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Stonewall Jackson Free Online Books |
Stonewall Jackson in Civil War |
Stonewall Jackson Biography |
Stonewall Jackson Obituary |
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STONEWALL JACKSON Chapter IV SECESSION.
1860–61
Stonewall Jackson Index |
Stonewall Jackson at West Point |
Stonewall Jackson and Mexican War |
Stonewall Jackson Lexington |
Stonewall Jackson and Secession |
Stonewall Jackson and Harper's Ferry |
Stonewall Jackson at Battle of Bull Run |
Stonewall Jackson at Romney |
Stonewall Jackson at Kernstown |
Battle of McDowell |
Battle of Winchester |
Battle of Cross Keys and Port Republic |
Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign |
The Seven Days Battle |
Battle of Frayser's Farm and Malvern Hill |
Battle of Cedar Run |
Second Battle of Bull Run |
Battle of Second Bull Run Conclusion |
Battle of Harper's Ferry |
Battle of Sharpsburg |
Battle of Fredericksburg |
The Army of Northern Virginia |
Stonewall Jackson's Winter Quarters |
Battle of Chancellorsville |
Battle of Chancellorsville Conclusion 
1861 Jackson spent ten years at Lexington, and he was just
five-and-thirty when he left it. For ten years he had seen no more
of military service than the drills of the cadet battalion. He had
lost all touch with the army. His name had been forgotten, except by
his comrades of the Mexican campaign, and he had hardly seen a
regular soldier since he resigned his commission. But, even from a
military point of view, those ten years had not been wasted. His
mind had a wider grasp, and his brain was more active. Striving to
fit himself for such duties as might devolve on him, should he be
summoned to the field, like all great men and all practical men he
had gone to the best masters. In the campaigns of Napoleon he had
found instruction in the highest branch of his profession, and had
made his own the methods of war which the greatest of modern
soldiers both preached and practised. Maturer years and the search
for wisdom had steadied his restless daring; and his devotion to
duty, always remarkable, had become a second nature. His health,
under careful and self-imposed treatment, had much improved, and the
year 1861 found him in the prime of physical and mental vigour.
Already it had become apparent that his life at Lexington was soon
to end. The Damascus blade was not to rust upon the shelf. During
the winter of 1860–61 the probability of a conflict between the free
and slave-holding States, that is, between North and South, had
become almost a certainty. South Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama,
Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, and Texas, had formally seceded from the Union; and
establishing a Provisional Government, with
Jefferson Davis as President, at
Montgomery in Alabama, had proclaimed a new Republic, under the
title of the
Confederate
States of America. In order to explain Jackson’s attitude at
this momentous crisis, it will be necessary to discuss the action of
Virginia, and to investigate the motives which led her to take the
side she did. Forces which it was
impossible to curb, and which but few detected, were at the root of
the secession movement. The ostensible cause was the future status
of the negro. Slavery was
recognised in fifteen States of the Union. In the North it had long
been abolished, but this made no difference to its existence in the
South. The States which composed the Union were semi-independent
communities, with their own legislatures, their own magistracies,
their own militia, and the power of the purse. How far their
sovereign rights extended was a matter of contention; but, under the
terms of the Constitution, slavery was a domestic institution, which
each individual State was at liberty to retain or discard at will,
and over which the Federal Government had no control whatever.
Congress would have been no more justified in declaring that the
slaves in Virginia were free men than in demanding that Russian
conspirators should be tried by jury. Nor was the philanthropy of
the Northern people, generally speaking, of an enthusiastic nature.
The majority regarded slavery as a necessary evil; and, if they
deplored the reproach to the Republic, they made little parade of
their sentiments. A large number of Southerners believed it to be
the happiest condition for the African race; but the best men,
especially in the border States, of which Virginia was the
principal, would have welcomed emancipation. But neither Northerner
nor Southerner saw a practicable method of giving freedom to the
negro. Such a measure, if carried out in its entirety, meant ruin to
the South. Cotton and tobacco, the principal and most lucrative
crops, required an immense number of hands, and in those hands—
THE ABOLITIONISTS 80
his negro slaves—the capital of the planter was locked up.
Emancipation would have swept the whole of this capital away.
Compensation, the remedy applied by England to Jamaica and South
Africa, was hardly to be thought of. Instead of twenty millions
sterling, it would have cost four hundred millions. It was doubtful,
too, if compensation would have staved off the ruin of the planters.
The labour of the free negro, naturally indolent and improvident,
was well known to be most inefficient as compared with that of the
slave. For some years, to say the least, after emancipation it would
have been impossible to work the plantations except at a heavy loss.
Moreover, abolition, in the judgment of all who knew him, meant ruin
to the negro. Under the system of the plantations, honesty and
morality were being gradually instilled into the coloured race. But
these virtues had as yet made little progress; the Christianity of
the slaves was but skin-deep; and if all restraint were removed, if
the old ties were broken, and the influence of the planter and his
family should cease to operate, it was only too probable that the
four millions of Africans would relapse into the barbaric vices of
their original condition. The hideous massacres which had followed
emancipation in San Domingo had not yet been forgotten. It is little
wonder, then, that the majority shrank before a problem involving
such tremendous consequences. A
party, however, conspicuous both in New England and the West, had
taken abolition for its watchword. Small in numbers, but vehement in
denunciation, its voice was heard throughout the Union. Zeal for
universal liberty rose superior to the Constitution. That instrument
was repudiated as an iniquitous document. The sovereign rights of
the individual States were indignantly denied. Slavery was denounced
as the sum of all villainies, the slave-holder as the worst of
tyrants; and no concealment was made of the intention, should
political power be secured, of compelling the South to set the
negroes free. In the autumn of 1860 came the Presidential election.
