow.
But we must meet and talk the whole matter over, and I will be
at any trouble to see you when I return.
Meantime I will not let go the hope that I will convince you
absolutely of your error, for the facts are entirely on my side.
Yours truly,
WILLIAM SOOY SMITH
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