THE STRATEGY OF THE CIVIL WAR
By EBEN SWIFT
Lieutenant-Colonel 8th Cavalry, United States
Army
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"Strategy, unfortunately, is a very
unpopular science, even among soldiers, requiring both in practice
and in demonstration constant and careful study of the map, the
closest computation of time and space, a grasp of many factors, and
the strictest attention to the various steps in the problems it
presents. At the same time, it is a science which repays the
student, although he may have no direct concern with military
affairs; for not only will a comprehension of its immutable
principles add a new interest to the records of stirring times and
great achievements, but will make him a more useful citizen."
*Stonewall Jackson and the Civil War,
Lieutenant-Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, C.B.
THE
student has great advantage over the actor in war, particularly when he
makes his study after a lapse of fifty years. His point of view is
illuminated then by the stories as told by both contestants, by the
disputes and explanations of many participants. He also pursues his
investigations without any of the distracting influences of war itself.
It may not, therefore, be entirely fair to take each man's act before
the bar of history and to require him to justify himself to the critics
of a later day. In a larger sense, though, it is right, because past
experience gives the best lessons and guides for the future. Until we
have another war, we shall continue to study the great conflict of
1861-1865, and to read the secrets of our future in its tale of failure
or success.
"Strategy" is a comparatively recent addition to our language. It is
derived from a Greek word, meaning generalship, and has several valuable
derivatives, as "strategic" and "strategist," which make it a more
useful word than generalship. It means the art of the general and
indicates the time, place, and way to fight battles.
The
War of the States was viewed at first with indifference by foreign
military men. For many years past, however, it has claimed their close
attention, because they have come to realize that new conditions were
tested then, and that new influences, which changed the art of the
general even from the respected models of Napoleon fifty years before,
were at work.
Ironclads, entrenchments, railroads, the breech-loader, a new kind
of cavalry were the fresh factors in the problem.
Although hostilities at first began over an area half as large as
Europe, the region of decisive operations was, on account of lack of
communication, narrowed to the country between the Atlantic and the
Mississippi, about seven hundred miles in an air-line. The line was
unequally divided by the towering barrier of the Alleghany Mountains,
about two hundred miles wide, over which communication was difficult.
The eastern section of the country beyond the range was about one
hundred miles wide and the western section was about four hundred miles
wide. In Maryland, northwestern Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri
sentiment was divided between the Union and the Confederacy. The
Mississippi River separated three of the seceding States from the
remaining eight.
The
immense amount of supplies needed for a great army caused military
operations on a large scale to be confined to rail and water lines. Of
the former, both the North and South had several routes running east and
west for lateral communication, and the South had several running north
and south in each section, which could be used for lines of military
operations. In respect to water routes, the North soon demonstrated its
complete control of the sea and was thus able to choose its points of
attack, while interior water routes were available by the Mississippi,
Tennessee, Cumberland, and James rivers. The advantage of the water
route over that by rail was at once utilized by the Northern generals.
It
was not so vulnerable to attack as the railroad. All navigable rivers
within the area of operations were used for this purpose, and McClellan,
Burnside, and Grant used the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries to carry
their base of supplies close to Richmond. The operations of the
Confederates, on the other hand, were greatly restricted by being
confined to railroad lines.
Several natural features which were certain to influence events to a
great extent are to be noticed. In Virginia, numerous rivers,
perpendicular to the direct line of advance, form good lines for defense
and also obstacles to an advance. Several mountain valleys leading north
at the eastern ranges of the Alleghanies gave opportunities for leading
large forces safely into Pennsylvania from Virginia, or vice versa.
