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General Sherman's Memoirs
MEMOIRS OF GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN
By
William T. Sherman
CAPTURE OF ATLANTA—AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER, 1864
CONTENTS
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ATLANTA CAMPAIGN-NASHVILLE AND CHATTANOOGA TO KENESAW—MARCH, APRIL,
AND MAY, 1864
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ATLANTA CAMPAIGN—BATTLES ABOUT KENESAW MOUNTAIN—JUNE, 1864
-
ATLANTA CAMPAIGN—BATTLES ABOUT ATLANTA—JULY, 1864
-
CAPTURE OF ATLANTA—AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER, 1864
-
ATLANTA AND AFTER—PURSUIT OF HOOD—SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, 1864
-
THE
MARCH TO THE SEA--FROM ATLANTA TO SAVANNAH--NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER,
1864
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SAVANNAH AND POCOTALIGO--DECEMBER, 1864, AND JANUARY, 1865
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CAMPAIGN OF THE CAROLINAS--FEBRUARY AND MARCH, 1865
-
END
OF THE WAR--FROM GOLDSBORO' TO RALEIGH AND WASHINGTON--APRIL AND
MAY, 1865
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CONCLUSION--MILITARY LESSONS OF THE WAR
-
AFTER
THE WAR
CHAPTER XIX.
CAPTURE OF ATLANTA.
AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER, 1864
The month of August opened hot and sultry, but our position before
Atlanta was healthy, with ample supply of wood, water, and provisions.
The troops had become habituated to the slow and steady progress of the
siege; the skirmish-lines were held close up to the enemy, were covered
by rifle-trenches or logs, and kept up a continuous clatter of musketry.
The mainlines were held farther back, adapted to the shape of the
ground, with muskets loaded and stacked for instant use. The
field-batteries were in select positions, covered by handsome parapets,
and occasional shots from them gave life and animation to the scene. The
men loitered about the trenches carelessly, or busied themselves in
constructing ingenious huts out of the abundant timber, and seemed as
snug, comfortable, and happy, as though they were at home. General
Schofield was still on the extreme left, Thomas in the centre, and
Howard on the right. Two divisions of the Fourteenth Corps (Baird's and
Jeff. C. Davis's) were detached to the right rear, and held in reserve.
I thus awaited the effect of the cavalry movement against the
railroad about Jonesboro, and had heard from General Garrard that
Stoneman had gone on to Mason; during that day (August 1st) Colonel
Brownlow, of a Tennessee cavalry regiment, came in to Marietta from
General McCook, and reported that McCook's whole division had been
overwhelmed, defeated, and captured at Newnan. Of course, I was
disturbed by this wild report, though I discredited it, but made all
possible preparations to strengthen our guards along the railroad to the
rear, on the theory that the force of cavalry which had defeated McCook
would at once be on the railroad about Marietta. At the same time
Garrard was ordered to occupy the trenches on our left, while
Schofield's whole army moved to the extreme right, and extended the line
toward East Point. Thomas was also ordered still further to thin out his
lines, so as to set free the other division (Johnson's) of the
Fourteenth Corps (Palmer's), which was moved to the extreme right rear,
and held in reserve ready to make a bold push from that flank to secure
a footing on the Mason Railroad at or below East Point.
These changes were effected during the 2d and 3d days of August, when
General McCook came in and reported the actual results of his cavalry
expedition. He had crossed the Chattahoochee River below Campbellton, by
his pontoon-bridge; had then marched rapidly across to the Mason
Railroad at Lovejoy's Station, where he had reason to expect General
Stoneman; but, not hearing of him, he set to work, tore up two miles of
track, burned two trains of cars, and cut away five miles of
telegraph-wire. He also found the wagon-train belonging to the rebel
army in Atlanta, burned five hundred wagons, killed eight hundred mules;
and captured seventy-two officers and three hundred and fifty men.
Finding his progress eastward, toward McDonough, barred by a superior
force, he turned back to Newnan, where he found himself completely
surrounded by infantry and cavalry. He had to drop his prisoners and
fight his way out, losing about six hundred men in killed and captured,
and then returned with the remainder to his position at Turner's Ferry.
This was bad enough, but not so bad as had been reported by Colonel
Brownlow. Meantime, rumors came that General Stoneman was down about
Mason, on the east bank of the Ocmulgee. On the 4th of August Colonel
Adams got to Marietta with his small brigade of nine hundred men
belonging to Stoneman's cavalry, reporting, as usual, all the rest lost,
and this was partially confirmed by a report which came to me all the
way round by General Grant's headquarters before Richmond. A few days
afterward Colonel Capron also got in, with another small brigade
perfectly demoralized, and confirmed the report that General Stoneman
had covered the escape of these two small brigades, himself standing
with a reserve of seven hundred men, with which he surrendered to a
Colonel Iverson. Thus another of my cavalry divisions was badly damaged,
and out of the fragments we hastily reorganized three small divisions
under Brigadier-Generals Garrard, McCook, and Kilpatrick.
Stoneman had not obeyed his orders to attack the railroad first
before going to Macon and Andersonville, but had crossed the Ocmulgee
River high up near Covington, and had gone down that river on the east
bank. He reached Clinton, and sent out detachments which struck the
railroad leading from Macon to Savannah at Griswold Station, where they
found and destroyed seventeen locomotives and over a hundred cars; then
went on and burned the bridge across the Oconee, and reunited the
division before Macon. Stoneman shelled the town across the river, but
could not cross over by the bridge, and returned to Clinton, where he
found his retreat obstructed, as he supposed, by a superior force. There
he became bewildered, and sacrificed himself for the safety of his
command. He occupied the attention of his enemy by a small force of
seven hundred men, giving Colonels Adams and Capron leave, with their
brigades, to cut their way back to me at Atlanta. The former reached us
entire, but the latter was struck and scattered at some place farther
north, and came in by detachments. Stoneman surrendered, and remained a
prisoner until he was exchanged some time after, late in September, at
Rough and Ready.
I now became satisfied that cavalry could not, or would not, make a
sufficient lodgment on the railroad below Atlanta, and that nothing
would suffice but for us to reach it with the main army. Therefore the
most urgent efforts to that end were made, and to Schofield, on the
right, was committed the charge of this special object. He had his own
corps (the Twenty-third), composed of eleven thousand and seventy-five
infantry and eight hundred and eighty-five artillery, with McCook's
broken division of cavalry, seventeen hundred and fifty-four men and
horses. For this purpose I also placed the Fourteenth Corps (Palmer)
under his orders. This corps numbered at the time seventeen thousand two
hundred and eighty-eight infantry and eight hundred and twenty-six
artillery; but General Palmer claimed to rank General Schofield in the
date of his commission as major-general, and denied the latter's right
to exercise command over him. General Palmer was a man of ability, but
was not enterprising. His three divisions were compact and strong, well
commanded, admirable on the defensive, but slow to move or to act on the
offensive. His corps (the Fourteenth) had sustained, up to that time,
fewer hard knocks than any other corps in the whole army, and I was
anxious to give it a chance. I always expected to have a desperate fight
to get possession of the Macon road, which was then the vital objective
of the campaign. Its possession by us would, in my judgment, result in
the capture of Atlanta, and give us the fruits of victory, although the
destruction of Hood's army was the real object to be desired. Yet
Atlanta was known as the "Gate-City of the South," was full of
founderies, arsenals, and machine-shops, and I knew that its capture
would be the death-knell of the Southern Confederacy.
On the 4th of August I ordered General Schofield to make a bold
attack on the railroad, anywhere about East Point, and ordered General
Palmer to report to him for duty. He at once denied General Schofield's
right to command him; but, after examining the dates of their respective
commissions, and hearing their arguments, I wrote to General Palmer.
August 4th.-10.45 p.m.
From the statements made by yourself and General Schofield
to-day, my decision is, that he ranks you as a major-general,
being of the same date of present commission, by reason of his
previous superior rank as brigadier-general. The movements of
to-morrow are so important that the orders of the superior on
that flank must be regarded as military orders, and not in the
nature of cooperation. I did hope that there would be no
necessity for my making this decision; but it is better for all
parties interested that no question of rank should occur in
actual battle. The Sandtown road, and the railroad, if possible,
must be gained to-morrow, if it costs half your command. I
regard the loss of time this afternoon as equal to the loss of
two thousand men.
I also communicated the substance of this to General Thomas, to whose
army Palmer's corps belonged, who replied on the 5th:
I regret to hear that Palmer has taken the course he has, and
I know that he intends to offer his resignation as soon as he
can properly do so. I recommend that his application be granted.
And on the 5th I again wrote to General Palmer, arguing the point
with him, advising him, as a friend, not to resign at that crisis lest
his motives might be misconstrued, and because it might damage his
future career in civil life; but, at the same time, I felt it my duty to
say to him that the operations on that flank, during the 4th and 5th,
had not been satisfactory—not imputing to him, however, any want of
energy or skill, but insisting that "the events did not keep pace with
my desires." General Schofield had reported to me that night:
I am compelled to acknowledge that I have totally failed to
make any aggressive movement with the Fourteenth Corps. I have
ordered General Johnson's division to replace General Hascall's
this evening, and I propose to-morrow to take my own troops
(Twenty-third Corps) to the right, and try to recover what has
been lost by two days' delay. The force may likely be too small.
