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STONEWALL JACKSON
Chapter XXIV
Battle of Chancellorsville
At a council of war held during the night at Chancellorville House,
the Federal generals were by no means unanimous as to the operations
of the morrow. Some of the generals advised an early assault. Others
favoured a strictly defensive attitude. Hooker himself wished to
contract his lines so as to strengthen them; but as the officers
commanding on the right were confident of the strength of their
intrenchments, it was at length determined that the army should
await attack in its present position.
Three miles down the plank road, under a grove of oak and pine, Lee
and Jackson, while their wearied soldiers slept around them, planned
for the fourth and the last time the overthrow of the great army
with which
Lincoln still
hoped to capture Richmond. At this council there was no difference
of opinion. If Hooker had not retreated before the morning—and
Jackson thought it possible he was already demoralised—he was to be
attacked. The situation admitted of no other course. It was
undoubtedly a hazardous operation for an inferior force to assault
an intrenched position; but the Federal army was divided, the right
wing involved in a difficult and unexplored country, with which the
Confederate generals and staff were more or less familiar, and an
opportunity so favourable might never recur. “Fortune,” says
Napoleon, “is a woman, who must be wooed while she is in the mood.
If her favours are rejected, she does not offer them again.” The
only question was where the attack should be delivered. Lee himself
had reconnoitred the enemy’s left. It was very utrong, resting on
the Rappahannock, and covered by a
THE LAST COUNCIL 430
stream called Mineral Spring Run. Two of Jackson’s staff officers
had reconnoitred the front, and had pronounced it impregnable,
except at a fearful sacrifice of life. But while the generals were
debating, Stuart rode in with the reports of his cavalry officers,
and the weak point of the position was at once revealed. General
Fitzhugh Lee, to whose skill and activity the victory of
Chancellorsville was in great part due, had discovered that the
Federal right, on the plank road, was completely in the air; that
is, it was protected by no natural obstacle, and the breastworks
faced south, and south only. It was evident that attack from the
west or north-west was not anticipated, and Lee at once seized upon
the chance of effecting a surprise.
Yet the difficulties of the proposed operation were very great. To
transfer a turning column to a point from which the Federal right
might be effectively outflanked necessitated a long march by the
narrow and intricate roadways of the Wilderness, and a division of
the Confederate army into two parts, between which communication
would be most precarious. To take advantage of the opportunity the
first rule of war must be violated. But as it has already been said,
the rules of war only point out the dangers which are incurred by
breaking them; and, in this case, before an enemy on the defensive
from whom the separation might be concealed until it is too late for
him to intervene, the risks of dispersion were much reduced. The
chief danger lay in this, that the two wings, each left to its own
resources, might fail to act in combination, just as within the past
twenty-four hours Hooker and Sedgwick had failed. But Lee knew that
in Jackson he possessed a lieutenant whose resolution was
invincible, and that the turning column, if entrusted to his charge,
would be pushed forward without stop or stay until it had either
joined hands with the main body, or had been annihilated.
Moreover, the
battle of
Fredericksburg had taught both armies that the elaborate
constructions of the engineer are not the only or the most useful
resources of fortification. Hooker had ordered his position to be
intrenched in the hope
THE LAST COUNCIL 431
that Lee and Jackson, following
Burnside’s example,
would dash their divisions into fragments against them and thus
become an easy prey. Lee, with a broader appreciation of the true
tactical bearing of ditch and parapet, determined to employ them as
a shelter for his own force until Jackson’s movement was completed,
and the time had come for a general advance. Orders were at once
sent to General McLaws to cover his front, extending across the pike
and the plank roads, with a line of breastworks; and long before
daylight the soldiers of his division, with the scanty means at
their disposal, were busy as beavers amongst the timber.
It only remained, then, to determine the route and the strength of
the outflanking force; and here it may be observed that the
headquarters staff appears to have neglected certain precautions for
which there had been ample leisure. So long ago as March 19 a
council of war had decided that if Hooker attacked he would do so by
the upper fords, and yet the Wilderness, lying immediately south of
the points of passage, had not been adequately examined. Had Jackson
been on the left wing above
Fredericksburg,
instead of on the right, near Hamilton’s Crossing, we may be certain
that accurate surveys would have been forthcoming. As it was, the
charts furnished to the Commander-in-Chief were untrustworthy, and
information had to be sought from the country-people.
May 2. 2.30 a.m. “About daylight on May 2,” says Major
Hotchkiss, “General Jackson awakened me, and requested that I would
at once go down to Catherine Furnace, which is quite near, and where
a Colonel Welford lived, and ascertain if there was any road by
which we could secretly pass round Chancellorsville to the vicinity
of Old Wilderness Tavern. I had a map, which our engineers had
prepared from actual surveys, of the surrounding country, showing
all the public roads, but with few details of the intermediate
topography. Reaching Mr. Welford’s, I aroused him from his bed, and
soon learned that he himself had recently opened a road through the
woods in that direction for the purpose of hauling cord-wood and
iron ore to his furnace. This I located on the map, and having
THE FLANK MARCH 432
asked Mr. Welford if he would act as a guide if it became necessary
to march over that road, I returned to head-quarters.
3.30 a.m. “When I reached those I found Generals Lee and
Jackson in conference, each seated on a cracker box, from a pile
which had been left there by the Federals the day before. In
response to General Jackson’s request for my report, I put another
cracker box between the two generals, on which I spread the map,
showed them the road I had ascertained, and indicated, so far as I
knew it, the position of the Federal army. General Lee then said,
‘General Jackson, what do you propose to do?’ He replied, ‘Go around
here,’ moving his finger over the road which I had located upon the
map. General Lee said, ‘What do you propose to make this movement
with?’ ‘With my whole corps,’ was the answer. General Lee then
asked, ‘What will you leave me?’ ‘The divisions of Anderson and
McLaws,’ said Jackson. General Lee, after a moment’s reflection,
remarked, ‘Well, go on,’ and then, pencil in hand, gave his last
instructions. Jackson, with an eager smile upon his face, from time
to time nodded assent, and when the Commander-in-Chief ended with
the words, ‘General Stuart will cover your movement with his
cavalry,’ he rose and saluted, saying, ‘My troops will move at once,
sir.’ ”1 The necessary orders were forthwith dispatched.
The trains, parked in open fields to the rear, were to move to
Todd’s Tavern, and thence westward by interior roads; the Second
Army Corps was to march in one column, Rodes’ division in front, and
A. P. Hill’s in rear; the First Virginia Cavalry, with whom was
Fitzhugh Lee, covered the front; squadrons of the 2nd, the 3rd, and
the 5th were on the right; Hotchkiss, accompanied by a squad of
couriers, was to send back constant reports to General Lee; the
commanding officers were impressed with the importance of celerity
and secrecy; the ranks were to be kept well closed up, and all
stragglers were to be bayoneted.
1 Letter to the author. A letter of General Lee to Mrs.
Jackson, which contains a reference to this council of war, appears
as a Note at the end of the chapter.
THE FLANK MARCH 433
4.5 a.m. The day had broken without a cloud, and as the
troops began their march in the fresh May morning, the green vistas
of the Wilderness, grass under foot, and thick foliage overhead,
were dappled with sunshine. The men, comprehending intuitively that
a daring and decisive movement was in progress, pressed rapidly
forward, and General Lee, standing by the roadside to watch them
pass, saw in their confident bearing the presage of success. Soon
after the first regiments had gone by Jackson himself appeared at
the head of his staff. Opposite to the Commander-in-Chief he drew
rein, and the two conversed for a few moments. Then Jackson rode on,
pointing in the direction in which his troops were moving. “His
face,” says an eyewitness, “was a little flushed, as it was turned
to General Lee, who nodded approval of what he said.” Such was the
last interview between Lee and Jackson.