Within the mountain district, a railroad from Lynchburg, Virginia, to
Chattanooga, in Tennessee, about four hundred miles long, gave an
opportunity for transferring troops from one section to the other, while
the corresponding distance at the North was three times as great. In the
western section, the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers are separated at
one place by a narrow neck about two miles wide, thus somewhat
simplifying the problem of controlling these two important streams. The
strategic chess-board, then, gave great opportunities to skilful
generalship. The Virginia rivers gave strength to long defensive lines,
screened marches from east to west, and forced the Northern generals to
seek the flank rather than the front attack. The Shenandoah valley
afforded a safe approach to Washington from the rear. This was availed
of by
Lee, Jackson, and Early to keep many thousand men of the army of the
North in idleness. In the West, the long line defended by scattered
troops was weak at every point and was quite easily broken by Grant,
particularly when the South was slow in grasping the situation there.
The advantage of the Richmond-Chattanooga railroad was not used by the
Confederates until too late for success.
Thousands of Union Troops were "Pinned Down" in the
Defense of Washington
The
strategy, on account of political and other influences, was not always
chosen according to the best military principles. Such influences always
exist, and it is the duty of the soldier to conform and to make his plan
to suit as best he can.
Under
the head of policy would come Lee's several invasions of the North,
undertaken with insufficient forces and too far from his base of
supplies. Numerous causes have been given for these campaigns, the most
plausible of which were of a political and not of a strategic nature. It
was thought that a victory won on Northern soil might lead to
intervention on the part of foreign nations, or that it would increase
the disaffected element in the North to such an extent that the South
could dictate a peace.
The
policy of making military operations conform to the desire to help
Northern sympathizers in eastern Tennessee had a powerful influence on
the entire war. In the spring of 1862, it would have taken Buell into
eastern Tennessee, instead of to the assistance of Grant and would have
changed the course of events in the Mississippi valley. Three months
later, it was one of the potent influences that led to the breaking up
of Halleek's army at Corinth. It finally caused Buell's relief from
command because of his disapproval. It caused Burnside's army to be
absent from the battle of Chickamauga.
In
1864, the campaigns of Price in Missouri and Hood in Tennessee are said
to have been intended to affect the presidential election at the North
by giving encouragement to the party which was claiming that the war was
a Federal failure. If that was not the case might not Hood have done
better by marching in the track of Longstreet through Knoxville,
Tennessee, and Lynchburg, Virginia, to join Lee, while Sherman was
marching to the sea, entirely out of reach?
An
unreasonable importance, from a military point of view, was given to the
capital of each government. The capital of the United States had been
captured in two wars without producing more than local effect, but every
plan in Virginia was contingent upon the safety of Washington, thus
causing the diversion of many thousand soldiers for that single duty. On
the Southern side the correct military decision would have been to
abandon Richmond as soon as Petersburg was invested, but the Government
delayed, for political reasons, until it was too late, and the defending
army surrendered as a consequence.
In
the distribution of troops the Federal authorities were hampered by the
rival claims of the border States, which thought they required
protection. Hence, Ohio sent an army into West Virginia; Pennsylvania,
into the Shenandoah valley; the national Government concentrated troops
for the protection of its capital; the Western States gathered along the
Ohio River and in Missouri. This great dispersion existed on both sides
and continued more or less till the end of the war. The advantage it
gave was in the protection of the friendly portion of the population and
in the good recruiting ground thus secured. The great difficulty of
holding troops in service, whose home country had been overrun, was
appreciated by both sides and exercised a strong influence on the plans
of the generals. These conditions dictated much of the strategy which is
subject to criticism, and should not be forgotten.
The
policy of furloughing great numbers of soldiers during the war, as an
inducement to reenlist, was probably unavoidable, but it helped to cause
inactivity during many months and in the case of Sherman's Atlanta
campaign it caused the absence of two of his divisions. Absenteeism is
one of the inevitable consequences of a long war, with troops untrained
in time of peace by modern methods.
Lincoln complained of it and the generals seemed powerless to limit
or prevent it. Probably the latter are entitled to most of the blame. It
was not uncommon for a general to call for reinforcements at a time when
large numbers of his troops were absent.