I sanctioned the movement, and ordered two of Palmers
divisions—Davis's and Baird's—to follow en echelon in support of
Schofield, and summoned General Palmer to meet me in person: He
came on the 6th to my headquarters, and insisted on his
resignation being accepted, for which formal act I referred him
to General Thomas. He then rode to General Thomas's camp, where
he made a written resignation of his office as commander of the
Fourteenth Corps, and was granted the usual leave of absence to
go to his home in Illinois, there to await further orders.
General Thomas recommended that the resignation be accepted;
that Johnson, the senior division commander of the corps, should
be ordered back to Nashville as chief of cavalry, and that
Brigadier-General Jefferson C. Davis, the next in order, should
be promoted major general, and assigned to command the corps.
These changes had to be referred to the President, in
Washington, and were, in due time, approved and executed; and
thenceforward I had no reason to complain of the slowness or
inactivity of that splendid corps. It had been originally formed
by General George H. Thomas, had been commanded by him in
person, and had imbibed some what his personal character, viz.,
steadiness, good order, and deliberation nothing hasty or rash,
but always safe, "slow, and sure." On August 7th I telegraphed
to General Halleck:
Have received to-day the dispatches of the Secretary of War and
of General Grant, which are very satisfactory. We keep hammering
away all the time, and there is no peace, inside or outside of
Atlanta. To-day General Schofield got round the line which was
assaulted yesterday by General Reilly's brigade, turned it and
gained the ground where the assault had been made, and got
possession of all our dead and wounded. He continued to press on
that flank, and brought on a noisy but not a bloody battle. He
drove the enemy behind his main breastworks, which cover the
railroad from Atlanta to East Point, and captured a good many of
the skirmishers, who are of his best troops—for the militia hug
the breastworks close. I do not deem it prudent to extend any
more to the right, but will push forward daily by parallels, and
make the inside of Atlanta too hot to be endured. I have sent
back to Chattanooga for two thirty-pound Parrotts, with which we
can pick out almost any house in town. I am too impatient for a
siege, and don't know but this is as good a place to fight it
out on, as farther inland. One thing is certain, whether we get
inside of Atlanta or not, it will be a used-up community when we
are done with it.
In Schofield's extension on the 5th, General Reilly's brigade
had struck an outwork, which he promptly attacked, but, as
usual, got entangled in the trees and bushes which had been
felled, and lost about five hundred men, in killed and wounded;
but, as above reported, this outwork was found abandoned the
next day, and we could see from it that the rebels were
extending their lines, parallel with the railroad, about as fast
as we could add to our line of investment. On the 10th of August
the Parrott thirty-pounders were received and placed in
Position; for a couple of days we kept up a sharp fire from all
our batteries converging on Atlanta, and at every available
point we advanced our infantry-lines, thereby shortening and
strengthening the investment; but I was not willing to order a
direct assault, unless some accident or positive neglect on the
part of our antagonist should reveal an opening. However, it was
manifest that no such opening was intended by Hood, who felt
secure behind his strong defenses. He had repelled our cavalry
attacks on his railroad, and had damaged us seriously thereby,
so I expected that he would attempt the same game against our
rear. Therefore I made extraordinary exertions to recompose our
cavalry divisions, which were so essential, both for defense and
offense. Kilpatrick was given that on our right rear, in support
of Schofield's exposed flank; Garrard retained that on our
general left; and McCook's division was held somewhat in
reserve, about Marietta and the railroad. On the 10th, having
occasion to telegraph to General Grant, then in Washington, I
used this language:
Since July 28th Hood has not attempted to meet us outside his
parapets. In order to possess and destroy effectually his
communications, I may have to leave a corps at the
railroad-bridge, well intrenched, and cut loose with the balance
to make a circle of desolation around Atlanta. I do not propose
to assault the works, which are too strong, nor to proceed by
regular approaches. I have lost a good many regiments, and will
lose more, by the expiration of service; and this is the only
reason why I want reenforcements. We have killed, crippled, and
captured more of the enemy than we have lost by his acts.
On the 12th of August I heard of the success of Admiral Farragut
in entering Mobile Bay, which was regarded as a most valuable
auxiliary to our operations at Atlanta; and learned that I had
been commissioned a major-general in the regular army, which was
unexpected, and not desired until successful in the capture of
Atlanta. These did not change the fact that we were held in
check by the stubborn defense of the place, and a conviction was
forced on my mind that our enemy would hold fast, even though
every house in the town should be battered down by our
artillery. It was evident that we most decoy him out to fight us
on something like equal terms, or else, with the whole army,
raise the siege and attack his communications. Accordingly, on
the 13th of August, I gave general orders for the Twentieth
Corps to draw back to the railroad-bridge at the Chattahoochee,
to protect our trains, hospitals, spare artillery, and the
railroad-depot, while the rest of the army should move bodily to
some point on the Macon Railroad below East Point.
Luckily, I learned just then that the enemy's cavalry, under
General Wheeler, had made a wide circuit around our left flank,
and had actually reached our railroad at Tilton Station, above
Resaca, captured a drove of one thousand of our beef-cattle, and
was strong enough to appear before Dalton, and demand of its
commander, Colonel Raum, the surrender of the place. General
John E. Smith, who was at Kingston, collected together a couple
of thousand men, and proceeded in cars to the relief of Dalton
when Wheeler retreated northward toward Cleveland. On the 16th
another detachment of the enemy's cavalry appeared in force
about Allatoona and the Etowah bridge, when I became fully
convinced that Hood had sent all of his cavalry to raid upon our
railroads. For some days our communication with Nashville was
interrupted by the destruction of the telegraph-lines, as well
as railroad. I at once ordered strong reconnoissances forward
from our flanks on the left by Garrard, and on the right by
Kilpatrick. The former moved with so much caution that I was
displeased; but Kilpatrick, on the contrary, displayed so much
zeal and activity that I was attracted to him at once. He
reached Fairburn Station, on the West Point road, and tore it
up, returning safely to his position on our right flank. I
summoned him to me, and was so pleased with his spirit and
confidence, that I concluded to suspend the general movement of
the main army, and to send him with his small division of
cavalry to break up the Macon road about Jonesboro, in the hopes
that it would force Hood to evacuate Atlanta, and that I should
thereby not only secure possession of the city itself, but
probably could catch Hood in the confusion of retreat; and,
further to increase the chances of success.
I ordered General Thomas to detach two brigades of Garrard's
division of cavalry from the left to the right rear, to act as a
reserve in support of General Kilpatrick. Meantime, also, the
utmost activity was ordered along our whole front by the
infantry and artillery. Kilpatrick got off during the night of
the 18th, and returned to us on the 22d, having made the
complete circuit of Atlanta. He reported that he had destroyed
three miles of the railroad about Jonesboro, which he reckoned
would take ten days to repair; that he had encountered a
division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry (Ross's); that he
had captured a battery and destroyed three of its guns, bringing
one in as a trophy, and he also brought in three battle-flags
and seventy prisoners. On the 23d, however, we saw trains coming
into Atlanta from the south, when I became more than ever
convinced that cavalry could not or would not work hard enough
to disable a railroad properly, and therefore resolved at once
to proceed to the execution of my original plan. Meantime, the
damage done to our own railroad and telegraph by Wheeler, about
Resaca and Dalton, had been repaired, and Wheeler himself was
too far away to be of any service to his own army, and where he
could not do us much harm, viz., up about the Hiawaesee. On the
24th I rode down to the Chattahoochee bridge, to see in person
that it could be properly defended by the single corps proposed
to be left there for that purpose, and found that the rebel
works, which had been built by Johnston to resist us, could be
easily utilized against themselves; and on returning to my camp,
at that same evening, I telegraphed to General Halleck as
follows:
Heavy fires in Atlanta all day, caused by our artillery. I will
be all ready, and will commence the movement around Atlanta by
the south, tomorrow night, and for some time you will hear
little of us. I will keep open a courier line back to the
Chattahoochee bridge, by way of Sandtown. The Twentieth Corps
will hold the railroad-bridge, and I will move with the balance
of the army, provisioned for twenty days.
Meantime General Dodge (commanding the Sixteenth Corps) had been
wounded in the forehead, had gone to the rear, and his two divisions
were distributed to the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps. The real
movement commenced on the 25th, at night. The Twentieth Corps drew back
and took post at the railroad-bridge, and the Fourth Corps (Stanley)
moved to his right rear, closing up with the Fourteenth Corps (Jeff. C.
Davis) near Utoy Creek; at the same time Garrard's cavalry, leaving
their horses out of sight, occupied the vacant trenches, so that the
enemy did not detect the change at all. The next night (26th) the
Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps, composing the Army of the Tennessee
(Howard), drew out of their trenches, made a wide circuit, and came up
on the extreme right of the Fourth and Fourteenth Corps of the Army of
the Cumberland (Thomas) along Utoy Creek, facing south. The enemy seemed
to suspect something that night, using his artillery pretty freely; but
I think he supposed we were going to retreat altogether. An
artillery-shot, fired at random, killed one man and wounded another, and
the next morning some of his infantry came out of Atlanta and found our
camps abandoned. It was afterward related that there was great rejoicing
in Atlanta "that the Yankees were gone;" the fact was telegraphed all
over the South, and several trains of cars (with ladies) came up from
Macon to assist in the celebration of their grand victory.