Then, during four long hours, for the column covered at least ten
miles, the flood of bright rifles and tattered uniforms swept with
steady flow down the forest track. The artillery followed, the guns
drawn by lean and wiry horses, and the ammunition waggons and
ambulances brought up the rear. In front was a regiment of cavalry,
the 5th Virginia, accompanied by General Fitzhugh Lee; on the flanks
were some ten squadrons, moving by the tracks nearest the enemy’s
outposts; a regiment of infantry, the 23rd Georgia, was posted at
the cross-roads near Catherine Furnace; and the plank road was well
guarded until Anderson’s troops came up to relieve the rear brigades
of the Second Army Corps.
Meanwhile, acting under the immediate orders of General Lee, and
most skilfully handled by McLaws and Anderson, the 10,000
Confederates who had been left in position opposite the Federal
masses kept up a brisk demonstration. Artillery was brought up to
every point along the front which offered space for action;
skirmishers, covered by the timber, engaged the enemy’s pickets, and
maintained a constant fire, and both on the pike and the river road
the lines of battle, disposed so as to give an impression of great
strength, threatened instant assault. Despite all precautions,
however, Jackson’s movement did
THE FLANK MARCH 434
not escape the notice of the Federals.
8 a.m. A mile north of Catherine Furnace the eminence
called Hazel Grove, clear of timber, looked down the valley of the
Lewis Creek, and as early as 8 a.m. General Birney, commanding the
Federal division at this point, reported the passage of a long
column across his front. The
indications, however, were deceptive. At first, it is probable, the
movement seemed merely a prolongation of the Confederate front; but
it soon received a different interpretation. The road at the point
where Jackson’s column was observed turned due south; it was noticed
that the troops were followed by their waggons, and that they were
turning their backs on the Federal lines. Hooker, when he received
Birney’s report, jumped to the conclusion that Lee, finding the
direct road to Richmond, through
Bowling Green,
threatened by Sedgwick, was retreating on Gordonsville.
11 a.m. About 11 a.m. a battery was ordered into action on
the Hazel Grove heights.
12.15 p.m. The fire caused some confusion in the
Confederate ranks; the trains were forced on to another road; and
shortly after noon, General Sickles, commanding the Third Army
Corps, was permitted by Hooker to advance upon Catherine Furnace and
to develop the situation. Birney’s division moved forward, and
Whipple’s soon followed. This attack, which threatened to cut the
Confederate army in two, was so vigorously opposed by Anderson’s
division astride the plank road and by the 23rd Georgia at the
Furnace, that General Sickles was constrained to call for
reinforcements. Barlow’s brigade, which had hitherto formed the
reserve of the Eleventh Corps, holding the extreme right of the
Federal line, the flank at which Jackson was aiming, was sent to his
assistance. Pleasonton’s cavalry brigade followed. Sickles’
movement, even before the fresh troops arrived, had met with some
success. The 23rd Georgia, driven back to the unfinished railroad
and surrounded, lost 300 officers and men. But word had been sent to
Jackson’s column, and Colonel Brown’s artillery battalion, together
with the brigades of Archer and Thomas, rapidly retracing their
steps, checked the advance in front, while Anderson,
THE FLANK MARCH 435
manœuvring his troops with vigour, struck heavily against the flank.
Jackson’s train, thus effectively protected, passed the dangerous
point in safety, and then Archer and Thomas, leaving Anderson to
deal with Sickles, drew off and pursued their march.
These operations, conducted for the most part in blind thickets,
consumed much time, and Jackson was already far in advance. Moving
in a south-westerly direction, he had struck the Brook road, a
narrow track which runs nearly due north, and crosses both the plank
road and the pike at a point about two miles west of the Federal
right flank. The Brock road, which, had
Stoneman’s three divisions of cavalry been present with the
Federal army, would have been strongly held, was absolutely free and
unobstructed. Since the previous evening Fitzhugh Lee’s patrols had
remained in close touch with the enemy’s outposts, and no attempt
had been made to drive them in. So with no further obstacle than the
heat the Second Army Corps pressed on. Away to the right, echoing
faintly through the Wilderness, came the sound of cannon and the
roll of musketry; couriers from the rear, galloping at top speed,
reported that the trains had been attacked, that the rear brigades
had turned back to save them, and that the enemy, in heavy strength,
had already filled the gap which divided the Confederate wings. But,
though the army was cut in two, Jackson cast no look behind him. The
battle at the Furnace made no more impression on him than if it was
being waged on the Mississippi. He had his orders to execute; and
above all, he was moving at his best speed towards the enemy’s weak
point. He knew—and none better—that Hooker would not long retain the
initiative; that every man detached from the Federal centre made his
own chances of success the more certain; and trusting implicitly in
Lee’s ability to stave off defeat, he rode northwards with redoubled
assurance of decisive victory. Forward was the cry, and though the
heat was stifling, and the dust, rising from the deep ruts on the
unmetalled road, rose in dense clouds beneath the trees, and men
dropped fainting
FITZHUGH LEE 436
in the ranks, the great column pushed on without a check.1
2 p.m. About 2 p.m., as the rear brigades, Archer and
Thomas, after checking Sickles, were just leaving Welford’s House,
some six miles distant, Jackson himself had reached the plank road,
the point where he intended to turn eastward against the Federal
flank. Here he was met by Fitzhugh Lee, conveying most important and
surprising information. The
cavalry regiment had halted when it arrived on the plank road; all
was reported quiet at the front; the patrols were moving northward,
and, attended by a staff officer, the young brigadier had ridden
towards the turnpike. The path they followed led to a wide clearing
at the summit of a hill, from which there was a view eastward as far
as Dowdall’s Tavern. Below, and but a few hundred yards distant, ran
the Federal breastworks, with abattis in front and long lines of
stacked arms in rear; but untenanted by a single company. Two cannon
were seen upon the highroad, the horses grazing quietly near at
hand. The soldiers were scattered in small groups, laughing,
cooking, smoking, sleeping, and playing cards, while others were
butchering cattle and drawing rations. What followed is best told in
General Fitzhugh Lee’s own words.
“I rode back and met Jackson. ‘General,’ said I, ‘if you will ride
with me, halting your columns here, out of sight, I will show you
the great advantage of attacking down the old turnpike instead of
the plank road, the enemy’s lines being taken in reverse. Bring only
one courier, as you will be in view from the top of the hill.’
Jackson assented. When we reached the eminence the picture below was
still unchanged, and I watched him closely as he gazed on
Howard’s troops. His
expression was one of intense interest. His eyes burnt with a
brilliant glow, and his face was slightly flushed, radiant at the
success of his flank movement. To the remarks made to him while the
unconscious line of blue was pointed out
1 There were three halts during the march of fourteen miles.
Letter from Major Hotchkiss.
FITZHUGH LEE 437
he made no reply, and yet during the five minutes he was on the hill
his lips were moving. ‘Tell General Rodes,’ he said, suddenly
turning his horse towards the courier, ‘to move across the plank
road, and halt when he gets to the old turnpike. I will join him
there.’ One more look at the Federal lines, and he rode rapidly down
the hill.” 4
p.m. The cavalry, supported by the Stonewall Brigade, was
immediately placed a short distance down the plank road, in order to
mask the march of the column. At 4 p.m. Rodes was on the turnpike.
Passing down it for about a mile, in the direction of the enemy’s
position, the troops were ordered to halt and form for battle. Not a
shot had been fired. A few hostile patrols had been observed, but
along the line of breastworks, watched closely by the cavalry, the
Federal troops, still in the most careless security, were preparing
their evening meal. Jackson, meanwhile, seated on a stump near the
Brock road, had penned his last dispatch to General Lee.
“Near 3 p.m. May 2, 1863.
“General,—The enemy has made a stand at Chancellor’s,1
which is about two miles from Chancellorsville. I hope as soon as
practicable to attack. I trust that an ever-kind Providence will
bless us with great success.
“Respectfully, T.
J. JACKSON, Lieutenant-General.
“The leading division is up, and the next two appear to be well
closed. “T.J.J.
“General B. E. Lee.”