Hitherto, of the two great political parties, the Democrats had long
ruled the councils of the nation, and nearly the
THE ABOLITIONISTS 81
whole South was Democratic. The South, as regards population, was
numerically inferior to the North; but the Democratic party had more
than held its own at the ballot-boxes, for the reason that it had
many adherents in the North. So long as the Southern and Northern
Democrats held together, they far outnumbered the Republicans. In
1860, however, the two sections of the Democratic party split
asunder. The Republicans, favoured by the schism, carried their own
candidate, and
Abraham Lincoln became President. South Carolina at once seceded
and the Confederacy was soon afterwards established.
It is not at first sight apparent why a change of government should
have caused so sudden a disruption of the Union. The Republican
party, however, embraced sections of various shades of thought. One
of these, rising every day to greater prominence, was that which
advocated immediate abolition; and to this section, designated by
the South as “Black Republicans,” the new President was believed to
belong. It is possible that, on his advent to office, the political
leaders of the South, despite the safeguards of the Constitution,
saw in the near future the unconditional emancipation of the slaves;
and not only this, but that the emancipated slaves would receive the
right of suffrage, and be placed on a footing of complete equality
with their former masters.1 As in many districts the
whites were far outnumbered by the negroes, this was tantamount to
transferring all local government into the hands of the latter, and
surrendering the planters to the mercies of their former bondsmen.
It is hardly necessary to say that an act of such gross injustice
was never contemplated, except by hysterical abolitionists and those
who truckled for their votes. It was certainly not contemplated by
Mr. Lincoln; and
it was hardly likely that a President who had been elected by a
minority of the people would dare, even if he were so inclined, to
assume unconstitutional powers. The Democratic party, taking both
sections together, was still the stronger;
1 Grant’s Memoirs, vol. i, p. 214.
THE ABOLITIONISTS 82
and the Northern Democrats, temporarily severed as they were from
their Southern brethren, would most assuredly have united with them
in resisting any unconstitutional action on the part of the
Republicans. If, then, it might be
asked, slavery ran no risk of unconditional abolition, why should
the Southern political leaders have acted with such extraordinary
precipitation? Why, in a country in which, to all appearances, the
two sections had been cordially united, should the advent to power
of one political party have been the signal for so much disquietude
on the part of the other? Had the presidential seat been suddenly
usurped by an abolitionist tyrant of the type of Robespierre the
South could hardly have exhibited greater apprehension. Few
Americans denied that a permanent Union, such as had been designed
by the founders of the Republic, was the best guarantee of
prosperity and peace. And yet because a certain number of misguided
if well-meaning men clamoured for emancipation, the South chose to
bring down in ruin the splendid fabric which their forefathers had
constructed. In thus refusing to trust the good sense and fair
dealing of the Republicans, it would seem, at a superficial glance,
that the course adopted by the members of the new Confederacy,
whether legitimate or not, could not possibly be justified.1
Unfortunately, something more than mere political rancour was at
work. The areas of slave and of free labour were divided by an
artificial frontier. “Mason
and 1 I have
been somewhat severely taken to task for attaching the epithets
“misguided,” “unpractical,” “fanatical,’ to the abolitionists. I see
no reason, however, to modify my language. It is too often the case
that men of the loftiest ideals seek to attain them by the most
objectionable means, and the maxim “Fiat justitia ruat cœlum” cannot
be literally applied to great affairs. The conversion of the
Mahomedan world to Christianity would be a nobler work than even the
emancipation of the negro, but the missionary who began with
reviling the faithful, and then proceeded to threaten them with fire
and the sword unless they changed their creed, would justly be
called a fanatic. Yet the abolitionists did worse than this, for
they incited the negroes to insurrection. Nor do I think that the
question is affected by the fact that many of the abolitionists were
upright, earnest, and devout. A good man is not necessarily a wise
man, and I remember that Samuel Johnson and John Wesley supported
King George against the American colonists.
THE LABOUR QUESTION 83
Dixon’s line,” originally fixed as the boundary between Pennsylvania
on the north and Virginia and Maryland on the south, cut the
territory of the United States into two distinct sections; and,
little by little, these two sections, geographically as well as
politically severed, had resolved themselves into what might almost
be termed two distinct nations.
Many circumstances tended to increase the cleavage. The South was
purely agricultural; the most prosperous part of the North was
purely industrial. In the South, the great planters formed a landed
aristocracy; the claims of birth were ungrudgingly admitted; class
barriers were, to a certain extent, a recognised part of the social
system, and the sons of the old houses were accepted as the natural
leaders of the people. In the North, on the contrary, the only
aristocracy was that of wealth; and even wealth, apart from merit,
had no hold on the respect of the community. The distinctions of
caste were slight in the extreme. The descendants of the
Puritans,
of those English country gentlemen who had preferred to ride with
Cromwell rather than with Rupert, to pray with Baxter rather than
with Laud, made no parade of their ancestry; and among the extreme
Republicans existed an innate but decided aversion to the
recognition of social grades. Moreover, divergent interests demanded
different fiscal treatment. The cotton and tobacco of the South, monopolising the markets of the world, asked for free trade. The
manufacturers of New England, struggling against foreign
competition, were strong protectionists, and they were powerful
enough to enforce their will in the shape of an oppressive tariff.