On the 28th (making a general left-wheel, pivoting on Schofield) both
Thomas and Howard reached the West Point Railroad, extending from East
Point to Red-Oak Station and Fairburn, where we spent the next day
(29th) in breaking it up thoroughly. The track was heaved up in sections
the length of a regiment, then separated rail by rail; bonfires were
made of the ties and of fence-rails on which the rails were heated,
carried to trees or telegraph-poles, wrapped around and left to cool.
Such rails could not be used again; and, to be still more certain, we
filled up many deep cuts with trees, brush, and earth, and commingled
with them loaded shells, so arranged that they would explode on an
attempt to haul out the bushes. The explosion of one such shell would
have demoralized a gang of negroes, and thus would have prevented even
the attempt to clear the road.
Meantime Schofield, with the Twenty-third Corps, presented a bold
front toward East Point, daring and inviting the enemy to sally out to
attack him in position. His first movement was on the 30th, to Mount
Gilead Church, then to Morrow's Mills, facing Rough and Ready. Thomas
was on his right, within easy support, moving by cross-roads from Red
Oak to the Fayetteville road, extending from Couch's to Renfrew's; and
Howard was aiming for Jonesboro.
I was with General Thomas that day, which was hot but otherwise very
pleasant. We stopped for a short noon-rest near a little church (marked
on our maps as Shoal-Creek Church), which stood back about a hundred
yards from the road, in a grove of native oaks. The infantry column had
halted in the road, stacked their arms, and the men were scattered
about—some lying in the shade of the trees, and others were bringing
corn-stalks from a large corn-field across the road to feed our horses,
while still others had arms full of the roasting-ears, then in their
prime. Hundreds of fires were soon started with the fence-rails, and the
men were busy roasting the ears. Thomas and I were walking up and down
the road which led to the church, discussing the chances of the
movement, which he thought were extra-hazardous, and our path carried us
by a fire at which a soldier was roasting his corn. The fire was built
artistically; the man was stripping the ears of their husks, standing
them in front of his fire, watching them carefully, and turning each ear
little by little, so as to roast it nicely. He was down on his knees
intent on his business, paying little heed to the stately and serious
deliberations of his leaders. Thomas's mind was running on the fact that
we had cut loose from our base of supplies, and that seventy thousand
men were then dependent for their food on the chance supplies of the
country (already impoverished by the requisitions of the enemy), and on
the contents of our wagons. Between Thomas and his men there existed a
most kindly relation, and he frequently talked with them in the most
familiar way. Pausing awhile, and watching the operations of this man
roasting his corn, he said, "What are you doing?" The man looked up
smilingly "Why, general, I am laying in a supply of provisions." "That
is right, my man, but don't waste your provisions." As we resumed our
walk, the man remarked, in a sort of musing way, but loud enough for me
to hear: "There he goes, there goes the old man, economizing as usual."
"Economizing" with corn, which cost only the labor of gathering and
roasting!
As we walked, we could hear General Howard's guns at intervals, away
off to our right front, but an ominous silence continued toward our
left, where I was expecting at each moment to hear the sound of battle.
That night we reached Renfrew's, and had reports from left to right
(from General Schofield, about Morrow's Mills, to General Howard, within
a couple of miles of Jonesboro). The next morning (August 31st) all
moved straight for the railroad. Schofield reached it near Rough and
Ready, and Thomas at two points between there and Jonesboro. Howard
found an intrenched foe (Hardee's corps) covering Jonesboro, and his men
began at once to dig their accustomed rifle-pits. Orders were sent to
Generals Thomas and Schofield to turn straight for Jonesboro, tearing up
the railroad-track as they advanced. About 3.00 p.m. the enemy sallied
from Jonesboro against the Fifteenth corps, but was easily repulsed, and
driven back within his lines. All hands were kept busy tearing up the
railroad, and it was not until toward evening of the 1st day of
September that the Fourteenth Corps (Davis) closed down on the north
front of Jonesboro, connecting on his right with Howard, and his left
reaching the railroad, along which General Stanley was moving, followed
by Schofield. General Davis formed his divisions in line about 4 p.m.,
swept forward over some old cotton-fields in full view, and went over
the rebel parapet handsomely, capturing the whole of Govan's brigade,
with two field-batteries of ten guns. Being on the spot, I checked
Davis's movement, and ordered General Howard to send the two divisions
of the Seventeenth Corps (Blair) round by his right rear, to get below
Jonesboro, and to reach the railroad, so as to cut off retreat in that
direction. I also dispatched orders after orders to hurry forward
Stanley, so as to lap around Jonesboro on the east, hoping thus to
capture the whole of Hardee's corps. I sent first Captain Audenried
(aide-de-camp), then Colonel Poe, of the Engineers, and lastly General
Thomas himself (and that is the only time during the campaign I can
recall seeing General Thomas urge his horse into a gallop). Night was
approaching, and the country on the farther side of the railroad was
densely wooded. General Stanley had come up on the left of Davis, and
was deploying, though there could not have been on his front more than a
skirmish-line. Had he moved straight on by the flank, or by a slight
circuit to his left, he would have inclosed the whole ground occupied by
Hardee's corps, and that corps could not have escaped us; but night came
on, and Hardee did escape.
Meantime General Slocum had reached his corps (the Twentieth),
stationed at the Chattahoochee bridge, had relieved General A. S.
Williams in command, and orders had been sent back to him to feel
forward occasionally toward Atlanta, to observe the effect when we had
reached the railroad. That night I was so restless and impatient that I
could not sleep, and about midnight there arose toward Atlanta sounds of
shells exploding, and other sound like that of musketry. I walked to the
house of a farmer close by my bivouac, called him out to listen to the
reverberations which came from the direction of Atlanta (twenty miles to
the north of us), and inquired of him if he had resided there long. He
said he had, and that these sounds were just like those of a battle. An
interval of quiet then ensued, when again, about 4 a.m., arose other
similar explosions, but I still remained in doubt whether the enemy was
engaged in blowing up his own magazines, or whether General Slocum had
not felt forward, and become engaged in a real battle.
The next morning General Hardee was gone, and we all pushed forward
along the railroad south, in close pursuit, till we ran up against his
lines at a point just above Lovejoy's Station. While bringing forward
troops and feeling the new position of our adversary, rumors came from
the rear that the enemy had evacuated Atlanta, and that General Slocum
was in the city. Later in the day I received a note in Slocum's own
handwriting, stating that he had heard during the night the very sounds
that I have referred to; that he had moved rapidly up from the bridge
about daylight, and had entered Atlanta unopposed. His letter was dated
inside the city, so there was no doubt of the fact. General Thomas's
bivouac was but a short distance from mine, and, before giving notice to
the army in general orders, I sent one of my staff-officers to show him
the note. In a few minutes the officer returned, soon followed by Thomas
himself, who again examined the note, so as to be perfectly certain that
it was genuine. The news seemed to him too good to be true. He snapped
his fingers, whistled, and almost danced, and, as the news spread to the
army, the shouts that arose from our men, the wild hallooing and
glorious laughter, were to us a full recompense for the labor and toils
and hardships through which we had passed in the previous three months.
A courier-line was at once organized, messages were sent back and
forth from our camp at Lovejoy's to Atlanta, and to our
telegraph-station at the Chattahoochee bridge. Of course, the glad
tidings flew on the wings of electricity to all parts of the North,
where the people had patiently awaited news of their husbands, sons, and
brothers, away down in "Dixie Land;" and congratulations came pouring
back full of good-will and patriotism. This victory was most opportune;
Mr. Lincoln himself told me afterward that even he had previously felt
in doubt, for the summer was fast passing away; that General Grant
seemed to be checkmated about Richmond and Petersburg, and my army
seemed to have run up against an impassable barrier, when, suddenly and
unexpectedly, came the news that "Atlanta was ours, and fairly won." On
this text many a fine speech was made, but none more eloquent than that
by Edward Everett, in Boston. A presidential election then agitated the
North. Mr. Lincoln represented the national cause, and General McClellan
had accepted the nomination of the Democratic party, whose platform was
that the war was a failure, and that it was better to allow the South to
go free to establish a separate government, whose corner-stone should be
slavery. Success to our arms at that instant was therefore a political
necessity; and it was all-important that something startling in our
interest should occur before the election in November. The brilliant
success at Atlanta filled that requirement, and made the election of Mr.
Lincoln certain. Among the many letters of congratulation received,
those of Mr. Lincoln and General Grant seem most important:
EXECUTIVE MANSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. September 3, 1864.
The national thanks are rendered by the President to
Major-General W. T. Sherman and the gallant officers and
soldiers of his command before Atlanta, for the distinguished
ability and perseverance displayed in the campaign in Georgia,
which, under Divine favor, has resulted in the capture of
Atlanta. The marches, battles, sieges, and other military
operations, that have signalized the campaign, must render it
famous in the annals of war, and have entitled those who have
participated therein to the applause and thanks of the nation.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN
President of the United States
CITY POINT VIRGINIA,
September 4, 1864-9 P.M.
Major-General SHERMAN: I have just received your dispatch
announcing the capture of Atlanta. In honor of your great
victory, I have ordered a salute to be fired with shotted guns
from every battery bearing upon the enemy. The salute will be
fired within an hour, amid great rejoicing.