25,000
men were now deploying in the forest within a mile of the Federal
works, overlapping them both to north and south, and not a single
general in the Northern army appears to have suspected their
presence. The day had passed quietly at Chancellorsville. At a very
early hour in 1
Melzi Chancellor’s house; otherwise Dowdall’s Tavern.
THE FEDERAL POSITION 438
the morning Hooker, anticipating a vigorous attack, had ordered the
First Army Corps, which had hitherto been acting with Sedgwick below
Fredericksburg, to recross the Rappahannock and march to
Chancellorsville. Averell’s division of cavalry, also, which had
been engaged near Orange Court House with W. H. F. Lee’s two
regiments, was instructed about the same time to rejoin the army as
soon as possible, and was now marching by the left bank of the
Rapidan to Ely’s Ford. Anticipating, therefore, that he would soon
be strongly reinforced, Hooker betrayed no uneasiness. Shortly after
dawn he had ridden round his lines. Expecting at that time to be
attacked in front only, he had no fault to find with their location
or construction. “As he looked over the barricades,” says
General Howard, “while
receiving the cheers and salutes of the men, he said to me, ‘How
strong! how strong!’ When the news came that a Confederate column
was marching westward past Catherine Furnace, his attention, for the
moment, was attracted to his right. At 10 a.m. he was still
uncertain as to the meaning of Jackson’s movement. As the hours went
by, however, and Jackson’s column disappeared in the forest, he
again grew confident; the generals were informed that Lee was in
full retreat towards Gordonsville, and a little later Sedgwick
received the following:
“Chancellorsville, May 2, 1863, 4.10 p.m.
“General
Butterfield,—The Major-General Commanding directs that General
Sedgwick cross the river (sic) as soon as indications will
permit,1 capture Fredericksburg with everything in it,
and vigorously pursue the enemy. We know that the enemy is fleeing,
trying to save his trains. Two of Sickles’ divisions are among them.
“J. H. VAN ALEN,
“Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp.”
“(Copy from Butterfield, at Falmouth, to Sedgwick, 5.50 p.m.).”
1 Sedgwick had crossed the river on April 29 and 30.
THE FEDERAL POSITION 439
At 4 o’clock, therefore, the moment Jackson’s vanguard reached the
old turnpike near Luckett’s Farm, Hooker believed that all danger of
a flank attack had passed away. His left wing was under orders to
advance, as soon as a swamp to the front could be “corduroyed,” and
strike Lee in flank; while to reinforce Sickles, “among the enemy’s
trains,” Williams’ division of the Twelfth Corps was sent forward
from the centre, Howard’s reserve brigade (Barlow’s) from the right,
and Pleasonton’s cavalry brigade from Hazel Grove.
The officers in charge of the Federal right appear to have been as
unsuspicious as their commander. During the morning some slight
preparations were made to defend the turnpike from the westward; a
shallow line of rifle-pits, with a few epaulements for artillery,
had been constructed on a low ridge, commanding open fields, which
runs north from Dowdall’s Tavern, and the wood beyond had been
partially entangled. But this was all, and even when the only
reserve of the Eleventh Army Corps, Barlow’s brigade, was sent to
Sickles, it was not considered necessary to make any change in the
disposition of the troops. The belief that Lee and Jackson were
retreating had taken firm hold of every mind. The pickets on the
flank had indeed reported, from time to time, that infantry was
massing in the thickets; and the Confederate cavalry, keeping just
outside effective range, occupied every road and every clearing. Yet
no attempt was made, by a strong reconnaissance in force, to
ascertain what was actually going on within the forest; and the
reports of the scouts were held to be exaggerated.
The neglect was the more marked in that the position of the Eleventh
Army Corps was very weak. Howard had with him twenty regiments of
infantry and six batteries; but his force was completely isolated.
His extreme right, consisting of four German regiments, was posted
in the forest, with two guns facing westward on the pike, and a line
of intrenchments facing south. On the low hill eastward, where
Talley’s Farm, a small wooden cottage, stood in the midst of a wide
clearing, were two more German regiments
THE ORDERS FOR ATTACK 440
and two American. Then, near the junction of the roads, intervened a
patch of forest, which was occupied by four regiments, with a
brigade upon their left; and beyond, nearly a mile wide from north
to south, and five or six hundred yards in breadth, were the open
fields round the little Wilderness Church, dipping at first to a
shallow brook, and then rising gradually to a house called Dowdall’s
Tavern. In these fields, south of the turnpike, were the breastworks
held by the second division of the Eleventh Army Corps; and here
were six regiments, with several batteries in close support. The
60th New York and 26th Wisconsin, near the Hawkins House at the
north end of the fields, faced to the west; the remainder all faced
south. Beyond Dowdall’s Tavern rose the forest, dark and
impenetrable to the view; but to the south-east, nearly two miles
from Talley’s, the clearings of Hazel Grove were plainly visible.
This part of the line, originally entrusted to General Sickles, was
now unguarded, for two divisions of the Third Corps were moving on
the Furnace; and the nearest force which could render support to
Howard’s was Berry’s division, retained in reserve north-east of
Chancellorsville, three miles distant from Talley’s Farm and nearly
two from Howard’s left. The
Confederates, meanwhile, were rapidly forming for attack.
Notwithstanding their fatigue, for many of the brigades had marched
over fifteen miles, the men were in the highest spirits. A young
staff-officer, who passed along the column, relates that he was
everywhere recognised with the usual greetings. “Say, here’s one of
old Jack’s little boys; let him by, boys!” “Have a good breakfast
this morning, sonny?” “Better hurry up, or you’ll catch it for
gettin’ behind.” “Tell old Jack we’re all a-comin’. Don’t let him
begin the fuss till we get there!” But on reaching the turnpike
orders were given that all noise should cease, and the troops,
deploying for a mile or more on either side of the road, took up
their formation for attack. In front were the skirmishers of Rodes’
division, under Major Blackford; four hundred yards in rear came the
lines of battle, Rodes forming the
THE ORDERS FOR ATTACK 441
first line;1 Colston, at two hundred yards distance, the
second line; A. P. Hill, part in line and part in column, the third.
In little more than an hour-and-a-half, notwithstanding the dense
woods, the formation was completed, and the lines dressed at the
proper angle to the road.
5.45 p.m. Notwithstanding that the enemy might at any
moment awake to their danger, not a single precaution was neglected.
Jackson was determined that the troops should move forward in good
order, and that every officer and man should know what was expected
from him. Staff-officers had been stationed at various points to
maintain communication between the divisions, and the divisional and
brigade commanders had received their instructions. The whole force
was to push resolutely forward through the forest. The open hill,
about a thousand yards eastward, on which stood Talley’s Farm, was
to be carried at all hazard, for, so far as could be ascertained, it
commanded, over an intervening patch of forest, the ridge which ran
north from Dowdall’s Tavern. After the capture of the heights at
Talley’s, if the Federals showed a determined front on their second
line, Rodes was to halt under cover until the artillery could come
up and dislodge them. Under no other circumstances was there to be
any pause in the advance. A brigade of the first line was detailed
to guard the right flank, a regiment the left; and the second and
third lines were ordered to support the first, whenever it might be
necessary, without waiting for further instructions. The field
hospital was established at the Old Wilderness Tavern.
The men were in position, eagerly awaiting the signal; their quick
intelligence had already realised the situation, and all was life
and animation. Across the narrow clearing stretched the long grey
lines, penetrating far into the forest on either flank; in the
centre, on the road, were four
1 Rodes’ brigades were formed in the following order:
......................................
|| _______ ______ _____ _______ ..........
Iverson O'Neal Doles Colquitt _______
Ramseur ||
THE FIRST CHARGE 442
Napoleon guns, the horses fretting with excitement; far to the rear,
their rifles glistening under the long shafts of the setting sun,
the heavy columns of A. P. Hill’s division were rapidly advancing,
and the rumble of the artillery, closing to the front, grew louder
and louder. Jackson, watch in hand, sat silent on “Little Sorrel,”
his slouched hat drawn low over his eyes, and his lips tightly
compressed. On his right was General Rodes, tall, lithe, and
soldierly, and on Rodes’ right was Major Blackford.