The
armies were indeed long in getting over the characteristics of raw
troops, but the generals in their early movements do not appear much
better than the troops. Every man who had been graduated from West Point
was regarded as a "trained soldier," which was a mistake, because West
Point was a preparatory school, and such men as had studied the art of
high command had done so by themselves. The trade of the general was new
to all, and had to be learned in the hard school of experience.
In
four of the early campaigns in which the Federal troops were practically
unopposed, they marched on an average of less than seven miles per day,
while, in case of opposition by a greatly inferior force, the average
was down to a mile a day, as in the Peninsula campaign and the advance
on Corinth.
The
plans for the early battles were complicated in the extreme, perhaps due
to the study of Napoleon and his perfect army opposed by poor generals.
Bull Run, Wilson's Creek, Seven Pines, Glendale, Malvern Hill, Shiloh,
Gaines' Mill were of this kind, and failed. Even at Gettysburg, July 2,
1863, Lee's failure to execute his echelon attacks showed that his army
was not yet ready to perform such a delicate refinement of war.
As an
example of improvement, however, take Jackson's march of fourteen miles
on a country road and the battle fought on May 2, 1863, all between
daylight and dark of one day. In battles, also, we notice the fine play
of early campaigns replaced by a savage directness and simplicity at a
later period, in the Wilderness by Lee and at Spottsylvania by Grant.
Thus it was that both leaders had ceased to count on the inefficiency of
the enemy. At the beginning of the movement on Richmond both Lee and
Grant seemed reckless in the risks they took. It was not so later.
The
earliest form of strategy was the practice of ruse, stratagem, and
surprise, but they have long been considered as clumsy expedients which
are no longer effective against the best troops and commanders. Among
instances which are often classed in this category are Shiloh,
Chancellorsville, and the Wilderness.
Some
forms of strategy have not changed in several thousand years. Sherman,
for instance, crossed the Chattahoochee, which was held by Johnston, in
1864, in the same way that Alexander crossed the Hydaspes in the year
326 B. C., by feinting at one flank and crossing at the other.
Vicksburg
Campaign
The
Vicksburg campaign gave great fame to General Grant and is really one of
the most complete and decisive examples in history. In this campaign, he
deliberately crossed the river north of Vicksburg, marched south and
crossed again below Vicksburg. Then, relying on the country for
supplies, he moved to Jackson, forty-five miles east of Vicksburg, where
he interposed between the fractions of the Confederate army under
Pemberton and Johnston. He then turned back again toward the
Mississippi, drove Pemberton into Vicksburg, established a base of
supplies at the North and invested the city. In this case, it is
noticeable that the tendency to rate localities at too high a value is
shown in Pemberton's retreating to Vicksburg, which was quite certain to
be surrendered, instead of joining forces with Johnston to oppose Grant
in the interior.
Siege of
Petersburg
The
same point is illustrated by the siege of Petersburg. As soon as Grant's
army crossed the James and began this siege the fate of Richmond was
sealed, for Grant had a great army and numerous means of extending his
fortified lines until they crossed every avenue of approach to Richmond.
Napoleon's
Tactic: Geography as the Objective, Not the Hostile Army
Moltke remarked that strategy was nothing more than common sense, but he
acknowledged that it was often difficult to decide what was common sense
and what was not. He might easily have had our Civil War in his mind. In
1861, the art of war had been greatly complicated by pedantic study,
principally by officers of the French school, in attempting to reduce it
to an exact science. The true lesson of Napoleon's so deep-rooted is the
idea of choosing a locality as the objective of a campaign instead of a
hostile army, that Rosecrans' campaign, in the summer of 1863, has gone
into history as the "Campaign for Chattanooga," and it has been claimed
by his admirers that the possession of that place was worth what it
cost—a heavy defeat at Chickamauga.