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
These dispatches were communicated to the army in general orders, and
we all felt duly encouraged and elated by the praise of those competent
to bestow it.
The army still remained where the news of success had first found us,
viz., Lovejoy's; but, after due refection, I resolved not to attempt at
that time a further pursuit of Hood's army, but slowly and deliberately
to move back, occupy Atlanta, enjoy a short period of rest, and to think
well over the next step required in the progress of events. Orders for
this movement were made on the 5th September, and three days were given
for each army to reach the place assigned it, viz.: the Army of the
Cumberland in and about Atlanta; the Army of the Tennessee at East
Point; and the Army of the Ohio at Decatur.
Personally I rode back to Jonesboro on the 6th, and there inspected
the rebel hospital, full of wounded officers and men left by Hardee in
his retreat. The next night we stopped at Rough and Ready, and on the
8th of September we rode into Atlanta, then occupied by the Twentieth
Corps (General Slocum). In the Court-House Square was encamped a
brigade, embracing the Massachusetts Second and Thirty-third Regiments,
which had two of the finest bands of the army, and their music was to us
all a source of infinite pleasure during our sojourn in that city. I
took up my headquarters in the house of Judge Lyons, which stood
opposite one corner of the Court-House Square, and at once set about a
measure already ordered, of which I had thought much and long, viz., to
remove the entire civil population, and to deny to all civilians from
the rear the expected profits of civil trade. Hundreds of sutlers and
traders were waiting at Nashville and Chattanooga, greedy to reach
Atlanta with their wares and goods, with, which to drive a profitable
trade with the inhabitants. I gave positive orders that none of these
traders, except three (one for each separate army), should be permitted
to come nearer than Chattanooga; and, moreover, I peremptorily required
that all the citizens and families resident in Atlanta should go away,
giving to each the option to go south or north, as their interests or
feelings dictated. I was resolved to make Atlanta a pure military
garrison or depot, with no civil population to influence military
measures. I had seen Memphis, Vicksburg, Natchez, and New Orleans, all
captured from the enemy, and each at once was garrisoned by a full
division of troops, if not more; so that success was actually crippling
our armies in the field by detachments to guard and protect the
interests of a hostile population.
I gave notice of this purpose, as early as the 4th of September, to
General Halleck, in a letter concluding with these words:
If the people raise a howl against my barbarity and cruelty, I will
answer that war is war, and not popularity-seeking. If they want peace,
they and their relatives most stop the war.
I knew, of course, that such a measure would be strongly criticised,
but made up my mind to do it with the absolute certainty of its
justness, and that time would sanction its wisdom. I knew that the
people of the South would read in this measure two important
conclusions: one, that we were in earnest; and the other, if they were
sincere in their common and popular clamor "to die in the last ditch,"
that the opportunity would soon come.
Soon after our reaching Atlanta, General Hood had sent in by a flag
of truce a proposition, offering a general exchange of prisoners, saying
that he was authorized to make such an exchange by the Richmond
authorities, out of the vast number of our men then held captive at
Andersonville, the same whom General Stoneman had hoped to rescue at the
time of his raid. Some of these prisoners had already escaped and got
in, had described the pitiable condition of the remainder, and, although
I felt a sympathy for their hardships and sufferings as deeply as any
man could, yet as nearly all the prisoners who had been captured by us
during the campaign had been sent, as fast as taken, to the usual depots
North, they were then beyond my control. There were still about two
thousand, mostly captured at Jonesboro, who had been sent back by cars,
but had not passed Chattanooga. These I ordered back, and offered
General Hood to exchange them for Stoneman, Buell, and such of my own
army as would make up the equivalent; but I would not exchange for his
prisoners generally, because I knew these would have to be sent to their
own regiments, away from my army, whereas all we could give him could at
once be put to duty in his immediate army. Quite an angry correspondence
grew up between us, which was published at the time in the newspapers,
but it is not to be found in any book of which I have present knowledge,
and therefore is given here, as illustrative of the events referred to,
and of the feelings of the actors in the game of war at that particular
crisis, together with certain other original letters of Generals Grant
and Halleck, never hitherto published.
HEADQUARTERS ARMIES
OF THE UNITED STATES CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, September 12, 1864
Major-General W. T.
SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the Mississippi
GENERAL: I send Lieutenant-Colonel Horace Porter, of my
staff, with this. Colonel Porter will explain to you the exact
condition of affairs here, better than I can do in the limits of
a letter. Although I feel myself strong enough now for offensive
operations, I am holding on quietly, to get advantage of
recruits and convalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly.
My lines are necessarily very long, extending from Deep Bottom,
north of the James, across the peninsula formed by the
Appomattox and the James, and south of the Appomattox to the
Weldon road. This line is very strongly fortified, and can be
held with comparatively few men; but, from its great length,
necessarily takes many in the aggregate. I propose, when I do
move, to extend my left so as to control what is known as the
Southside, or Lynchburg & Petersburg road; then, if possible, to
keep the Danville road out. At the same time this move is made,
I want to send a force of from six to ten thousand men against
Wilmington. The way I propose to do this is to land the men
north of Fort Fisher, and hold that point. At the same time a
large naval fleet will be assembled there, and the iron-clads
will run the batteries as they did at Mobile. This will give us
the same control of the harbor of Wilmington that we now have of
the harbor of Mobile. What you are to do with the forces at your
command, I do not exactly see. The difficulties of supplying
your army, except when they are constantly moving beyond where
you are, I plainly see. If it had not been for Price's movement,
Canby could have sent twelve thousand more men to Mobile. From
your command on the Mississippi, an equal number could have been
taken. With these forces, my idea would have been to divide
them, sending one-half to Mobile, and the other half to
Savannah. You could then move as proposed in your telegram, so
as to threaten Macon and Augusta equally. Whichever one should
be abandoned by the enemy, you could take and open up a new base
of supplies. My object now in sending a staff-officer to you is
not so much to suggest operations for you as to get your views,
and to have plans matured by the time every thing can be got
ready. It would probably be the 5th of October before any of the
plans here indicated will be executed. If you have any
promotions to recommend, send the names forward, and I will
approve them.
In conclusion, it is hardly necessary for me to say that I feel
you have accomplished the most gigantic undertaking given to any
general in this war, and with a skill and ability that will be
acknowledged in history as unsurpassed, if not unequaled. It
gives me as much pleasure to record this in your favor as it
world in favor of any living man, myself included. Truly yours,
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA,
GEORGIA, September 20, 1864.
Lieutenant-General
U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief, City Point, Virgina
GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge, at the hands of
Lieutenant Colonel Porter, of your staff, your letter of
September 12th, and accept with thanks the honorable and kindly
mention of the services of this army in the great cause in which
we are all engaged.
I send by Colonel Porter all official reports which are
completed, and will in a few days submit a list of names which
are deemed worthy of promotion.
I think we owe it to the President to save him the invidious
task of selection among the vast number of worthy applicants,
and have ordered my army commanders to prepare their lists with
great care, and to express their preferences, based upon claims
of actual capacity and services rendered.
These I will consolidate, and submit in such a form that, if
mistakes are made, they will at least be sanctioned by the best
contemporaneous evidence of merit, for I know that vacancies do
not exist equal in number to that of the officers who really
deserve promotion.
As to the future, I am pleased to know that your army is being
steadily reinforced by a good class of men, and I hope it will
go on until you have a force that is numerically double that of
your antagonist, so that with one part you can watch him, and
with the other push out boldly from your left flank, occupy the
Southside Railroad, compel him to attack you in position, or
accept battle on your own terms.
We ought to ask our country for the largest possible armies that
can be raised, as so important a thing as the self-existence of
a great nation should not be left to the fickle chances of war.
Now that Mobile is shut out to the commerce of our enemy, it
calls for no further effort on our part, unless the capture of
the city can be followed by the occupation of the Alabama River
and the railroad to Columbus, Georgia, when that place would be
a magnificent auxiliary to my further progress into Georgia;
but, until General Canby is much reinforced, and until he can
more thoroughly subdue the scattered armies west of the
Mississippi, I suppose that much cannot be attempted by him
against the Alabama River and Columbus, Georgia.
The utter destruction of Wilmington, North Carolina, is of
importance only in connection with the necessity of cutting off
all foreign trade to our enemy, and if Admiral Farragut can get
across the bar, and move quickly, I suppose he will succeed.
From my knowledge of the mouth of Cape Fear River, I anticipate
more difficulty in getting the heavy ships across the bar than
in reaching the town of Wilmington; but, of course, the
soundings of the channel are well known at Washington, as well
as the draught of his iron-clads, so that it must be
demonstrated to be feasible, or else it would not be attempted.
If successful, I suppose that Fort Caswell will be occupied, and
the fleet at once sent to the Savannah River. Then the reduction
of that city is the next question. It once in our possession,
and the river open to us, I would not hesitate to cross the
State of Georgia with sixty thousand men, hauling some stores,
and depending on the country for the balance. Where a million of
people find subsistence, my army won't starve; but, as you know,
in a country like Georgia, with few roads and innumerable
streams, an inferior force can so delay an army and harass it,
that it would not be a formidable object; but if the enemy knew
that we had our boats in the Savannah River I could rapidly move
to Milledgeville, where there is abundance of corn and meat, and
could so threaten Macon and Augusta that the enemy world
doubtless give up Macon for Augusta; then I would move so as to
interpose between Augusta and Savannah, and force him to give us
Augusta, with the only powder-mills and factories remaining in
the South, or let us have the use of the Savannah River. Either
horn of the dilemma will be worth a battle. I would prefer his
holding Augusta (as the probabilities are); for then, with the
Savannah River in our possession, the taking of Augusta would be
a mere matter of time. This campaign can be made in the winter.