Thus the planters of Virginia paid high prices in order that mills
might flourish in Connecticut; and the sovereign States of the
South, to their own detriment, were compelled to contribute to the
abundance of the wealthier North. The interests of labour were not
less conflicting. The competition between free and forced labour,
side by side on the same continent, was bound in itself, sooner or
later, to breed dissension; and if it had not yet reached an acute
stage, it had at least
THE LABOUR QUESTION 84
created a certain degree of bitter feeling. But more than all—and
the fact must be borne in mind if the character of the Civil War is
to be fully appreciated—the natural ties which should have linked
together the States on either side of Mason and Dixon’s line had
weakened to a mere mechanical bond. The intercourse between North
and South, social or commercial, was hardly more than that which
exists between two foreign nations. The two sections knew but little
of each other, and that little was not the good points but the bad.
For more than fifty years after the election of the first President,
while as yet the crust of European tradition overlaid the young
shoots of democracy, the supremacy, social and political, of the
great landowners of the South had been practically undisputed. But
when the young Republic began to take its place amongst the nations,
men found that the wealth and talents which led it forward belonged
as much to the busy cities of New England as to the plantations of
Virginia and the Carolinas; and with the growing sentiment in favour
of universal equality began the revolt against the dominion of a
caste. Those who had carved out their own fortunes by sheer hard
work and ability questioned the superiority of men whose positions
were no guarantee of personal capacity, and whose wealth was not of
their own making. Those who had borne the heat and burden of the day
deemed themselves the equals and more than equals of those who had
loitered in the shade; and, esteeming men for their own worth and
not for that of some forgotten ancestor, they had come to despise
those who toiled not neither did they spin. Tenaciously the
Southerners clung to the supremacy they had inherited from a bygone
age. The contempt of the Northerner was repaid in kind. In the
political arena the struggle was fierce and keen. Mutual hatred,
fanned by unscrupulous agitators, increased in bitterness; and,
hindering reconciliation, rose the fatal barrier of slavery.
It is true that, prior to 1860, the abolitionists were not numerous
in the North; and it is equally true that by
THE ABOLITIONISTS 85
many of the best men in the South the institution which had been
bequeathed to them was thoroughly detested. Looking back over the
years which have elapsed since the slaves were freed, the errors of
the two factions are sufficiently manifest. If, on the one hand, the
abolitionist, denouncing sternly, in season and out of season, the
existence of slavery on the free soil of America, was unjust and
worse to the slave-owner, who, to say the least, was in no way
responsible for the inhuman and shortsighted policy of a former
generation; on the other hand the high-principled Southerner,
although in his heart deploring the condition of the negro, and
sometimes imitating the example of Washington, whose dying bequest
gave freedom to his slaves, made no attempt to find a remedy.1
The latter had the better excuse. He knew, were emancipation
granted, that years must elapse before the negro could be trained to
the responsibilities of freedom, and that those years would
impoverish the South. It appears to have been forgotten by the
abolitionists that all races upon earth have required a protracted
probation to fit them for the rights of citizenship and the duties
of free men. Here was a people, hardly emerged from the grossest
barbarism, and possibly, from the very beginning,
1 On the publication of the first edition my views on the
action of the abolitionists were traversed by critics whose opinions
demand consideration. They implied that in condemning the unwisdom
and violence of the anti-slavery party, I had not taken into account
the aggressive tendencies of the Southern politicians from 1850
onwards, that I had ignored the attempts to extend slavery to the
Territories, and that I had overlooked the effect of the
Fugitive
Slave Law. A close study of abolitionist literature, however,
had made it very clear to me that the advocates of emancipation,
although actuated by the highest motives, never at any time
approached the question in a conciliatory spirit; and that long
before 1850 their fierce cries for vengeance had roused the very
bitterest feelings in the South. In fact they had already made war
inevitable. Draper, the Northern historian, admits that so early as
1844 “the contest between the abolitionists on one side and the
slave-holders on the other hand had become a mortal duel.” It may be
argued, perhaps, that the abolitionists saw that the slave-power
would never yield except to armed force, and that they therefore
showed good judgment in provoking the South into secession and civil
war. But forcing the hand of the Almighty is something more than a
questionable doctrine.
THE ABOLITIONISTS 86
of inferior natural endowment, on whom they proposed to confer the
same rights without any probation whatsoever. A glance at the world
around them should have induced reflection. The experience of other
countries was not encouraging. Hayti, where the blacks had long been
masters of the soil, was still a pandemonium; and in Jamaica and
South Africa the precipitate action of zealous but unpractical
philanthropists had wrought incalculable mischief. Even
Lincoln himself,
redemption by purchase being impracticable, saw no other way out of
the difficulty than the wholesale deportation of the negroes to West
Africa. In time, perhaps, under
the influence of such men as
Lincoln
and Lee, the nation might have found a solution of the problem, and
North and South have combined to rid their common country of the
curse of human servitude. But between fanaticism on the one side and
helplessness on the other there was no common ground. The fierce
invectives of the reformers forbade all hope of temperate
discussion, and their unreasoning denunciations only provoked
resentment. And this resentment became the more bitter because in
demanding emancipation, either by fair means or forcible, and in
expressing their intention of making it a national question, the
abolitionists were directly striking at a right which the people of
the South held sacred. It had
never been questioned, hitherto, that the several States of the
Union, so far at least as concerned their domestic institutions,
were each and all of them, under the Constitution, absolutely
self-governing. But the threats which the Black Republicans held out
were tantamount to a proposal to set the Constitution aside. It was
their charter of liberty, therefore, and not only their material
prosperity, which the States that first seceded believed to be
endangered by Lincoln’s election. Ignorant of the temper of the
great mass of the Northern people, as loyal in reality to the
Constitution as themselves, they were only too ready to be convinced
that the denunciations of the abolitionists were the first presage
of the storm that was presently to overwhelm them, to reduce their
States to provinces, to wrest from them the freedom they had
THE CHARGE AGAINST THE SOUTH 87
inherited, and to make them hewers of wood and drawers of water to
the detested plutocrats of New England.