In
1864, Grant had authority to lay down a choice of objective, which he
had already announced in 1862. For himself it was clearly Lee's army,
and it was intended to be the same with other commands as well. General
Sherman, however, was not so clear in his manner of execution as was his
chief. His strategy creates a suspicion that it was designed to force
Johnston to retreat and to relinquish territory. There was an idea that
Johnston would not give up Dalton, which he had strongly fortified, but
Sherman's heavy turning movement against his rear forced him to retreat
without a battle. The same strategy continued until Atlanta was reached,
and still Johnston's army was undefeated, while Sherman had weakened his
army by guarding a long line of communication. Judging from this, we are
disposed to suspect that Atlanta, rather than Johnston's army, was
Sherman's main objective.
Sherman's
March to the Sea
Later, the historic "March to the Sea" introduces a novel element into
the question, for Sherman abandoned Hood's army as a first objective,
and chose Lee's army instead. It will be remembered that Sherman had
difficulty in getting consent from Grant, who wanted him to ruin Hood's
army first. As it turned out, Sherman marched one thousand miles and was
several hundred miles from Lee at the end of the campaign. If Lee's army
had been his real objective there were other ways of reaching it: first,
by sending his army by sea north from Savannah, as was suggested by
Grant, which would have taken two months, say until the end of February,
1865; second, by sending the troops by rail, as Schofield was moved with
fifteen thousand men and as Hooker was moved with twenty-three thousand
men, and, third, by marching on Lynchburg by the Knoxville road, which
would have been about one-third to one-half the distance actually
marched.
Grant's
Strategy: Destroy the Enemy
Looking upon the war with all the advantage of today, it is not
difficult to assume that the hopes of both sides rested on two great
armies, one in the East and one in the West, and the destruction of
either meant the destruction of the other. This clear estimate seems to
have come quite naturally and easily to only one man during the war, and
that man was Grant. Such a conception clears away a mass of secondary
objectives, such as so-called "strategic points" along the coast and
west of the Mississippi, which consumed hundreds of thousands of troops
and had only a minor effect on the final issue. It must be admitted that
Grant used some seventy-five thousand men on secondary objectives which
were not successful, in 1864, when these men would have had a great
effect either with the armies of Sherman or himself. He probably thought
that an army of one hundred and twenty thousand men was large enough for
his purposes, but he found it was a mistake.
Equally fallacious with the importance given to "strategic points" was
that ascribed to the occupation of territory. The control of Kentucky
and Tennessee was given by Grant's Fort Donelson campaign, but the
injury inflicted on the Confederate army by the large capture of men at
Donelson and Island Number 10 was the real and vital result. The control
of territory that was not accompanied by the defeat of the foe often had
many disadvantages. Such was the experience of Grant and Sherman, the
former in his first advance on Vicksburg, and the latter in the Atlanta
campaign.
Confederate Strategy: Weaken the Opponents Will and Try to Get Europe to
Enter the War
For
the South it was an easier task to decide upon an objective because it
was the weaker side and its acts were determined by those of the
stronger. The main idea of the strategy of the Southern generals was to
divert attention to side issues, to induce the opposing general to
weaken his forces at decisive points. Numerous examples of diversions
are afforded by Jackson's Valley campaign, in 1862, which kept many
thousand men away from McClellan; Early's march on Washington, and many
cavalry raids.
The
result of a study of objectives shows that, with good troops, and safe,
but not brilliant, generals on both sides, the only way to overthrow the
opponent is to attack and defeat his main army.
The
long periods of inactivity in the several armies of the North seem to
have been largely, but not always, due to the frequent change of
commanders. The other causes would take long to analyze. Lee made six
campaigns in fourteen months, from May, 1862, to July, 1863, a
performance unequaled in history. But McClellan's army was inactive for
ten months after Bull Run; Rosecrans' army for five months after
Murfreesboro, and Grant's army for four months after Vicksburg, while
Grant's army was almost in the same class during its ten months before
Petersburg.
The
concentration of scattered forces at decisive points, which is
technically called in the text-book the use of interior lines, and in
more homely phrase, "getting there first with the most men," was often
skillfully performed on both a large and small scale. Thus, Johnston
joined Beauregard at Bull Run in time to win the battle; Jackson
alternately attacked the divided forces of his opponents and neutralized
their greatly superior forces, and finally joined Lee for another
campaign; Longstreet joined Bragg to win Chickamauga; Ewell joined
Breckinridge to defeat Sigel. Many opportunities were lost, even in the
very campaigns mentioned, as we see them today.