But the more I study the game, the more am I convinced that it
would be wrong for us to penetrate farther into Georgia without
an objective beyond. It would not be productive of much good. I
can start east and make a circuit south and back, doing vast
damage to the State, but resulting in no permanent good; and by
mere threatening to do so, I hold a rod over the Georgians, who
are not over-loyal to the South. I will therefore give it as my
opinion that your army and Canby's should be reinforced to the
maximum; that, after you get Wilmington, you should strike for
Savannah and its river; that General Canby should hold the
Mississippi River, and send a force to take Columbus, Georgia,
either by way of the Alabama or Appalachicola River; that I
should keep Hood employed and put my army in fine order for a
march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston; and start as soon as
Wilmington is sealed to commerce, and the city of Savannah is in
our possession.
I think it will be found that the movements of Price and Shelby,
west of the Mississippi, are mere diversions. They cannot hope
to enter Missouri except as raiders; and the truth is, that
General Rosecrans should be ashamed to take my troops for such a
purpose. If you will secure Wilmington and the city of Savannah
from your centre, and let General Canby leave command over the
Mississippi River and country west of it, I will send a force to
the Alabama and Appalachicola, provided you give me one hundred
thousand of the drafted men to fill up my old regiments; and if
you will fix a day to be in Savannah, I will insure our
possession of Macon and a point on the river below Augusta. The
possession of the Savannah River is more than fatal to the
possibility of Southern independence. They may stand the fall of
Richmond, but not of all Georgia.
I will have a long talk with Colonel Porter, and tell him every
thing that may occur to me of interest to you.
In the mean time, know that I admire your dogged perseverance
and pluck more than ever. If you can whip Lee and I can march to
the Atlantic, I think Uncle Abe will give us a twenty days'
leave of absence to see the young folks.
Yours as ever,
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE
ARMY,
WASHINGTON, September 16, 1864.
General W. T.
SHERMAN, Atlanta, Georgia.
My DEAR GENERAL: Your very interesting letter of the 4th is
just received. Its perusal has given me the greatest pleasure. I
have not written before to congratulate you on the capture of
Atlanta, the objective point of your brilliant campaign, for the
reason that I have been suffering from my annual attack of "coryza,"
or hay-cold. It affects my eyes so much that I can scarcely see
to write. As you suppose, I have watched your movements most
attentively and critically, and I do not hesitate to say that
your campaign has been the most brilliant of the war. Its
results are less striking and less complete than those of
General Grant at Vicksburg, but then you have had greater
difficulties to encounter, a longer line of communications to
keep up, and a longer and more continuous strain upon yourself
and upon your army.
You must have been very considerably annoyed by the State negro
recruiting-agents. Your letter was a capital one, and did much
good. The law was a ridiculous one; it was opposed by the War
Department, but passed through the influence of Eastern
manufacturers, who hoped to escape the draft in that way. They
were making immense fortunes out of the war, and could well
afford to purchase negro recruits, and thus save their employees
at home.
I fully agree with you in regard to the policy of a stringent
draft; but, unfortunately, political influences are against us,
and I fear it will not amount to much. Mr. Seward's speech at
Auburn, again prophesying, for the twentieth time, that the
rebellion would be crushed in a few months, and saying that
there would be no draft, as we now had enough soldiers to end
the war, etc., has done much harm, in a military point of view.
I have seen enough of politics here to last me for life. You are
right in avoiding them. McClellan may possibly reach the White
House, but he will lose the respect of all honest, high-minded
patriots, by his affiliation with such traitors and Copperheads
as B—-, V—-, W—-, S—-, & Co. He would not stand upon the
traitorous Chicago platform, but he had not the manliness to
oppose it. A major-general in the United States Army, and yet
not one word to utter against rebels or the rebellion! I had
much respect for McClellan before he became a politician, but
very little after reading his letter accepting the nomination.
Hooker certainly made a mistake in leaving before the capture of
Atlanta. I understand that, when here, he said that you would
fail; your army was discouraged and dissatisfied, etc., etc. He
is most unmeasured in his abuse of me. I inclose you a specimen
of what he publishes in Northern papers, wherever he goes. They
are dictated by himself and written by W. B. and such worthies.
The funny part of the business is, that I had nothing whatever
to do with his being relieved on either occasion. Moreover, I
have never said any thing to the President or Secretary of War
to injure him in the slightest degree, and he knows that
perfectly well. His animosity arises from another source. He is
aware that I know some things about his character and conduct in
California, and, fearing that I may use that information against
him, he seeks to ward off its effect by making it appear that I
am his personal enemy, am jealous of him, etc. I know of no
other reason for his hostility to me. He is welcome to abuse me
as much as he pleases; I don't think it will do him much good,
or me much harm. I know very little of General Howard, but
believe him to be a true, honorable man. Thomas is also a noble
old war-horse. It is true, as you say, that he is slow, but he
is always sure.
I have not seen General Grant since the fall of Atlanta, and do
not know what instructions he has sent you. I fear that Canby
has not the means to do much by way of Mobile. The military
effects of Banks's disaster are now showing themselves by the
threatened operations of Price & Co. toward Missouri, thus
keeping in check our armies west of the Mississippi.
With many thanks for your kind letter, and wishes for your
future success, yours truly,
H. W. HALLECK.
HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September
20, 1864.
Major General
HALLECK, Chief of Staff, Washington D.C.
GENERAL: I have the honor herewith to submit copies of a
correspondence between General Hood, of the Confederate Army,
the Mayor of Atlanta, and myself, touching the removal of the
inhabitants of Atlanta.
In explanation of the tone which marks some of these letters, I
will only call your attention to the fact that, after I had
announced my determination, General Hood took upon himself to
question my motives. I could not tamely submit to such
impertinence; and I have also seen that, in violation of all
official usage, he has published in the Macon newspapers such
parts of the correspondence as suited his purpose. This could
have had no other object than to create a feeling on the part of
the people; but if he expects to resort to such artifices, I
think I can meet him there too.
It is sufficient for my Government to know that the removal of
the inhabitants has been made with liberality and fairness, that
it has been attended with no force, and that no women or
children have suffered, unless for want of provisions by their
natural protectors and friends.
My real reasons for this step were:
We want all the houses of Atlanta for military storage and
occupation.
We want to contract the lines of defense, so as to diminish the
garrison to the limit necessary to defend its narrow and vital
parts, instead of embracing, as the lines now do, the vast
suburbs. This contraction of the lines, with the necessary
citadels and redoubts, will make it necessary to destroy the
very houses used by families as residences.
Atlanta is a fortified town, was stubbornly defended, and fairly
captured. As captors, we have a right to it.
The residence here of a poor population would compel us, sooner
or later, to feed them or to see them starve under our eyes.
The residence here of the families of our enemies would be a
temptation and a means to keep up a correspondence dangerous and
hurtful to our cause; a civil population calls for
provost-guards, and absorbs the attention of officers in
listening to everlasting complaints and special grievances that
are not military.
These are my reasons; and, if satisfactory to the Government of
the United States, it makes no difference whether it pleases
General Hood and his people or not. I am, with respect, your
obedient servant,
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.
HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 7, 1864.
General HOOD,
commanding Confederate Army.
GENERAL: I have deemed it to the interest of the United
States that the citizens now residing in Atlanta should remove,
those who prefer it to go south, and the rest north. For the
latter I can provide food and transportation to points of their
election in Tennessee, Kentucky, or farther north. For the
former I can provide transportation by cars as far as Rough and
Ready, and also wagons; but, that their removal may be made with
as little discomfort as possible, it will be necessary for you
to help the families from Rough and Ready to the care at
Lovejoy's. If you consent, I will undertake to remove all the
families in Atlanta who prefer to go south to Rough and Ready,
with all their movable effects, viz., clothing, trunks,
reasonable furniture, bedding, etc., with their servants, white
and black, with the proviso that no force shall be used toward
the blacks, one way or the other. If they want to go with their
masters or mistresses, they may do so; otherwise they will be
sent away, unless they be men, when they may be employed by our
quartermaster. Atlanta is no place for families or
non-combatants, and I have no desire to send them north if you
will assist in conveying them south. If this proposition meets
your views, I will consent to a truce in the neighborhood of
Rough and Ready, stipulating that any wagons, horses, animals,
or persons sent there for the purposes herein stated, shall in
no manner be harmed or molested; you in your turn agreeing that
any care, wagons, or carriages, persons or animals sent to the
same point, shall not be interfered with. Each of us might send
a guard of, say, one hundred men, to maintain order, and limit
the truce to, say, two days after a certain time appointed.
I have authorized the mayor to choose two citizens to convey to
you this letter, with such documents as the mayor may forward in
explanation, and shall await your reply. I have the honor to be
your obedient servant.
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.