But the gravamen of the indictment against the Southern people is
not that they seceded, but that they seceded in order to preserve
and to perpetuate slavery; or, to put it more forcibly, that the
liberty to enslave others was the right which most they valued. This
charge, put forward by the abolitionists in order to cloak their own
revolt against the Constitution, is true as regards a certain
section, but as regards the South as a nation it is quite untenable,
for three-fourths of the population derived rather injury than
benefit from the presence in their midst of four million serfs.1
“Had slavery continued, the system of labour,” says
General Grant, “would
soon have impoverished the soil and left the country poor. The
non-slave-holder must have left the country, and the small
slave-holder have sold out to his more fortunate neighbour.”2
The slaves neither bought nor sold. Their wants were supplied almost
entirely by their own labour; and the local markets of the South
would have drawn far larger profit from a few thousand white
labourers than they did from the multitude of negroes. It is true
that a party in the South, more numerous perhaps among the political
leaders than among the people at large, was averse to emancipation
under any form or shape. There were men who looked upon their
bondsmen as mere beasts of burden, more valuable but hardly more
human than the cattle in their fields, and who would not only have
perpetuated but have extended slavery. There were others who
conscientiously believed that the negro was unfit for freedom, that
he was incapable of self-improvement, and that he was far happier
and more contented as a slave. Among these were ministers of the
Gospel, in no small number, who, appealing to the Old Testament,
preached boldly that the institution was of divine origin, that the
coloured race 1
Of 8.3 million whites in the fifteen slave-holding States, only
346,000 were slave-holders, and of these 69,000 owned only one
negro. 2 Battles and Leaders, vol. iii, p. 689.
THE CHARGE AGAINST THE SOUTH 88
had been created for servitude, and that to advocate emancipation
was to impugn the wisdom of the Almighty.
But there were still others, including many of those who were not
slave-owners, who, while they acquiesced in the existence of an
institution for which they were not personally accountable, looked
forward to its ultimate extinction by the voluntary action of the
States concerned. It was impossible as yet to touch the question
openly, for the invectives and injustice of the abolitionists had so
wrought upon the Southern people, that such action would have been
deemed a base surrender to the dictation of the enemy; but they
trusted to time, to the spread of education, and to a feeling in
favour of emancipation which was gradually pervading the whole
country.1 The opinions
of this party, with which, it may be said, the bulk of the Northern
people was in close sympathy,2 are perhaps best expressed
in a letter written by Colonel Robert Lee, the head of one of the
oldest families in Virginia, a large landed proprietor and
slave-holder, and the same officer who had won such well-deserved
renown in
Mexico. “In this enlightened age,”
wrote the future general-in-chief of the Confederate army, “there
are few, I believe, but will acknowledge that slavery as an
institution is a moral and political evil. It is useless to
expatiate on its disadvantages. I think it a greater evil to the
white than to the coloured race, and while my feelings are strongly
interested in the latter, my sympathies are more deeply engaged for
the former. The blacks are immeasurably better off here than in
Africa—morally, socially, and physically. The painful discipline
they are undergoing is necessary for their instruction as a race,
and, I hope, will prepare them for better things. How long their
subjection may be necessary is known and ordered by a merciful
Providence. Their emancipation will sooner result from the mild and
1 There is no doubt that a feeling of aversion to slavery was
fast spreading among a numerous and powerful class in the South. In
Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri the number of slaves was
decreasing, and in Delaware the institution had almost disappeared.
2 Grant’s Memoirs, p. 214.
SLAVERY IN THE SOUTH 89
melting influence of Christianity than from the storms and contests
of fiery controversy. This influence, though slow, is sure. The
doctrines and miracles of our Saviour have required nearly two
thousand years to convert but a small part of the human race, and
even among Christian nations what gross errors still exist! While we
see the course of the final abolition of slavery is still onward,
and we give it the aid of our prayers and all justifiable means in
our power, we must leave the progress as well as the result in His
hands, who sees the end and who chooses to work by slow things, and
with whom a thousand years are but as a single day. The abolitionist
must know this, and must see that he has neither the right nor the
power of operating except by moral means and suasion; if he means
well to the slave, he must not create angry feelings in the master.
Although he may not approve of the mode by which it pleases
Providence to accomplish its purposes, the result will nevertheless
be the same; and the reason he gives for interference in what he has
no concern holds good for every kind of interference with our
neighbours when we disapprove of their conduct.”
With this view of the question Jackson was in perfect agreement. “I
am very confident,” says his wife, “that he would never have fought
for the sole object of perpetuating slavery. . . . He found the
institution a responsible and troublesome one, and I have heard him
say that he would prefer to see the negroes free, but he believed
that the Bible taught that slavery was sanctioned by the Creator
Himself, who maketh all men to differ, and instituted laws for the
bond and free. He therefore accepted slavery, as it existed in the
South, not as a thing desirable in itself, but as allowed by
Providence for ends which it was not his business to determine.”
It may perhaps be maintained that to have had no dealings with “the
accursed thing,” and to have publicly advocated some process of
gradual emancipation, would have been the nobler course. But,
setting aside the teaching of the Churches, and the bitter temper of
the time, it should be remembered that slavery, although its
SLAVERY IN THE SOUTH 90
hardships were admitted, presented itself in no repulsive aspect to
the people of the
Confederate
States. They regarded it with feelings very different from those
of the abolitionists, whose acquaintance with the condition they
reprobated was small in the extreme. The lot of the slaves, the
Southerners were well aware, was far preferable to that of the poor
and the destitute of great cities, of the victims of the sweater and
the inmates of fever dens. The helpless negro had more hands to
succour him in Virginia than the starving white man in New England.