“Are you ready, General Rodes?” said Jackson.
“Yes, sir,” said Rodes, impatient as his men.
“You can go forward, sir,” said Jackson.
6 p.m. A nod from Rodes was a sufficient order to
Blackford, and the woods rang with the notes of a single bugle. Back
came the responses from bugles to right and left, and the
skirmishers, dashing through the wild undergrowth, sprang eagerly to
their work, followed by the quick rush of the lines of battle. For a
moment the troops seemed buried in the thickets; then, as the
enemy’s sentries, completely taken by surprise, fired a few
scattered shots, and the guns on the turnpike came quickly into
action, the echoes waked; through the still air of the summer
evening rang the rebel yell, filling the forest far to north and
south, and the hearts of the astonished Federals, lying idly behind
their breastworks, stood still within them.
So rapid was the advance, so utterly unexpected the attack, that the
pickets were at once over-run; and, crashing through the timber,
driving before it the wild creatures of the forest, deer, and hares,
and foxes, the broad front of the mighty torrent bore down upon
Howard’s flank. For a few moments the four regiments which formed
his right, supported by two guns, held staunchly together, and even
checked for a brief space the advance of O’Neal’s brigade. But from
the right and from the left the grey infantry swarmed round them;
the second line came surging forward to O’Neal’s assistance; the
gunners were shot down and their pieces captured; and in ten minutes
the right brigade of the Federal army,
THE FIRST CHARGE 443
submerged by numbers, was flying in panic across the clearing, Here,
near Talley’s Farm, on the fields south of the turnpike and in the
forest to the north, another brigade, hastily changing front,
essayed to stay the rout. But Jackson’s horse-artillery, moving
forward at a gallop, poured in canister at short range; and three
brigades, O’Neal’s, Iverson’s, and Doles’, attacked the Northerners
fiercely in front and flank. No troops, however brave, could have
long withstood that overwhelming rush. The slaughter was very great;
every mounted officer was shot down, and in ten or fifteen minutes
the fragments of these hapless regiments were retreating rapidly and
tumultuously towards the Wilderness Church.
The first position had been captured, but there was no pause in the
attack. As Jackson, following the artillery, rode past Talley’s
Farm, and gazed across the clearing to the east, he saw a sight
which raised high his hopes of a decisive victory. Already, in the
green cornfields, the spoils of battle lay thick around him. Squads
of prisoners were being hurried to the rear. Abandoned guns, and
waggons overturned, the wounded horses still struggling in the
traces, were surrounded by the dead and dying of Howard’s brigades.
Knapsacks, piled in regular order, arms, blankets, accoutrements,
lay in profusion near the breastworks; and beyond, under a rolling
cloud of smoke and dust, the bare fields, sloping down to the brook,
were covered with fugitives. Still further eastward, along the plank
road, speeding in wild confusion towards Chancellorsville, was a
dense mass of men and waggons; cattle, maddened with fright, were
rushing to and fro, and on the ridge beyond the little church,
pushing their way through the terror-stricken throng like ships
through a heavy sea, or breaking into fragments before the pressure,
the irregular lines of a few small regiments were moving hastily to
the front. At more than one point on the edge of the distant woods
guns were coming into action; the hill near Talley’s Farm was
covered with projectiles; men were falling, and the Confederate
first line was already in some confusion.
Galloping up the turnpike, and urging the artillery
THE FIRST CHARGE 444
forward with voice and gesture, Jackson passed through the ranks of
his eager infantry; and then Rodes’s division, rushing down the
wooded slopes, burst from the covert, and, driving their flying foes
before them, advanced against the trenches on the opposite ridge.
Here and there the rush of the first line was checked by the bold
resistance of the German regiments. On the right, especially,
progress was slow, for Colquitt’s brigade, drawn off by the pressure
of Federal outposts in the woods to the south, had lost touch with
the remainder of the division; Ramseur’s brigade in rear had been
compelled to follow suit, and on this flank the Federals were most
effectively supported by their artillery. But Iverson, O’Neal, and
Doles, hardly halting to reform as they Left the woods, and followed
closely by the second line, swept rapidly across the fields, dashed
back the regiments which sought to check them, and under a hot fire
of grape and canister pressed resolutely forward.
The rifle-pits on the ridge were occupied by the last brigade of
Howard’s Army Corps. A battery was in rear, three more were on the
left, near Dowdall’s Tavern, and many of the fugitives from Talley’s
Farm had rallied behind the breastwork. But a few guns and four or
five thousand rifles, although the ground to the front was clear and
open, were powerless to arrest the rush of Jackson’s veterans. The
long lines of colours, tossing redly above the swiftly moving ranks,
never for a moment faltered; the men, running alternately to the
front, delivered their fire, stopped for a moment to load, and then
again ran on. Nearer and nearer they came, until the defenders of
the trenches, already half demoralised, could mark through the
smoke-drift the tanned faces, the fierce eyes, and the gleaming
bayonets of their terrible foes. The guns were already flying, and
the position was outflanked; yet along the whole length of the ridge
the parapets still blazed with fire; and while men fell headlong in
the Confederate ranks, for a moment there was a check. But it was
the check of a mighty wave, mounting slowly to full volume, ere it
falls in thunder on the shrinking sands. Running to the front with
uplifted swords, the officers gave the signal for the charge.
HOOKER 445
The men answered with a yell of triumph; the second line, closing
rapidly on the first, could no longer be restrained; and as the grey
masses, crowding together in their excitement, breasted the last
slope, the Federal infantry, in every quarter of the field, gave way
before them; the ridge was abandoned, and through the dark pines
beyond rolled the rout of the Eleventh Army Corps.
7 p.m. It was seven o’clock. Twilight was falling on the
woods; and Rodes’ and Colston’s divisions had become so inextricably
mingled that officers could not find their men nor men their
officers. But Jackson, galloping into the disordered ranks, directed
them to press the pursuit. His face was aglow with the blaze of
battle. His swift gestures and curt orders, admitting of no
question, betrayed the fierce intensity of his resolution. Although
the great tract of forest, covering Chancellorsville on the west,
had swallowed up the fugitives, he had no need of vision to reveal
to him the extent of his success. 10,000 men had been utterly
defeated. The enemy’s right wing was scattered to the winds. The
Southerners were within a mile-and-a-half of the Federals’ centre
and completely in rear of their intrenchments; and the White House
or Bullock road, only half-a-mile to the front, led directly to
Hooker’s line of retreat by the United States Ford. Until that road
was in his possession Jackson was determined to call no halt. The
dense woods, the gathering darkness, the fatigue and disorder of his
troops, he regarded no more than he did the enemy’s overwhelming
numbers. In spirit he was standing at Hooker’s side, and he saw, as
clearly as though the intervening woods had been swept away, the
condition to which his adversary had been reduced.
To the Federal headquarters confusion and dismay had come, indeed,
with appalling suddenness. Late in the afternoon Hooker was sitting
with two aides-de-camp in the verandah of the Chancellor House.