Major General W. T.
SHERMAN, commanding United States Forces in Georgia
GENERAL: Your letter of yesterday's date, borne by James M.
Ball and James R. Crew, citizens of Atlanta, is received. You
say therein, "I deem it to be to the interest of the United
States that the citizens now residing in Atlanta should remove,"
etc. I do not consider that I have any alternative in this
matter. I therefore accept your proposition to declare a truce
of two days, or such time as may be necessary to accomplish the
purpose mentioned, and shall render all assistance in my power
to expedite the transportation of citizens in this direction. I
suggest that a staff-officer be appointed by you to superintend
the removal from the city to Rough and Ready, while I appoint a
like officer to control their removal farther south; that a
guard of one hundred men be sent by either party as you propose,
to maintain order at that place, and that the removal begin on
Monday next.
And now, sir, permit me to say that the unprecedented measure
you propose transcends, in studied and ingenious cruelty, all
acts ever before brought to my attention in the dark history of
war.
In the name of God and humanity, I protest, believing that you
will find that you are expelling from their homes and firesides
the wives and children of a brave people. I am, general, very
respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. B. HOOD, General.
HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA,
GEORGIA, September 10, 1864.
General J. B. HOOD,
commanding Army of Tennessee, Confederate Army.
GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of this date, at the hands of Messrs. Ball and Crew,
consenting to the arrangements I had proposed to facilitate the
removal south of the people of Atlanta, who prefer to go in that
direction. I inclose you a copy of my orders, which will, I am
satisfied, accomplish my purpose perfectly.
You style the measures proposed "unprecedented," and appeal to
the dark history of war for a parallel, as an act of "studied
and ingenious cruelty." It is not unprecedented; for General
Johnston himself very wisely and properly removed the families
all the way from Dalton down, and I see no reason why Atlanta
should be excepted. Nor is it necessary to appeal to the dark
history of war, when recent and modern examples are so handy.
You yourself burned dwelling-houses along your parapet, and I
have seen to-day fifty houses that you have rendered
uninhabitable because they stood in the way of your forts and
men. You defended Atlanta on a line so close to town that every
cannon-shot and many musket-shots from our line of investment,
that overshot their mark, went into the habitations of women and
children. General Hardee did the same at Jonesboro, and General
Johnston did the same, last summer, at Jackson, Mississippi. I
have not accused you of heartless cruelty, but merely instance
these cases of very recent occurrence, and could go on and
enumerate hundreds of others, and challenge any fair man to
judge which of us has the heart of pity for the families of a
"brave people."
I say that it is kindness to these families of Atlanta to remove
them now, at once, from scenes that women and children should
not be exposed to, and the "brave people" should scorn to commit
their wives and children to the rude barbarians who thus, as you
say, violate the laws of war, as illustrated in the pages of its
dark history.
In the name of common-sense, I ask you not to appeal to a just
God in such a sacrilegious manner. You who, in the midst of
peace and prosperity, have plunged a nation into war—dark and
cruel war—who dared and badgered us to battle, insulted our
flag, seized our arsenals and forts that were left in the
honorable custody of peaceful ordnance-sergeants, seized and
made "prisoners of war" the very garrisons sent to protect your
people against negroes and Indians, long before any overt act
was committed by the (to you) hated Lincoln Government; tried to
force Kentucky and Missouri into rebellion, spite of themselves;
falsified the vote of
Louisiana; turned loose your privateers to
plunder unarmed ships; expelled Union families by the thousands,
burned their houses, and declared, by an act of your Congress,
the confiscation of all debts due Northern men for goods had and
received! Talk thus to the marines, but not to me, who have seen
these things, and who will this day make as much sacrifice for
the peace and honor of the South as the best-born Southerner
among you! If we must be enemies, let us be men, and fight it
out as we propose to do, and not deal in arch hypocritical
appeals to God and humanity. God will judge us in due time, and
he will pronounce whether it be more humane to fight with a town
full of women and the families of a brave people at our back or
to remove them in time to places of safety among their own
friends and people. I am, very respectfully, your obedient
servant,
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF
THE TENNESSEE September 12, 1864
Major-General W. T,
SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.
GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your
letter of the 9th inst., with its inclosure in reference to the
women, children, and others, whom you have thought proper to
expel from their homes in the city of Atlanta. Had you seen
proper to let the matter rest there, I would gladly have allowed
your letter to close this correspondence, and, without your
expressing it in words, would have been willing to believe that,
while "the interests of the United States," in your opinion,
compelled you to an act of barbarous cruelty, you regretted the
necessity, and we would have dropped the subject; but you have
chosen to indulge in statements which I feel compelled to
notice, at least so far as to signify my dissent, and not allow
silence in regard to them to be construed as acquiescence.
I see nothing in your communication which induces me to modify
the language of condemnation with which I characterized your
order. It but strengthens me in the opinion that it stands
"preeminent in the dark history of war for studied and ingenious
cruelty." Your original order was stripped of all pretenses; you
announced the edict for the sole reason that it was "to the
interest of the United States." This alone you offered to us and
the civilized world as an all-sufficient reason for disregarding
the laws of God and man. You say that "General Johnston himself
very wisely and properly removed the families all the way from
Dalton down." It is due to that gallant soldier and gentleman to
say that no act of his distinguished career gives the least
color to your unfounded aspersions upon his conduct. He
depopulated no villages, nor towns, nor cities, either friendly
or hostile. He offered and extended friendly aid to his
unfortunate fellow-citizens who desired to flee from your
fraternal embraces. You are equally unfortunate in your attempt
to find a justification for this act of cruelty, either in the
defense of Jonesboro, by General Hardee, or of Atlanta, by
myself. General Hardee defended his position in front of
Jonesboro at the expense of injury to the houses; an ordinary,
proper, and justifiable act of war. I defended Atlanta at the
same risk and cost. If there was any fault in either case, it
was your own, in not giving notice, especially in the case of
Atlanta, of your purpose to shell the town, which is usual in
war among civilized nations. No inhabitant was expelled from his
home and fireside by the orders of General Hardee or myself, and
therefore your recent order can find no support from the conduct
of either of us. I feel no other emotion other than pain in
reading that portion of your letter which attempts to justify
your shelling Atlanta without notice under pretense that I
defended Atlanta upon a line so close to town that every
cannon-shot and many musket-balls from your line of investment,
that overshot their mark, went into the habitations of women and
children. I made no complaint of your firing into Atlanta in any
way you thought proper. I make none now, but there are a hundred
thousand witnesses that you fired into the habitations of women
and children for weeks, firing far above and miles beyond my
line of defense. I have too good an opinion, founded both upon
observation and experience, of the skill of your artillerists,
to credit the insinuation that they for several weeks
unintentionally fired too high for my modest field-works, and
slaughtered women and children by accident and want of skill.
The residue of your letter is rather discussion. It opens a wide
field for the discussion of questions which I do not feel are
committed to me. I am only a general of one of the armies of the
Confederate States, charged with military operations in the
field, under the direction of my superior officers, and I am not
called upon to discuss with you the causes of the present war,
or the political questions which led to or resulted from it.
These grave and important questions have been committed to far
abler hands than mine, and I shall only refer to them so far as
to repel any unjust conclusion which might be drawn from my
silence. You charge my country with "daring and badgering you to
battle." The truth is, we sent commissioners to you,
respectfully offering a peaceful separation, before the first
gun was fired on either aide. You say we insulted your flag. The
truth is, we fired upon it, and those who fought under it, when
you came to our doors upon the mission of subjugation. You say
we seized upon your forts and arsenals, and made prisoners of
the garrisons sent to protect us against negroes and Indians.
The truth is, we, by force of arms, drove out insolent intruders
and took possession of our own forts and arsenals, to resist
your claims to dominion over masters, slaves, and Indians, all
of whom are to this day, with a unanimity unexampled in the
history of the world, warring against your attempts to become
their masters. You say that we tried to force Missouri and
Kentucky into rebellion in spite of themselves. The truth is, my
Government, from the beginning of this struggle to this hour,
has again and again offered, before the whole world, to leave it
to the unbiased will of these States, and all others, to
determine for themselves whether they will cast their destiny
with your Government or ours; and your Government has resisted
this fundamental principle of free institutions with the
bayonet, and labors daily, by force and fraud, to fasten its
hateful tyranny upon the unfortunate freemen of these States.
You say we falsified the vote of Louisiana. The truth is,
Louisiana not only separated herself from your Government by
nearly a unanimous vote of her people, but has vindicated the
act upon every battle-field from Gettysburg to the Sabine, and
has exhibited an heroic devotion to her decision which
challenges the admiration and respect of every man capable of
feeling sympathy for the oppressed or admiration for heroic
valor. You say that we turned loose pirates to plunder your
unarmed ships. The truth is, when you robbed us of our part of
the navy, we built and bought a few vessels, hoisted the flag of
our country, and swept the seas, in defiance of your navy,
around the whole circumference of the globe. You say we have
expelled Union families by thousands. The truth is, not a single
family has been expelled from the Confederate States, that I am
aware of; but, on the contrary, the moderation of our Government
toward traitors has been a fruitful theme of denunciation by its
enemies and well-meaning friends of our cause. You say my
Government, by acts of Congress, has confiscated "all debts due
Northern men for goods sold and delivered." The truth is, our
Congress gave due and ample time to your merchants and traders
to depart from our shores with their ships, goods, and effects,
and only sequestrated the property of our enemies in retaliation
for their acts—declaring us traitors, and confiscating our
property wherever their power extended, either in their country
or our own. Such are your accusations, and such are the facts
known of all men to be true.