The children of the plantation enjoyed a far brighter existence than
the children of the slums. The worn and feeble were maintained by
their masters, and the black labourer, looking forward to an old age
of ease and comfort among his own people, was more fortunate than
many a Northern artisan. Moreover, the brutalities ascribed to the
slave-owners as a class were of rare occurrence. The people of the
South were neither less humane nor less moral than the people of the
North or of Europe, and it is absolutely inconceivable that men of
high character and women of gentle nature should have looked with
leniency on cruelty, or have failed to visit the offender with
something more than reprobation. Had the calumnies1 which
were scattered broadcast by the abolitionists possessed more than a
vestige of truth, men like Lee and Jackson would never have remained
silent. In the minds of the Northern people slavery was associated
with atrocious cruelty and continual suffering. In the eyes of the
Southerners, on the other hand, it was associated with great
kindness and the most affectionate relations between the planters
and their bondsmen. And if the Southerners were blind, it is most
difficult to explain the remarkable fact that throughout the war,
although thousands of plantations and farms, together with thousands
of women and children, all of whose male relatives were in the
Confederate armies, were left entirely to the care of the negroes,
both life and property were perfectly secure.
Such, then, was the attitude of the South towards
1 Uncle Tom's Cabin to wit.
SLAVERY IN THE SOUTH 91
slavery. The institution had many advocates, uncompromising and
aggressive, but taking the people as a whole it was rather tolerated
than approved; and, even if no evidence to the contrary were
forthcoming, we should find it hard to believe that a civilised
community would have plunged into revolution in order to maintain
it. There can be no question but that secession was revolution; and
revolutions, as has been well said, are not made for the sake of
“greased cartridges”. To bring about such unanimity of purpose as
took possession of the whole South, such passionate loyalty to the
new Confederacy, such intense determination to resist coercion to
the bitter end, needed some motive of unusual potency, and the
perpetuation of slavery was not a sufficient motive. The great bulk
of the population neither owned slaves nor was connected with those
who did; many favoured emancipation; and the working men, a rapidly
increasing class, were distinctly antagonistic to slave-labour.
Moreover, the Southerners were not only warmly attached to the
Union, which they had done so much to establish, but their pride in
their common country, in its strength, its prestige, and its
prosperity, was very great. Why, then, should they break away?
History supplies us with a pertinent example.
Previous to 1765 the honour of England was dear to the people of the
American colonies. King George had no more devoted subjects; his
enemies no fiercer foes. And yet it required very little to reverse
the scroll. The right claimed by the Crown to tax the colonists
hardly menaced their material prosperity. A few shillings more or
less would neither have added to the burdens nor have diminished the
comforts of a well-to-do and thrifty people, and there was some
justice in the demand that they should contribute to the defence of
the British Empire. But the demand, as formulated by the Government,
involved a principle which they were unwilling to admit, and in
defence of their birthright as free citizens they flew to arms. So,
in defence of the principle of States’ Rights the Southern people
resolved upon secession with all its consequences.
It might be said, however, that South Carolina and her
THE REAL CAUSE OF SECESSION 92
sister States seceded under the threat of a mere faction; that there
was nothing in the attitude of the Federal Government to justify the
apprehension that the Constitution would be set aside; and that
their action, therefore, was neither more nor less than rank
rebellion. But, whether their rights had been infringed or not, a
large majority of the Southern people believed that secession, at
any moment and for any cause, was perfectly legitimate. The several
States of the Union, according to their political creed, were each
and all of them sovereign and independent nations. The Constitution,
they held, was nothing more than a treaty which they had entered
into for their own convenience, and which, in the exercise of their
sovereign powers, individually or collectively, they might abrogate
when they pleased. This interpretation was not admitted in the
North, either by Republicans or Democrats; yet there was nothing in
the letter of the Constitution which denied it, and as regards the
spirit of that covenant North and South held opposite opinions. But
both were perfectly sincere, and in leaving the Union, therefore,
and in creating for themselves a new government, the people of the
seceding States considered that they were absolutely within their
right.1 It must be
admitted, at the same time, that the action of the States which
first seceded was marked by a petulant haste; and it is only too
probable that the people of these States suffered themselves to be
too easily persuaded that the North meant mischief. It is impossible
to determine how far the professional politician was responsible for
the Civil War. But when we recall the fact that secession followed
close on the overthrow of a faction which had long monopolised the
spoils of office, and that this faction found compensation in the
establishment of a new government, it is not easy to resist the
suspicion that the secession movement was neither more nor less than
a conspiracy, hatched by a clever and unscrupulous cabal.
It would be unwise, however, to brand the whole, or even the
majority, of the Southern leaders as selfish and
1 For an admirable statement of the Southern doctrine, see
Ropes’ History of the Civil War, vol. i, chap. i.
THE REAL CAUSE OF SECESSION 93
unprincipled. Unless he has real grievances on which to work, or
unless those who listen to him are supremely ignorant, the mere
agitator is powerless; and it is most assuredly incredible that
seven millions of Anglo-Saxons, and Anglo-Saxons of the purest
strain—English, Lowland Scottish, and North Irish—should have been
beguiled by silver tongues of a few ambitious or hare-brained
demagogues. The latter undoubtedly had a share in bringing matters
to a crisis. But the South was ripe for revolution long before the
presidential election. The forces which were at work needed no
artificial impulse to propel them forward. It was instinctively
recognised that the nation had outgrown the Constitution; and it was
to this, and not to the attacks upon slavery, that secession was
really due. The North had come to regard the American people as one
nation, and the will of the majority as paramount.1 The
South, on the other hand, holding, as it had always held, that each
State was a nation in itself, denied in toto that the will of
the majority, except in certain specified cases, had any power
whatever; and where political creeds were in such direct antagonism
no compromise was possible. Moreover, as the action of the
abolitionists very plainly showed, there was a growing tendency in
the North to disregard altogether the rights of the minority.