Both Sides
Failed to Fully Exploit their Victories
The
conduct of pursuits confirms the idea that it is the most difficult
operation presented to a general. Johnston after Bull Run, McClellan
after Antietam, Meade after Gettysburg, Bragg after Chickamauga, Grant
after Chattanooga, and Lee after Fredericksburg practically allowed the
defeated enemy to escape without further injury. Lee's pursuit of
McClellan in the Seven Days' Battles on the Peninsula and of Meade in
the operations of October, 1863, had only partial success. Near the end
of the war Thomas' pursuit of Hood, after Nashville, showed a much
higher efficiency than had yet been reached, and the Appomattox campaign
gives the only entirely successful instance in about one hundred years
of military history.
Robert E.
Lee's Strategy
The
campaigns of Lee and Jackson were models of their kind. Napoleon has
said that the general who makes no mistakes never goes to war. The
critic of Lee finds it hard to detect mistakes. No general since
Hannibal, and perhaps Napoleon, in the last two years of his campaigns,
has made war under greater disadvantages and accomplished so much with
an inferior force. While all great generals before him inherited a
ready-made army, Lee, like Washington, made his own army. He fought
soldiers of the same race and generals of the same school as himself.
His genius was shown in many ways, but nowhere more than in his ability
to calculate chances, even when he was violating the so-called rules of
war. He used converging columns which met upon the field of battle; he
detached inferior forces against the Federals' rear; he divided his army
in the presence of the foe; he uncovered his lines of retreat and fought
battles in that position; he did not hesitate to throw his last reserve
into the fight.
On
two occasions he withdrew his army across the Potomac River, in good
order and without loss, in the presence of a powerful hostile army. His
use of the ground to compensate for inferior numbers and to hide his
movements from the Federals shows how clearly he saw the secrets of
Napoleon's generalship, while his battles in the woods were entirely
original and his use of entrenchments was effective. The power of the
modern firearm in the hands of his opponents forced him to accept less
decisive results than great soldiers who preceded him. As with other
great soldiers, his best success was due to the inefficiency of his
opponents in the early days. He was probably the last of the race of
generals who, like Napoleon, dominated the field of war by genius alone.
He will be replaced by the safe leader who is never brilliant, but makes
no mistakes and at the same time commands the heaviest battalions.
The
absence of a broad and comprehensive plan of operations was particularly
noticeable on both sides. It never seemed to have been developed in the
North until Grant issued his orders for a general advance, in 1864. In
the South, Longstreet seems to have prepared a strategic plan for the
movement of all Confederate armies after Chancellorsville, but this was
not approved. The immense area occupied by the opposing forces, greater
than had ever before been occupied in a single war, may be the excuse
for this.
Great
fame has come to the various generals who each made some well-planned
maneuver, which forced the foe to relinquish territory and retreat to a
rear position. McClellan before Manassas, Rosecrans before Shelbyville,
and Sherman before Dalton did all this, but it is a debatable question
whether the final issue was hastened or delayed.
Sherman gained Atlanta with a loss of thirty-two thousand men, and
Rosecrans gained Chattanooga with a loss of eighteen thousand men, but
the foe was not defeated. On the other hand, Grant, in his year from the
Rapidan to Appomattox accomplished the desired result, but with severe
losses, it is true.
After
all is said, the subject may be narrowed down to the statement that Lee,
Jackson, and perhaps Johnston handled inferior forces with as great
skill as any commanders since Hannibal and Napoleon.
On
the other side it was also an American soldier, even before Sedan and
Mukden, who formulated the modern idea of strategy which has been so
closely followed in recent wars—to seek out the foe, get close to him,
and fight it out by short-arm jolts.
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