You order into exile the whole population of a city; drive men,
women and children from their homes at the point of the bayonet,
under the plea that it is to the interest of your Government,
and on the claim that it is "an act of kindness to these
families of Atlanta." Butler only banished from New Orleans the
registered enemies of his Government, and acknowledged that he
did it as a punishment. You issue a sweeping edict, covering all
the inhabitants of a city, and add insult to the injury heaped
upon the defenseless by assuming that you have done them a
kindness. This you follow by the assertion that you will "make
as much sacrifice for the peace and honor of the South as the
best-born Southerner." And, because I characterize what you call
as kindness as being real cruelty, you presume to sit in
judgment between me and my God; and you decide that my earnest
prayer to the Almighty Father to save our women and children
from what you call kindness, is a "sacrilegious, hypocritical
appeal."
You came into our country with your army, avowedly for the
purpose of subjugating free white men, women, and children, and
not only intend to rule over them, but you make negroes your
allies, and desire to place over us an inferior race, which we
have raised from barbarism to its present position, which is the
highest ever attained by that race, in any country, in all time.
I must, therefore, decline to accept your statements in
reference to your kindness toward the people of Atlanta, and
your willingness to sacrifice every thing for the peace and
honor of the South, and refuse to be governed by your decision
in regard to matters between myself, my country, and my God.
You say, "Let us fight it out like men." To this my reply is—for
myself, and I believe for all the free men, ay, and women and
children, in my country—we will fight you to the death! Better
die a thousand deaths than submit to live under you or your
Government and your negro allies!
Having answered the points forced upon me by your letter of the
9th of September, I close this correspondence with you; and,
notwithstanding your comments upon my appeal to God in the cause
of humanity, I again humbly and reverently invoke his almighty
aid in defense of justice and right. Respectfully, your obedient
servant,
J. B. HOOD, General.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA,
September 11, 1864
Major-General W. T. SHERMAN.
Sir: We the undersigned, Mayor and two of the Council for the
city of Atlanta, for the time being the only legal organ of the
people of the said city, to express their wants and wishes, ask
leave most earnestly but respectfully to petition you to
reconsider the order requiring them to leave Atlanta.
At first view, it struck us that the measure world involve
extraordinary hardship and loss, but since we have seen the
practical execution of it so far as it has progressed, and the
individual condition of the people, and heard their statements
as to the inconveniences, loss, and suffering attending it, we
are satisfied that the amount of it will involve in the
aggregate consequences appalling and heart-rending.
Many poor women are in advanced state of pregnancy, others now
having young children, and whose husbands for the greater part
are either in the army, prisoners, or dead. Some say: "I have
such a one sick at my house; who will wait on them when I am
gone?" Others say: "What are we to do? We have no house to go
to, and no means to buy, build, or rent any; no parents,
relatives, or friends, to go to." Another says: "I will try and
take this or that article of property, but such and such things
I must leave behind, though I need them much." We reply to them:
"General Sherman will carry your property to Rough and Ready,
and General Hood will take it thence on." And they will reply to
that: "But I want to leave the railroad at such a place, and
cannot get conveyance from there on."
We only refer to a few facts, to try to illustrate in part how
this measure will operate in practice. As you advanced, the
people north of this fell back; and before your arrival here, a
large portion of the people had retired south, so that the
country south of this is already crowded, and without houses
enough to accommodate the people, and we are informed that many
are now staying in churches and other out-buildings.
This being so, how is it possible for the people still here
(mostly women and children) to find any shelter? And how can
they live through the winter in the woods—no shelter or
subsistence, in the midst of strangers who know them not, and
without the power to assist them much, if they were willing to
do so?
This is but a feeble picture of the consequences of this
measure. You know the woe, the horrors, and the suffering,
cannot be described by words; imagination can only conceive of
it, and we ask you to take these things into consideration.
We know your mind and time are constantly occupied with the
duties of your command, which almost deters us from asking your
attention to this matter, but thought it might be that you had
not considered this subject in all of its awful consequences,
and that on more reflection you, we hope, would not make this
people an exception to all mankind, for we know of no such
instance ever having occurred—surely never in the United
States—and what has this helpless people done, that they should
be driven from their homes, to wander strangers and outcasts,
and exiles, and to subsist on charity?
We do not know as yet the number of people still here; of those
who are here, we are satisfied a respectable number, if allowed
to remain at home, could subsist for several months without
assistance, and a respectable number for a much longer time, and
who might not need assistance at any time.
In conclusion, we most earnestly and solemnly petition you to
reconsider this order, or modify it, and suffer this unfortunate
people to remain at home, and enjoy what little means they have.
Respectfully submitted
JAMES M. CALHOUN, Mayor.
E. E. RAWSON, Councilman.
S. C. Warns, Councilman.
HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA,
GEORGIA, September 12, 1864.
JAMES M. CALHOUN,
Mayor, E. E. RAWSON and S. C. Wares, representing City Council
of Atlanta.
GENTLEMEN: I have your letter of the 11th, in the nature of a
petition to revoke my orders removing all the inhabitants from
Atlanta. I have read it carefully, and give full credit to your
statements of the distress that will be occasioned, and yet
shall not revoke my orders, because they were not designed to
meet the humanities of the case, but to prepare for the future
struggles in which millions of good people outside of Atlanta
have a deep interest. We must have peace, not only at Atlanta,
but in all America. To secure this, we must stop the war that
now desolates our once happy and favored country. To stop war,
we must defeat the rebel armies which are arrayed against the
laws and Constitution that all must respect and obey. To defeat
those armies, we must prepare the way to reach them in their
recesses, provided with the arms and instruments which enable us
to accomplish our purpose. Now, I know the vindictive nature of
our enemy, that we may have many years of military operations
from this quarter; and, therefore, deem it wise and prudent to
prepare in time. The use of Atlanta for warlike purposes is
inconsistent with its character as a home for families. There
will be no manufactures, commerce, or agriculture here, for the
maintenance of families, and sooner or later want will compel
the inhabitants to go. Why not go now, when all the arrangements
are completed for the transfer,—instead of waiting till the
plunging shot of contending armies will renew the scenes of the
past months. Of course, I do not apprehend any such thing at
this moment, but you do not suppose this army will be here until
the war is over. I cannot discuss this subject with you fairly,
because I cannot impart to you what we propose to do, but I
assert that our military plans make it necessary for the
inhabitants to go away, and I can only renew my offer of
services to make their exodus in any direction as easy and
comfortable as possible.
You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will. War is
cruelty, and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war
into our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a
people can pour out. I know I had no hand in making this war,
and I know I will make more sacrifices to-day than any of you to
secure peace. But you cannot have peace and a division of our
country. If the United States submits to a division now, it will
not stop, but will go on until we reap the fate of Mexico, which
is eternal war. The United States does and must assert its
authority, wherever it once had power; for, if it relaxes one
bit to pressure, it is gone, and I believe that such is the
national feeling. This feeling assumes various shapes, but
always comes back to that of Union. Once admit the Union, once
more acknowledge the authority of the national Government, and,
instead of devoting your houses and streets and roads to the
dread uses of war, I and this army become at once your
protectors and supporters, shielding you from danger, let it
come from what quarter it may. I know that a few individuals
cannot resist a torrent of error and passion, such as swept the
South into rebellion, but you can point out, so that we may know
those who desire a government, and those who insist on war and
its desolation.
You might as well appeal against the thunder-storm as against
these terrible hardships of war. They are inevitable, and the
only way the people of Atlanta can hope once more to live in
peace and quiet at home, is to stop the war, which can only be
done by admitting that it began in error and is perpetuated in
pride.
We don't want your negroes, or your horses, or your houses, or
your lands, or any thing you have, but we do want and will have
a just obedience to the laws of the United States. That we will
have, and, if it involves the destruction of your improvements,
we cannot help it.
You have heretofore read public sentiment in your newspapers,
that live by falsehood and excitement; and the quicker you seek
for truth in other quarters, the better. I repeat then that, by
the original compact of Government, the United States had
certain rights in Georgia, which have never been relinquished
and never will be; that the South began war by seizing forts,
arsenals, mints, custom-houses, etc., etc., long before Mr.
Lincoln was installed, and before the South had one jot or
tittle of provocation. I myself have seen in Missouri, Kentucky,
Tennessee, and Mississippi, hundreds and thousands of women and
children fleeing from your armies and desperadoes, hungry and
with bleeding feet. In Memphis, Vicksburg, and Mississippi, we
fed thousands upon thousands of the families of rebel soldiers
left on our hands, and whom we could not see starve. Now that
war comes home to you; you feel very different. You deprecate
its horrors, but did not feel them when you sent car-loads of
soldiers and ammunition, and moulded shells and shot, to carry
war into Kentucky and Tennessee, to desolate the homes of
hundreds and thousands of good people who only asked to live in
peace at their old homes, and under the Government of their
inheritance. But these comparisons are idle. I want peace, and
believe it can only be reached through union and war, and I will
ever conduct war with a view to perfect and early success.