Secession, in fact, was a protest against mob rule. The weaker
community, hopeless of maintaining its most cherished principles
within the Union, was ready to seize the first pretext for leaving
it; and the strength of the popular sentiment may be measured by the
willingness of every class, gentle and simple, rich and poor, to
risk all and to suffer all, in order to free themselves from bonds
which must soon have become unbearable. It is always difficult to
analyse the motives of those by whom revolution is provoked; but if
a whole people acquiesce, it is a certain proof
1 “The Government had been Federal under the
Articles of
Confederation (1781), but the [Northern] people quickly recognised
that that relation was changing under the Constitution (1789). They
began to discern that the power they thought they had delegated was
in fact surrendered, and that henceforth no single State could meet
the general Government as sovereign and equal.” Draper’s History
of the American Civil War, vol. i, p. 286.
THE REAL CAUSE OF SECESSION 94
of the existence of universal apprehension and deep-rooted
discontent. The spirit of self-sacrifice which animated the
Confederate South has been characteristic of every revolution which
has been the expression of a nation’s wrongs, but it has never yet
accompanied mere factious insurrection.
When, in process of time, the history of Secession comes to be
viewed with the same freedom from prejudice as the history of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it will be clear that the
fourth great Revolution of the English-speaking race differs in no
essential characteristic from those which preceded it. It was not
simply because the five members were illegally impeached in 1642,
the seven bishops illegally tried in 1688, men shot at Lexington in
1775, or slavery threatened in 1861, that the people rose. These
were the occasions, not the causes of revolt. In each case a great
principle was at stake: in 1642 the liberty of the subject; in 1688
the integrity of the Protestant faith; in 1775 taxation only with
consent of the taxed; in 1861 the sovereignty of the individual
States.1 The accuracy
of this statement, as already suggested, has been consistently
denied. That the only principle involved in Secession was the
establishment of slavery on a firmer basis, and that the cry of
States’ Rights was raised only by way of securing sympathy, is a
very general opinion. But before it can be accepted, it is necessary
to make several admissions; first, that the Southerners were
absolutely callous to the evils produced by the institution they had
determined to make permanent; second, that they had persuaded
themselves, in face of the tendencies of civilisation, that it was
possible to make it permanent; and third, that they conscientiously
held their progress and
1 It has been remarked that States’ Rights, as a political
principle, cannot be placed on the same plane as those with which it
is here grouped. History, however, proves conclusively that,
although it may be less vital to the common weal, the right of
self-government is just as deeply cherished. A people that has once
enjoyed independence can seldom be brought to admit that a Union
with others deprives it of the prerogatives of sovereignty, and it
would seem that the treatment of this instinct of nationality is one
of the most delicate and important tasks of statesmanship.
SOUTHERN AFFECTION FOR THE UNION 95
prosperity to be dependent on its continued existence. Are we to
believe that the standard of morals and intelligence was so low as
these admissions would indicate? Are we to believe that if they had
been approached in a charitable spirit, that if the Republican
party, disclaiming all right of interference, had offered to aid
them in substituting, by some means which would have provided for
the control of the negro and, at the same time, have prevented an
entire collapse of the social fabric, a system more consonant with
humanity, the Southerners would have still preferred to leave the
Union, and by creating a great slave-power earn the execration of
the Christian world? Unless the
South be credited with an unusual measure of depravity and of
short-sightedness, the reply can hardly be in the affirmative. And
if it be otherwise, there remains but one explanation of the conduct
of the seceding States—namely the dread that if they remained in the
Union they would not be fairly treated.
It is futile to argue that the people were dragooned into secession
by the slave-holders. What power had the slave-holders over the
great mass of the population, over the professional classes, over
the small farmer, the mechanic, the tradesman, the labourer? Yet it
is constantly asserted by Northern writers, although the statement
is virtually an admission that only the few were prepared to fight
for slavery, that the Federal sentiment was so strong among the
Southerners that terrorism must have had a large share in turning
them into Separatists. The answer, putting aside the very patent
fact that the Southerner was not easily coerced, is very plain.
Undoubtedly, throughout the South there was much affection for the
Union; but so in the first Revolution there was much loyalty to the
Crown, and yet it has never been asserted that the people of
Virginia or of New England were forced into sedition against their
will. The truth is that there were many Southerners who, in the vain
hope of compromise, would have postponed the rupture; but when the
right of secession was questioned, and the right of coercion was
proclaimed, all differences of opinion were swept away, and
SOUTHERN AFFECTION FOR THE UNION 96
the people, thenceforward, were of one heart and mind. The action of
Virginia is a striking illustration.
The great border State, the most important of those south of Mason
and Dixon’s line, was not a member of the Confederacy when the
Provisional Government was established at Montgomery. Nor did
the secession movement secure any strong measure of approval. In
fact, the people of Virginia, owing to their closer proximity to,
and to their more intimate knowledge of, the North, were by no means
inclined to make of the Black Republican President the bugbear he
appeared to the States which bordered on the Gulf of Mexico. Whilst
acknowledging that the South had grievances, they saw no reason to
believe that redress might not be obtained by constitutional means.