There were few troops in sight. The Third Corps and Pleasonton’s
cavalry had long since disappeared in the forest. The Twelfth Army
Corps, with the exception of two brigades, was already advancing
against Anderson; and only the trains and some artillery remained
THE PURSUIT STAYED 446
within the intrenchments at Hazel Grove. All was going well. A
desultory firing broke out at intervals to the eastward, but it was
not sustained; and three miles to the south, where, as Hooker
believed, in pursuit of Jackson, Sickles and Pleasonton were, the
reports of their cannon, growing fainter and fainter as they pushed
further south, betokened no more than a lively skirmish. The quiet
of the Wilderness, save for those distant sounds, was undisturbed,
and men and animals, free from every care, were enjoying the calm of
the summer evening. It was about half-past six. Suddenly the
cannonade swelled to a heavier roar, and the sound came from a new
direction. All were listening intently, speculating on what this
might mean, when a staff-officer, who had stepped out to the front
of the house and was looking down the plank road with his glass,
exclaimed: “My God, here they come!” Hooker sprang upon his horse;
and riding rapidly down the road, met the stragglers of the Eleventh
Corps—men, waggons, and ambulances, an ever-increasing crowd—rushing
in blind terror from the forest, flying they knew not whither. The
whole of the right wing, they said, overwhelmed by superior numbers,
was falling back on Chancellorsville, and Stonewall Jackson was in
hot pursuit. The situation had
changed in the twinkling of an eye. Just now congratulating himself
on the complete success of his manœuvres, on the retreat of his
enemies, on the flight of Jackson and the helplessness of Lee,
Hooker saw his strong intrenchments taken in reverse, his army
scattered, his reserves far distant, and the most dreaded of his
opponents, followed by his victorious veterans, within a few hundred
yards of his headquarters. His weak point had been found, and there
were no troops at hand wherewith to restore the fight. The centre
was held only by the two brigades of the Twelfth Corps at the
Fairview Cemetery. The works at Hazel Grove were untenanted, save by
a few batteries and a handful of infantry. The Second and Fifth
Corps on the left were fully occupied by McLaws, for Lee, at the
first sound of Jackson’s guns, had ordered a vigorous attack up the
pike and the plank road. Sickles, with
THE PURSUIT STAYED 447
20,000 men, was far away, isolated and perhaps surrounded, and the
line of retreat, the road to United States Ford, was absolutely
unprotected. Messengers were
dispatched in hot haste to recall Sickles and Pleasonton to Hazel
Grove. Berry’s division, forming the reserve north-east of the
Chancellor House, was summoned to Fairview, and Hays’ brigade of the
Second Corps ordered to support it. But what could three small
brigades, hurried into position and unprotected by intrenchments,
avail against 25,000 Southerners, led by Stonewall Jackson, and
animated by their easy victory? If Berry and Hays could stand fast
against the rush of fugitives, it was all that could be expected;
and as the uproar in the dark woods swelled to a deeper volume, and
the yells of the Confederates, mingled with the crash of the
musketry, were borne to his ears, Hooker must have felt that all was
lost. To make matters worse, as Pleasonton, hurrying back with his
cavalry, arrived at Hazel Grove, the trains of the Third Army Corps,
fired on by the Confederate skirmishers, dashed wildly across the
clearing, swept through the parked artillery, and, breaking through
the forest, increased the fearful tumult which reigned round
Chancellorsville. The gunners,
however, with a courage beyond all praise, stood staunchly to their
pieces; and soon a long line of artillery, for which two regiments
of the Third Army Corps, coming up rapidly from the south, formed a
sufficient escort, was established on this commanding hill. Other
batteries, hitherto held in reserve, took post on the high ground at
Fairview, a mile to the north-east, and, although Berry’s infantry
were not yet in position, and the stream of broken troops was still
pouring past, a strong front of fifty guns opposed the Confederate
advance. But it was not the
artillery that saved Hooker from irretrievable disaster.1
As they followed the remnants of the Eleventh Army Corps, the
progress of Rodes and Colston had been far less rapid than when they
stormed forward 1
Lieutenant-Colonel Hamlin, the latest historian of Chancellorsville,
has completely disposed of the legend that these fifty guns repulsed
a desperate attack on Hazel Grove.
JACKSON’S ORDERS TO A. P. HILL 448
past the Wilderness Church. A regiment of Federal cavalry, riding to
Howard’s aid by a track from Hazel Grove to the plank road, was
quickly swept aside; but the deep darkness of the forest, the
efforts of the officers to re-form the ranks, the barriers opposed
by the tangled undergrowth, the difficulty of keeping the direction,
brought a large portion of the troops to a standstill. At the
junction of the White House road the order to halt was given, and
although a number of men, pushing impetuously forward, seized a line
of log breastworks which ran north-west through the timber below the
Fairview heights, the pursuit was stayed in the midst of the dense
thickets. 8.15
p.m. At this moment, shortly after eight o’clock, Jackson
was at Dowdall’s Tavern. The reports from the front informed him
that his first and second lines had halted; General Rodes, who had
galloped up the plank road to reconnoitre, sent in word that there
were no Federal troops to be seen between his line and the Fairview
heights; and Colonel Cobb, of the 44th Virginia, brought the news
that the strong intrenchments, less than a mile from
Chancellorsville, had been occupied without resistance.
There was a lull in the battle; the firing had died away, and the
excited troops, with a clamour that was heard in the Federal lines,
sought their companies and regiments by the dim light of the rising
moon. But deeming that nothing was done while aught remained to do,
Jackson was already planning a further movement. Sending
instructions to A. P. Hill to relieve Rodes and Colston, and to
prepare for a night attack, he rode forward, almost unattended,
amongst his rallying troops, and lent his aid to the efforts of the
regimental officers. Intent on bringing up the two divisions in
close support of Hill, he passed from one regiment to another.
Turning to Colonel Cobb, he said to him; “Find General Rodes, and
tell him to occupy the barricade1 at once,” and then
added: “I need your help for a time; this disorder must be
corrected. As you go along the right, tell the troops from me to get
into line and preserve their order.”
1 In the woods west of the Fairview Heights.
JACKSON’S ORDERS TO A. P. HILL 449
It was long, however, before the men could be assembled, and the
delay was increased by an unfortunate incident. Jackson’s chief of
artillery, pressing forward up the plank road to within a thousand
yards of Chancellorsville, opened fire with three guns upon the
enemy’s position. This audacious proceeding evoked a quick reply.
Such Federal guns as could be brought to bear were at once turned
upon the road, and although the damage done was small, A. P. Hill’s
brigades, just coming up into line, were for the moment checked;
under the hail of shell and canister the artillery horses became
unmanageable, the drivers lost their nerve, and as they rushed to
the rear some of the infantry joined them, and a stampede was only
prevented by the personal efforts of Jackson, Colston, and their
staff-officers. Colonel Crutchfield was then ordered to cease
firing; the Federals did the same; and A. P. Hill’s brigades, that
of General Lane leading, advanced to the deserted breastworks, while
two brigades, one from Rodes’ division and one from Colston’s, were
ordered to guard the roads from Hazel Grove.
8.45 p.m. These arrangements made, Jackson proceeded to
join his advanced line. At the point where the track to the White
House and United States ford strikes the plank road he met General
Lane, seeking his instructions for the attack. They were
sufficiently brief: “Push right ahead, Lane; right ahead!” As Lane
galloped off to his command, General Hill and some of his staff came
up, and Jackson gave Hill his orders. “Press them; cut them off from
the United States Ford, Hill; press them.” General Hill replied that
he was entirely unacquainted with the topography of the country, and
asked for an officer to act as guide. Jackson directed Captain
Boswell, his chief engineer, to accompany General Hill, and then,
turning to the front, rode up the plank road, passing quickly
through the ranks of the 18th North Carolina of Lane’s brigade. Two
or three hundred yards eastward the general halted, for the ringing
of axes and the words of command were distinctly audible in the
enemy’s lines. While the
Confederates were re-forming, Hooker’s
THE FATAL VOLLEY 450
reserves had reached the front, and Berry’s regiments, on the
Fairview heights, using their bayonets and tin-plates for
intrenching tools, piling up the earth with their hands, and hacking
down the brushwood with their knives, were endeavouring in desperate
haste to provide some shelter, however slight, against the rush that
they knew was about to come. After
a few minutes, becoming impatient for the advance of Hill’s
division, Jackson turned and retraced his steps towards his own
lines. “General,” said an officer who was with him, “you should not
expose yourself so much.” “There is no danger, sir, the enemy is
routed. Go back and tell General Hill to press on.”
Once more, when he was only sixty or eighty yards from where the
18th North Carolina were standing in the trees, he drew rein and
listened—the whole party, generals, staff-officers, and couriers,
hidden in the deep shadows of the silent woods. At this moment a
single rifle-shot rang out with startling suddenness.