But, my dear sirs, when peace does come, you may call on me for
any thing. Then will I share with you the last cracker, and
watch with you to shield your homes and families against danger
from every quarter.
Now you must go, and take with you the old and feeble, feed and
nurse them, and build for them, in more quiet places, proper
habitations to shield them against the weather until the mad
passions of men cool down, and allow the Union and peace once
more to settle over your old homes at Atlanta. Yours in haste,
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.
HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 14, 1864.
General J. B. HOOD,
commanding Army of the Tennessee, Confederate Army.
GENERAL: Yours of September 12th is received, and has been
carefully perused. I agree with you that this discussion by two
soldiers is out of place, and profitless; but you must admit
that you began the controversy by characterizing an official act
of mine in unfair and improper terms. I reiterate my former
answer, and to the only new matter contained in your rejoinder
add: We have no "negro allies" in this army; not a single negro
soldier left Chattanooga with this army, or is with it now.
There are a few guarding Chattanooga, which General Steedman
sent at one time to drive Wheeler out of Dalton.
I was not bound by the laws of war to give notice of the
shelling of Atlanta, a "fortified town, with magazines,
arsenals, founderies, and public stores;" you were bound to take
notice. See the books.
This is the conclusion of our correspondence, which I did not
begin, and terminate with satisfaction. I am, with respect, your
obedient servant,
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE
ARMY
WASHINGTON, September 28, 1864,
Major-General SHERMAN, Atlanta, Georgia.
GENERAL: Your communications of the 20th in regard to the
removal of families from Atlanta, and the exchange of prisoners,
and also the official report of your campaign, are just
received. I have not had time as yet to examine your report. The
course which you have pursued in removing rebel families from
Atlanta, and in the exchange of prisoners, is fully approved by
the War Department. Not only are you justified by the laws and
usages of war in removing these people, but I think it was your
duty to your own army to do so. Moreover, I am fully of opinion
that the nature of your position, the character of the war, the
conduct of the enemy (and especially of non-combatants and women
of the territory which we have heretofore conquered and
occupied), will justify you in gathering up all the forage and
provisions which your army may require, both for a siege of
Atlanta and for your supply in your march farther into the
enemy's country. Let the disloyal families of the country, thus
stripped, go to their husbands, fathers, and natural protectors,
in the rebel ranks; we have tried three years of conciliation
and kindness without any reciprocation; on the contrary, those
thus treated have acted as spies and guerrillas in our rear and
within our lines. The safety of our armies, and a proper regard
for the lives of our soldiers, require that we apply to our
inexorable foes the severe rules of war. We certainly are not
required to treat the so-called non-combatant rebels better than
they themselves treat each other. Even herein Virginia, within
fifty miles of Washington, they strip their own families of
provisions, leaving them, as our army advances, to be fed by us,
or to starve within our lines. We have fed this class of people
long enough. Let them go with their husbands and fathers in the
rebel ranks; and if they won't go, we must send them to their
friends and natural protectors. I would destroy every mill and
factory within reach which I did not want for my own use. This
the rebels have done, not only in Maryland and Pennsylvania, but
also in Virginia and other rebel States, when compelled to fall
back before our armies. In many sections of the country they
have not left a mill to grind grain for their own suffering
families, lest we might use them to supply our armies. We most
do the same.
I have endeavored to impress these views upon our commanders for
the last two years. You are almost the only one who has properly
applied them. I do not approve of General Hunter's course in
burning private homes or uselessly destroying private property.
That is barbarous. But I approve of taking or destroying
whatever may serve as supplies to us or to the enemy's army.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Chief of Staff
In order to effect the exchange of prisoners, to facilitate the
exodus of the people of Atlanta, and to keep open communication with the
South, we established a neutral camp, at and about the railroad-station
next south of Atlanta, known as "Rough and Ready," to which point I
dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel Willard Warner, of my staff, with a guard
of one hundred men, and General Hood sent Colonel Clare, of his staff,
with a similar guard; these officers and men harmonized perfectly, and
parted good friends when their work was done. In the mean time I also
had reconnoitred the entire rebel lines about Atlanta, which were well
built, but were entirely too extensive to be held by a single corps or
division of troops, so I instructed Colonel Poe, United States
Engineers, on my staff, to lay off an inner and shorter line,
susceptible of defense by a smaller garrison.
By the middle of September all these matters were in progress, the
reports of the past campaign were written up and dispatched to
Washington, and our thoughts began to turn toward the future. Admiral
Farragut had boldly and successfully run the forts at the entrance to
Mobile Bay, which resulted in the capture of Fort Morgan, so that
General Canby was enabled to begin his regular operations against Mobile
City, with a view to open the Alabama River to navigation. My first
thoughts were to concert operations with him, either by way of
Montgomery, Alabama, or by the Appalachicula; but so long a line, to be
used as a base for further operations eastward, was not advisable, and I
concluded to await the initiative of the enemy, supposing that he would
be forced to resort to some desperate campaign by the clamor raised at
the South on account of the great loss to them of the city of Atlanta.
General Thomas occupied a house on Marietta Streets which had a
veranda with high pillars. We were sitting there one evening, talking
about things generally, when General Thomas asked leave to send his
trains back to Chattanooga, for the convenience and economy of forage. I
inquired of him if he supposed we would be allowed much rest at Atlanta,
and he said he thought we would, or that at all events it would not be
prudent for us to go much farther into Georgia because of our already
long line of communication, viz., three hundred miles from Nashville.
This was true; but there we were, and we could not afford to remain on
the defensive, simply holding Atlanta and fighting for the safety of its
railroad. I insisted on his retaining all trains, and on keeping all his
divisions ready to move at a moment's warning. All the army, officers
and men, seemed to relax more or less, and sink into a condition of
idleness. General Schofield was permitted to go to Knoxville, to look
after matters in his Department of the Ohio; and Generals Blair and
Logan went home to look after politics. Many of the regiments were
entitled to, and claimed, their discharge, by reason of the expiration
of their term of service; so that with victory and success came also
many causes of disintegration.
The rebel General Wheeler was still in Middle Tennessee, threatening
our railroads, and rumors came that Forrest was on his way from
Mississippi to the same theatre, for the avowed purpose of breaking up
our railroads and compelling us to fall back from our conquest. To
prepare for this, or any other emergency, I ordered Newton's division of
the Fourth Corps back to Chattanooga, and Corse's division of the
Seventeenth Corps to Rome, and instructed General Rousseau at Nashville,
Granger at Decatur, and Steadman at Chattanooga, to adopt the most
active measures to protect and insure the safety of our roads.
Hood still remained about Lovejoy's Station, and, up to the 15th of
September, had given no signs of his future plans; so that with this
date I close the campaign of Atlanta, with the following review of our
relative losses during the months of August and September, with a
summary of those for the whole campaign, beginning May 6 and ending
September 15, 1864. The losses for August and September are added
together, so as to include those about Jonesboro:
|
Killed and Missing |
Wounded |
Total |
Grand Aggregate
|
1,408 |
3,731 |
5,139 |
Hood's losses, as reported for the same period, page 577, Johnston's
"Narrative:"
|
Killed |
Wounded |
Total |
|
482 |
3,223 |
3,705 |
To which should be added:
Prisoners captured by us: |
3,738 |
|
Giving his total loss |
7,440 |
On recapitulating the entire losses of each army during the entire
campaign, from May to September, inclusive, we have, in the Union army,
as per table appended:
Killed |
4,423 |
Wounded |
22,822 |
Missing |
4,442 |
|
Aggregate Loss
|
31,627 |
In the Southern army, according to the reports of Surgeon Foard (pp
576, 577, Johnston's "Narrative ")
Total killed |
3,044 |
Total killed and wounded |
21,996 |
Prisoners captured by us |
12,983 |
|
Aggregate loss to the Southern Army
|
34,979 |
The foregoing figures are official, and are very nearly correct. I
see no room for error save in the cavalry, which was very much
scattered, and whose reports are much less reliable than of the infantry
and artillery; but as Surgeon Foard's tables do not embrace Wheeler's,
Jackson's, and Martin's divisions of cavalry, I infer that the
comparison, as to cavalry losses, is a "stand-off."
I have no doubt that the Southern officers flattered themselves that
they had filled and crippled of us two and even six to one, as stated by
Johnston; but they were simply mistaken, and I herewith submit official
tabular statements made up from the archives of the War Department, in
proof thereof.
I have also had a careful tabular statement compiled from official
records in the adjutant-general's office, giving the "effective
strength" of the army under my command for each of the months of May,
June, July, August, and September, 1864, which enumerate every man
(infantry, artillery, and cavalry) for duty. The recapitulation clearly
exhibits the actual truth. We opened the campaign with 98,797
(ninety-eight thousand seven hundred and ninety-seven) men. Blair's two
divisions joined us early in June, giving 112,819 (one hundred and
twelve thousand eight hundred and nineteen), which number gradually
became reduced to 106,070 (one hundred and six thousand and seventy
men), 91,675 (ninety-one thousand six hundred and seventy-five), and
81,758 (eighty-one thousand seven hundred and fifty-eight) at the end of
the campaign. This gradual reduction was not altogether owing to death
and wounds, but to the expiration of service, or by detachments sent to
points at the rear.
|