At the same time, although they questioned the expediency, they held
no half-hearted opinion as to the right, of secession, and in their
particular case the right seems undeniable. When the Constitution of
the United States was ratified, Virginia, by the mouth of its
Legislature, had solemnly declared “that the powers granted [to the
Federal Government] under the Constitution, being truly derived from
the people of the United States, may be resumed by them whenever the
same shall be perverted to their injury and oppression.” And this
declaration had been more than once reaffirmed. As already stated,
this view of the political status of the Virginia citizen was not
endorsed by the North. Nevertheless, it was not definitely rejected.
The majority of the Northern people held the Federal Government
paramount, but, at the same time, they held that it had no power
either to punish or coerce the individual States. This had been the
attitude of the founders of the Republic, and it is perfectly clear
that their interpretation of the Constitution was this: although the
several States were morally bound to maintain the compact into which
they had voluntarily entered, the obligation, if any one State chose
to repudiate it, could not be legally enforced. Their ideal was a
Union based upon fraternal affection; and in the halcyon days of
Washington’s first presidency, when the long and victorious struggle
against a common enemy was still fresh in men’s minds, and the sun
of liberty shone in an unclouded sky, a
THE BASIS OF UNION 97
vision so Utopian perhaps seemed capable of realisation. At all
events, the promise of a new era of unbroken peace and prosperity
was not to be sullied by cold precautions against civil dissensions
and conflicting interests. The new order, under which every man was
his own sovereign, would surely strengthen the links of kindly
sympathy, and by those links alone it was believed that the Union
would be held together. Such was the dream of the unselfish patriots
who ruled the destinies of the infant Republic. Such were the ideas
that so far influenced their deliberations that, with all their
wisdom, they left a legacy to their posterity which deluged the land
in blood. Mr. Lincoln’s
predecessor in the presidential chair had publicly proclaimed that
coercion was both illegal and inexpedient; and for the three months
which intervened between the secession of South Carolina and the
inauguration of the Republican President, the Government made not
the slightest attempt to interfere with the peaceable establishment
of the new Confederacy. Not a single soldier reinforced the
garrisons of the military posts in the South. Not a single regiment
was recalled from the western frontiers; and the seceded States,
without a word of protest, were permitted to take possession, with
few exceptions, of the forts, arsenals, navy yards and
custom houses
which stood on their own territory. It seemed that the Federal
Government was only waiting until an amicable arrangement might be
arrived at as to the terms of separation.
If, in addition to the words in which she had assented to the
Constitution, further justification were needed for the belief of
Virginia in the right of secession, it was assuredly to be found in
the apparent want of unanimity on so grave a question even in the
Republican party, and in the acquiescent attitude of the Federal
Government. The people of
Virginia, however, saw in the election of a Republican President no
immediate danger of the Constitution being “perverted to their
injury and oppression.” The North, generally speaking, regarded the
action of the secessionists with that strange and good-humoured
THE BASIS OF UNION 98
tolerance with which the American citizen too often regards internal
politics. The common sense of the nation asserted itself in all its
strength. A Union which could only be maintained by force was a
strange and obnoxious idea to the majority. Amid the storm of abuse
and insult in which the two extreme parties indulged, the
abolitionists on the one side, the politicians on the other,
Lincoln, “The still
strong man in a blatant land,”
stood calm and steadfast, promising justice to the South, and eager
for reconciliation. And Lincoln represented the real temper of the
Northern people. So, in the
earlier months of 1861, there was no sign whatever that the Old
Dominion might be compelled to use the alternative her original
representatives had reserved. The question of slavery was no longer
to the fore. While reprobating the action of the Confederates, the
President, in his inaugural address (March 4, 1861), had
declared that the Government had no right to interfere with the
domestic institutions of the individual States; and throughout
Virginia the feeling was strong in favour of the Union. Earnest
endeavours were made to effect a compromise, under which the seceded
communities might renew the Federal compact. The Legislature called
a Convention of the People to deliberate on the part that the State
should play, and the other States were invited to join in a Peace
Conference at Washington. It need
hardly be said that during the period of negotiation excitement rose
to the highest pitch. The political situation was the sole theme of
discussion. In Lexington as elsewhere the one absorbing topic ousted
all others, and in Lexington as elsewhere there was much difference
of opinion. But the general sentiment was strongly Unionist, and in
the election of members of the Convention an overwhelming majority
had pronounced against secession. Between the two parties, however,
there were sharp conflicts. A flagstaff flying the national ensign
had been erected in Main Street, Lexington. The cadets fired on the
flag,
VIRGINIA 99
and substituting the State colours placed a guard over them. Next
morning a report reached the Institute that the local company of
volunteers had driven off the guard, and were about to restore the
Stars and Stripes. It was a holiday, and there were no officers
present. The drums beat to arms. The boys rushed down to their
parade-ground, buckling on their belts, and carrying their rifles.
Ammunition was distributed, and the whole battalion, under the cadet
officers, marched out of the Institute gates, determined to lower
the emblem of Northern tyranny and drive away the volunteers. A
collision would certainly have ensued had not the attacking column
been met by the Commandant. In
every discussion on the action of the State Jackson had spoken
strongly on the side of the majority. In terse phrase he had summed
up his view of the situation. He was no advocate of secession. He
deprecated the hasty action of South Carolina. “It is better,” he
said, “for the South to fight for her rights in the Union than out
of it.” But much as they loved the Union, the people of Virginia
revered still more the principles inculcated by their forefathers,
the right of secession and the illegality of coercion. And when the
proposals of the Peace Conference came to nothing, when all hope of
compromise died away, and the Federal Government showed no sign of
recognising the Provisional Government, it became evident even to
the staunchest Unionist that civil war could no longer be postponed.
From the very first no shadow of a doubt had existed in Jackson’s
mind as to the side he should espouse, or the course he should
pursue. “If I know myself,” he wrote, “all I am and all I have is at
the service of my country.”