A detachment of Federal infantry, groping their way through the
thickets, had approached the Southern lines.
The skirmishers on both sides were now engaged, and the lines of
battle in rear became keenly on the alert. Some mounted officers
galloped hastily back to their commands. The sound startled the
Confederate soldiers,
and an officer of the 18th North Carolina, seeing a group of strange
horsemen riding towards him through the darkness—for Jackson,
hearing the firing, had turned back to his own lines—gave the order
to fire. The volley was fearfully
effective. Men and horses fell dead and dying on the narrow track.
Jackson himself received three bullets, one in the right hand, and
two in the left arm, cutting the main artery, and crushing the bone
below the shoulder, and as the reins dropped upon his neck, “Little
Sorrel,” frantic with terror, plunged into the wood and rushed
towards the Federal lines. An overhanging bough struck his rider
violently in the face, tore off his cap and nearly unhorsed him; but
recovering his seat, he managed to seize the bridle with his
bleeding hand, and turned
THE FATAL VOLLEY 451
into the road. Here Captain Wilbourn, one of his staff-officers,
succeeded in catching the reins; and, as the horse stopped, Jackson
leaned forward and fell into his arms. Captain Hotchkiss, who had
just returned from a reconnaissance, rode off to find Dr. McGuire,
while Captain Wilbourn, with a small penknife, ripped up the sleeve
of the wounded arm. As he was doing so, General Hill, who had
himself been exposed to the fire of the North Carolinians, reached
the scene, and, throwing himself from his horse, pulled off
Jackson’s gauntlets, which were full of blood, and bandaged the
shattered arm with a handkerchief. “General,” he said, “are you much
hurt?” “I think I am,” was the reply, “and all my wounds are from my
own men. I believe my right arm is broken.”
To all questions put to him he answered in a perfectly calm and
self-possessed tone, and, although he spoke no word of complaint, he
was manifestly growing weaker. It seemed impossible to move him, and
yet it was absolutely necessary that he should be carried to the
rear. He was still in front of his own lines, and, even as Hill was
speaking, two of the enemy’s skirmishers, emerging from the thicket,
halted within a few paces of the little group. Hill, turning quietly
to his escort, said, “Take charge of those men,” and two orderlies,
springing forward, seized the rifles of the astonished Federals.
Lieutenant Morrison, Jackson’s aide-de-camp, who had gone down the
road to reconnoitre, now reported that he had seen a section of
artillery unlimbering close at hand. Hill gave orders that the
general should be at once removed, and that no one should tell the
men that he was wounded. Jackson, lying on Hill’s breast, opened his
eyes, and said, “Tell them simply that you have a wounded
Confederate officer.” Lieutenants Smith and Morrison, and Captain
Leigh of Hill’s staff, now lifted him to his feet, and with their
aid he walked a few steps through the trees. But hardly had they
gained the road when the Federal batteries, along their whole front,
opened a terrible fire of grape and canister. The storm of bullets,
tearing through the foliage, was fortunately directed too high, and
the three young officers,
REMOVAL FROM THE FIELD 452
laying the general down by the roadside, endeavoured to shield him
by lying between him and the deadly hail. The earth round them was
torn up by the shot, covering them with dust; boughs fell from the
trees, and fire flashed from the flints and gravel of the roadway.
Once Jackson attempted to rise; but Smith threw his arm over him,
holding him down, and saying, “General, you must be still—it will
cost you your life to rise.” After
a few minutes, however, the enemy’s gunners, changing from canister
to shell, mercifully increased their range; and again, as the
Confederate infantry came hurrying to the front, their wounded
leader, supported by strong arms, was lifted to his feet. Anxious
that the men should not recognise him, Jackson turned aside into the
wood, and slowly and painfully dragged himself through the
undergrowth. As he passed along, General Fender, whose brigade was
then pushing forward, asked Smith who it was that was wounded. “A
Confederate officer” was the reply; but as they came nearer Fender,
despite the darkness, saw that it was Jackson. Springing from his
horse, he hurriedly expressed his regret, and added that his lines
were so much disorganised by the enemy’s artillery that he feared it
would be necessary to fall back. “At this moment,” says an
eye-witness, “the scene was a fearful one. The air seemed to be
alive with the shriek of shells and the whistling of bullets; horses
riderless and mad with fright dashed in every direction; hundreds
left the ranks and hurried to the rear, and the groans of the
wounded and dying mingled with the wild shouts of others to be led
again to the assault. Almost fainting as he was from loss of blood,
desperately wounded, and in the midst of this awful uproar,
Jackson’s heart was unshaken. The words of Fender seemed to rouse
him to life. Pushing aside those who supported him, he raised
himself to his full height, and answered feebly, but distinctly
enough to be heard above the din, ‘You must hold your ground,
General Fender; you must hold out to the last, sir.’ ”
His strength was now completely gone, and he asked to be allowed to
lie down. His staff-officers, however,
REMOVAL FROM THE FIELD 453
refused assent. The shells were still crashing through the forest,
and a litter having been brought up by Captain Leigh, he was carried
slowly towards Dowdall’s Tavern. But before they were free of the
tangled wood, one of the stretcher-bearers, struck by a shot in the
arm, let go the handle. Jackson fell violently to the ground on his
wounded side. His agony must have been intense, and for the first
time he was heard to groan. Smith
sprang to his side, and as he raised his head a bright beam of
moonlight made its way through the thick foliage, and rested upon
his white and lacerated face. The aide-de-camp was startled by its
great pallor and stillness, and cried out, “General, are you
seriously hurt?” “No, Mr. Smith, don’t trouble yourself about me,”
he replied quietly, and added some words about winning the battle
first, and attending to the wounded afterwards. He was again placed
upon the litter, and carried a few hundred yards, still followed by
the Federal shells, to where his medical director was waiting with
an ambulance. Dr. McGuire knelt
down beside him and said, “I hope you are not badly hurt, General?”
He replied very calmly but feebly, “I am badly injured, doctor, I
fear I am dying.” After a pause he went on, “I am glad you have
come. I think the wound in my shoulder is still bleeding.” The
bandages were readjusted and he was lifted into the ambulance, where
Colonel Crutchfield, who had also been seriously wounded, was
already lying. Whisky and morphia were administered, and by the
light of pine torches, carried by a few soldiers, he was slowly
driven through the fields where Hooker’s right had so lately fled
before his impetuous onset. All was done that could ease his
sufferings, but some jolting of the ambulance over the rough road
was unavoidable; “and yet,” writes Dr. McGuire, “his uniform
politeness did not forsake him even in these most trying
circumstances. His complete control, too, over his mind, enfeebled
as it was by loss of blood and pain, was wonderful. His suffering
was intense; his hands were cold, his skin clammy. But not a groan
escaped him—not a sign of suffering, except the
REMOVAL FROM THE FIELD 454
light corrugation of the brow, the fixed, rigid face, the thin lips,
so tightly compressed that the impression of the teeth could be seen
through them. Except these, he controlled by his iron will all
evidence of emotion, and, more difficult than this even, he
controlled that disposition to restlessness which many of us have
observed upon the battle-field as attending great loss of blood. Nor
was he forgetful of others. He expressed very feelingly his sympathy
for Crutchfield, and once, when the latter groaned aloud, he
directed the ambulance to stop, and requested me to see if something
could not be done for his relief.
“After reaching the hospital, he was carried to a tent, and placed
in bed, covered with blankets, and another drink of whisky and water
given him. Two hours and a half elapsed before sufficient reaction
took place to warrant an examination, and at two o’clock on Sunday
morning I informed him that chloroform would be given him; I told
him also that
amputation would probably be required, and
asked, if it was found necessary, whether it should be done at once.
He replied promptly, ‘Yes, certainly, Dr. McGuire, do for me
whatever you think best.’