According to his political creed his country was his native State,
and such was the creed of the whole South. In conforming to the
Ordinance of Secession enacted by the legislatures of their own
States, the people, according to their reading of the Constitution,
acted as loyal and patriotic citizens; to resist that ordinance was
treason and rebellion; and in taking up arms “they were not, in
their own opinion, rebels at all; they were defending
VIRGINIA 100
their States—that is, the nations to which they conceived themselves
to belong, from invasion and conquest.”1
When, after the incident described above, the cadets marched back to
barracks, it was already so certain that the Stars and Stripes would
soon be torn down from every flagstaff in Virginia that their breach
of discipline was easily condoned. They were addressed by the
Commandant, and amid growing excitement officer after officer,
hardly concealing his sympathy with their action, gave vent to his
opinions on the approaching crisis. Jackson was silent. At length,
perhaps in anticipation of some amusement, for he was known to be a
stumbling speaker, the cadets called on him by name. In answer to
the summons he stood before them, not, as was his wont in public
assemblies, with ill-dissembled shyness and awkward gesture, but
with body erect and eyes sparkling. “Soldiers,” he said, “when they
make speeches should say but few words, and speak them to the point,
and I admire, young gentlemen, the spirit you have shown in rushing
to the defence of your comrades; but I must commend you particularly
for the readiness with which you listened to the counsel and obeyed
the commands of your superior officer. The time may come,” he
continued, and the deep tones, vibrating with unsuspected
resolution, held his audience spellbound, “when your State will need
your services; and if that time does come, then draw your swords and
throw away the scabbards.” The
crisis was not long postponed. Fort Sumter, in
Charleston Harbour, the port of South Carolina, was held by a
Federal garrison. The State had demanded its surrender, but no reply
had been vouchsafed by Lincoln. On April 8 a message was conveyed to
the Governor of the State that an attempt would be made to supply
the troops with provisions. This message was telegraphed to
Montgomery, still the capital of the Confederacy, and the Government
ordered the reduction of the fort. On the morning of April 12 the
Southern batteries opened fire, and the next day, when the flames
were already scorching the doors
1 History of the Civil War, Ropes, chap. i, p. 3.
VIRGINIA SECEDES 101
of the magazine, the standard of the Union was hauled down.
Two days later Lincoln spoke with no uncertain voice. 75,000 militia
were called out to suppress the “rebellion.” The North gave the
President loyal support. The insult to the flag set the blood of the
nation, of Democrat and Republican, aflame. The time for
reconciliation was passed. The Confederates had committed an
unpardonable crime. They had forfeited all title to consideration;
and even in the minds of those Northerners who had shared their
political creed the memory of their grievances was obliterated.
So far Virginia had given no overt sign of sympathy with the
revolution. But she was now called upon to furnish her quota of
regiments for the Federal army. To have acceded to the demand would
have been to abjure the most cherished principles of her political
existence. As the Federal Government, according to her political
faith, had no jurisdiction whatever within the boundaries of States
which had chosen to secede, it had not the slightest right to
maintain a garrison in Fort Sumter. The action of the Confederacy in
enforcing the withdrawal of the troops was not generally approved
of, but it was held to be perfectly legitimate; and Mr. Lincoln’s
appeal to arms, for the purpose of suppressing what, in the opinion
of Virginia, was a strictly constitutional movement, was instantly
and fiercely challenged.
Neutrality was impossible. She was bound to furnish her tale of
troops, and thus belie her principles; or to secede at once, and
reject with a clean conscience the President’s mandate. On April 17
she chose the latter, deliberately and with her eyes open, knowing
that war would be the result, and knowing the vast resources of the
North. She was followed by Arkansas, Tennessee, and North Carolina.1
The world has long since done justice to the motives of Cromwell and
of Washington, and signs are not wanting
1 Kentucky and Missouri attempted to remain neutral. Maryland
was held in check by the Federal Government, and Delaware sided with
the North. The first three, however, supplied large contingents to
the Confederate armies.
VIRGINIA SECEDES 102
that before many years have passed it will do justice to the motives
of the Southern people. They were true to their interpretation of
the Constitution; and if the morality of secession may be
questioned, if South Carolina acted with undue haste and without
sufficient provocation, if certain of the Southern politicians
desired emancipation for themselves that they might continue to
enslave others, it can hardly be denied that the action of Virginia
was not only fully justified, but beyond suspicion. The wildest
threats of the Black Republicans, their loudly expressed
determination, in defiance of the Constitution, to abolish slavery,
if necessary by the bullet and the sabre, shook in no degree
whatever her loyalty to the Union. Her best endeavours were exerted
to maintain the peace between the hostile sections; and not till her
liberties were menaced did she repudiate a compact which had become
intolerable. It was to preserve the freedom which her forefathers
had bequeathed her, and which she desired to hand down unsullied to
future generations, that she acquiesced in the revolution.
The North, in resolving to maintain the Union by force of arms, was
upheld by the belief that she was acting in accordance with the
Constitution. The South, in asserting her independence and resisting
coercion, found moral support in the same conviction, and the
patriotism of those who fought for the Union was neither purer nor
more ardent than the patriotism of those who fought for States’
Rights. Long ago, a parliament of that nation to which Jackson and
so many of his compatriots owed their origin made petition to the
Pope that he should require the English king “to respect the
independence of Scotland, and to mind his own affairs. So long as a
hundred of us are left alive,” said the signatories, “we will never
in any degree be subjected to the English. It is not for glory, or
for riches, or for honour that we fight, but for liberty alone,
which no good man loses but with his life.” More than five hundred
years later, for the same noble cause and in the same uncompromising
spirit, the people of Virginia made appeal to the God of battles. |