“Chloroform was then administered, and the left arm amputated about
two inches below the shoulder. Throughout the whole of the
operation, and until all the dressings were applied, he continued
insensible. About half-past three, Colonel (then Major) Pendleton
arrived at the hospital. He stated that General Hill had been
wounded, and that the troops were in great disorder. General Stuart
was in command, and had sent him to see the general. At first I
declined to permit an interview, but Pendleton urged that the safety
of the army and success of the cause depended upon his seeing him.
When he entered the tent the general said, ‘Well, Major, I am glad
to see you; I thought you were killed.’ Pendleton briefly explained
the position of affairs, gave Stuart’s message, and asked what
should be done. Jackson was at once interested, and asked in his
quick way several questions. When they were answered, he remained
silent, evidently trying to think; he contracted his brow, set his
mouth, COUNTER ATTACK 455
and for some moments lay obviously endeavouring to concentrate his
thoughts. For a moment we believed he had succeeded, for his
nostrils dilated, and his eye flashed with its old fire, but it was
only for a moment: his face relaxed again, and presently he
answered, very feebly and sadly: ‘I don’t know—I can’t tell; say to
General Stuart he must do what he thinks best.’ Soon after this he
slept.” So, leaving behind him,
struggling vainly against the oppression of his mortal hurt, the one
man who could have completed the Confederate victory, Pendleton rode
wearily through the night. Jackson’s fall, at so critical a moment,
just as the final blow was to be delivered, had proved a terrible
disaster. Hill, who alone knew his intention of moving to the White
House, had been wounded by a fragment of shell as he rode back to
lead his troops. Boswell, who had been ordered to point out the
road, had been killed by the same volley which struck down his
chief, and the subordinate generals, without instructions and
without guides, with their men in disorder, and the enemy’s
artillery playing fiercely on the forest, had hesitated to advance.
Hill, remaining in a litter near the line of battle, had sent for
Stuart. The cavalry commander, however, was at some distance from
the field. Late in the evening, finding it impossible to employ his
command at the front, he had been detached by Jackson, a regiment of
infantry supporting him, to take and hold Ely’s Ford. He had already
arrived within view of a Federal camp established at that point, and
was preparing to charge the enemy, under cover of the night, when
Hill’s messenger recalled him.
When Stuart reached the front he found the troops still halted,
Rodes and Colston reforming on the open fields near Dowdall’s
Tavern, the Light Division deployed within the forest, and the
generals anxious for their own security.
So far the attack had been completely successful, but Lee’s lack of
strength prevented the full accomplishment of his design. Had
Longstreet been present, with Pickett and Hood to lead his splendid
infantry, the COUNTER
ATTACK 456
Third Corps and the Twelfth would have been so hardly pressed that
Chancellorsville, Hazel Grove, and the White House would have fallen
an easy prize to Jackson’s bayonets. Anderson, with four small
brigades, was powerless to hold the force confronting him, and
marching rapidly northwards, Sickles had reached Hazel Grove before
Jackson fell. Here Pleasonton, with his batteries, was still in
position, and Hooker had not yet lost his head. As soon as Birney’s
and Whipple’s divisions had come up, forming in columns of brigades
behind the guns, Sickles was ordered to assail the enemy’s right
flank and check his advance. Just before midnight the attack was
made, in two lines of battle, supported by strong columns. The night
was very clear and still; the moon, nearly full, threw enough light
into the woods to facilitate the advance, and the tracks leading
north-west served as lines of direction.
The attack, however, although gallantly made, gained no material
advantage. The preliminary movements were plainly audible to the
Confederates, and Lane’s brigade, most of which was now south of the
plank road, had made every preparation to receive it. Against troops
lying down in the woods the Federal artillery, although fifty or
sixty guns were in action, made but small impression; and the
dangers of a night attack, made upon troops who are expecting it,
and whose moral is unaffected, were forcibly illustrated. The
confusion in the forest was very great; a portion of the assailing
force, losing direction, fell foul of Berry’s division at the foot
of the Fairview heights, which had not been informed of the
movement, and at least two regiments, fired into from front and
rear, broke up in panic. Some part of the log breastworks which
Jackson’s advanced line had occupied were recaptured; but not a
single one of the assailants, except as prisoners, reached the plank
road. And yet the attack was an exceedingly well-timed stroke, and
as such, although the losses were heavy, had a very considerable
effect on the issue of the day’s fighting. It showed, or seemed to
show, that the Federals were still in good heart, that they were
rapidly concentrating, and that the Confederates might be met by
STUART 457
vigorous counter-strokes. “The fact,” said Stuart in his official
dispatch, “that the attack was made, and at night, made me
apprehensive of a repetition of it.”
So, while Jackson slept through the hours of darkness that should
have seen the consummation of his enterprise, his soldiers lay
beside their arms; and the Federals, digging, felling, and building,
constructed a new line of parapet, protected by abattis, and
strengthened by a long array of guns, on the slopes of Fairview and
Hazel Grove. The respite which the fall of the Confederate leader
had brought them was not neglected; the fast-spreading panic was
stayed; the First Army Corps, rapidly crossing the Rappahannock,
secured the road to the White House, and Averell’s division of
cavalry reached Ely’s Ford.
May 3 On the left, between Chancellorsville and the river,
where a young Federal colonel, named Miles,1 handled his
troops with conspicuous skill, Lee’s continuous attacks had been
successfully repulsed, and at dawn on the morning of May 3 the
situation of the Union army was far from unpromising. A gap of
nearly two miles intervened between the Confederate wings, and
within this gap, on the commanding heights of Hazel Grove and
Fairview, the Federals were strongly intrenched. An opportunity for
dealing a crushing counterblow—for holding one portion of Lee’s army
in check while the other was overwhelmed—appeared to present itself.
The only question was whether the moral of the general and
the men could be depended upon. In
Stuart, however, Hooker had to deal with a soldier who was no
unworthy successor of Stonewall Jackson. Reluctantly abandoning the
idea of a night attack, the cavalry general, fully alive to the
exigencies of the situation, had determined to reduce the interval
between himself and Lee; and during the night the artillery was
brought up to the front, and the batteries deployed wherever they
could find room. Just before the darkness began to lift, orders were
received from Lee that the assault was to be made as early as
possible; and the right wing, swinging round in order to come
abreast of the centre,
1 Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, 1898.
THE FEDERAL TACTICS 458
became hotly engaged. Away to the south-east, across the hills held
by the Federals, came the responding thunder of Lee’s guns; and
40,000 infantry, advancing through the woods against front and
flank, enveloped in a circle of fire a stronghold which was held by
over 60,000
muskets.
It is unnecessary to describe minutely the events of the morning.
The Federal troops, such as were brought into action, fought well;
but Jackson’s tremendous attack had already defeated Hooker. Before
Sickles made his night attack from Hazel Grove he had sent orders
for Sedgwick to move at once, occupy Fredericksburg, seize the
heights, and march westward by the plank road; and, at the same
time, he had instructed his engineers to select and fortify a
position about a mile in rear of Chancellorsville. So, when Stuart
pressed forward, not only had this new position been occupied by the
First and Fifth Army Corps, but the troops hitherto in possession of
Hazel Grove were already evacuating their intrenchments.
These dispositions sufficiently attest the demoralisation of the
Federal commander. As the historian of the
Army of the Potomac
puts it: “The movement to be executed by Sedgwick was precisely one
of those movements which, according as they are wrought out, may be
either the height of wisdom or the height of folly. Its successful
accomplishment certainly promised very brilliant results. It is easy
to see how seriously Lee’s safety would be compromised if, while
engaged with Hooker in front, he should suddenly find a powerful
force assailing his rear, and grasping already his direct line of
communication with Richmond. But if, on the other hand, Lee should
be able by any slackness on the part of his opponent to engage him
in front with a part of his force, while he should turn swiftly
round to assail the isolated moving column, it is obvious that he
would be able to repulse or destroy that column, and then by a
vigorous return, meet or attack his antagonist’s main body. In the
successful execution of this plan not only was Sedgwick bound to the
most energetic action, but Hooker also was engaged by every
THE FEDERAL TACTICS 459
consideration of honour and duty to so act as to make the dangerous
task he had assigned to Sedgwick possible.”1
But so far from aiding his subordinate by a heavy counter-attack on
Lee’s front, Hooker deliberately abandoned the Hazel Grove salient,
which, keeping asunder the Confederate wings, strongly facilitated
such a manœuvre; and more than this, he divided his own army into
two portions, of which the rear, occupying the new position, was
actually forbidden to reinforce the front.
It is possible that Hooker contemplated an early retreat of his
whole force to the second position. If so, Lee and Stuart were too
quick for him. The cavalry commander, as soon as it became light,
and the hills and undulations of the Wilderness emerged from the
shadows, immediately recognised the importance of Hazel Grove. The
hill was quickly seized; thirty pieces of artillery, established on
the crest, enfiladed the Federal batteries, facing west, on the
heights of Fairview; and the brigade on Stuart’s extreme right was
soon in touch with the troops directed by General Lee. Then against
the three sides of the Federal position the battle raged. From the
south and south-east came Anderson and McLaws, the batteries
unlimbering on every eminence, and the infantry, hitherto held back,
attacking with the vigour which their gallant commanders knew so
well how to inspire. And from the west, formed in three lines,
Hill’s division to the front, came the Second Army Corps. The men
knew by this time that the leader whom they trusted beyond all
others had been struck down, that he was lying wounded, helpless,
far away in rear. Yet his spirit was still with them. Stuart,
galloping along the ranks, recalled him with ringing words to their
memories, and as the bugles sounded the onset, it was with a cry of
“Remember Jackson!” that his soldiers rushed fiercely upon the
Federal breastworks. The advanced
line, within the forest, was taken at the first rush; the second, at
the foot of the Fairview heights, protected by a swampy stream, a
broad belt of abattis, and
1 Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, pp. 241–242.
THE FEDERAL TACTICS 460
with thirty guns on the hill behind, proved far more formidable, and
Hill’s division was forced back. But Rodes and Colston were in close
support. The fight was speedily renewed; and then came charge and
counter-charge; the storm of the parapets; the rally of the
defenders; the rush with the bayonet; and, mowing down men like
grass, the fearful sweep of case and canister. Twice the
Confederates were repulsed. Twice they reformed, brigade mingled
with brigade, regiment with regiment, and charged again in the teeth
of the thirty guns. On both sides
ammunition began to fail; the brushwood took fire, the ground became
hot beneath the foot, and many wounded perished miserably in the
flames. Yet still, with the tangled abattis dividing the opposing
lines, the fight went on; both sides struggling fiercely, the
Federals with the advantage of position, the Confederates of
numbers, for Hooker refused to reinforce his gallant troops. At
length the guns which Stuart had established on Hazel Grove,
crossing their fire with those of McLaws and Anderson, gained the
upper hand over the Union batteries. The storm of shell, sweeping
the Fairview plateau, took the breastworks in reverse; the Northern
infantry, after five hours of such hot battle as few fields have
witnessed, began sullenly to yield, and as Stuart, leading the last
charge, leapt his horse over the parapet, the works were evacuated,
and the tattered colours of the Confederates waved in triumph on the
hill. “The scene,” says a
staff-officer, “can never be effaced from the minds of those that
witnessed it. The troops were pressing forward with all the ardour
and enthusiasm of combat. The white smoke of musketry fringed the
front of battle, while the artillery on the hills in rear shook the
earth with its thunder and filled the air with the wild shrieking of
the shells that plunged into the masses of the retreating foe. To
add greater horror and sublimity to the scene, the Chancellorsville
House and the woods surrounding it were wrapped in flames. It was
then that General Lee rode to the front of his advancing battalions.
His presence was the signal for one of those uncontrollable out-
LEE’S VICTORY 461
bursts of enthusiasm which none can appreciate who have not
witnessed them. “The fierce
soldiers, with their faces blackened with the smoke of battle, the
wounded, crawling with feeble limbs from the fury of the devouring
flames, all seemed possessed of a common impulse. One long, unbroken
cheer, in which the feeble cry of those who lay helpless on the
earth blended with the strong voices of those who still fought,
hailed the presence of the victorious chief.
“His first care was for the wounded of both armies, and he was among
the foremost at the burning mansion, where some of them lay. But at
that moment, when the transports of his troops were drowning the
roar of battle with acclamations, a note was brought to him from
General Jackson. It was handed to him as he sat on his horse near
the Chancellorsville House, and unable to open it with his
gauntleted hands, he passed it to me with directions to read it to
him. I shall never forget the look of pain and anguish that passed
over his face as he listened. In a voice broken with emotion he bade
me say to General Jackson that the victory was his. I do not know
how others may regard this incident, but for myself, as I gave
expression to the thoughts of his exalted mind, I forgot the genius
that won the day in my reverence for the generosity that refused its
glory.” Lee’s reply ran:—
“General,—I have just received your note, informing me that you were
wounded. I cannot express my regret at the occurrence. Could I have
directed events, I should have chosen for the good of the country to
be disabled in your stead. “I
congratulate you upon the victory, which is due to your skill and
energy. “Very
respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. E. LEE, General.”
Such was the tribute, not the less valued that it was couched in no
exaggerated terms, which was brought to the bedside in the quiet
hospital. Jackson was almost alone. As the sound of cannon and
musketry, borne across
LEE’S VICTORY 462
the forest, grew gradually louder, he had ordered all those who had
remained with him, except Mr. Smith, to return to the battle-field
and attend to their different duties.
His side, injured by his fall from the litter, gave him much pain,
but his thoughts were still clear, and his speech coherent. “General
Lee,” he said, when his aide-de-camp read to him the
Commander-in-Chief’s brief words, “is very kind, but he should give
the praise to God.” During the day
the pain gradually ceased; the general grew brighter, and from those
who visited the hospital he inquired minutely about the battle and
the troops engaged. When conspicuous instances of courage were
related his face lit up with enthusiasm, and he uttered his usual
“Good, good,” with unwonted energy when the gallant behaviour of his
old command was alluded to. “Some day,” he said, “the men of that
brigade will be proud to say to their children, ‘I was one of the
Stonewall Brigade.’ He disclaimed all right of his own to the name
Stonewall: ‘It belongs to the brigade and not to me.’ That night he
slept well, and was free from pain.
Meanwhile the Confederate army, resting on the heights of
Chancellorsville, preparatory to an attack upon Hooker’s second
stronghold, had received untoward news. Sedgwick, at eleven o’clock
in the morning, had carried Marye’s Hill, and, driving Early before
him, was moving up the plank road. Wilcox’ brigade of Anderson’s
division, then at Banks’ Ford, was ordered to retard the advance of
the hostile column. McLaws was detached to Salem Church. The Second
Army Corps and the rest of Anderson’s division remained to hold
Hooker in check, and for the moment operations at Chancellorsville
were suspended. McLaws, deploying
his troops in the forest, two hundred and fifty yards from a wide
expanse of cleared ground, pushed his skirmishers forward to the
edge, and awaited the attack of a superior force. Reserving his fire
to close quarters, its effect was fearful. But the Federals pushed
forward; a school-house occupied as an advanced post was captured,
and at this point Sedgwick was within an ace of breaking through.
His second line, however, had not yet
THE FEDERALS RETREAT 463
deployed, and a vigorous counterstroke, delivered by two brigades,
drove back the whole of his leading division in great disorder. As
night fell the Confederates, careful not to expose themselves to the
Union reserves, retired to the forest, and Sedgwick, like Hooker,
abandoned all further idea of offensive action.
May 4 The next morning Lee himself, with the three
remaining brigades of Anderson, arrived upon the scene. Sedgwick,
who had lost 5,000 men the preceding day, May had fortified a
position covering Banks’ Ford, and occupied it with over 20,000
muskets. Lee, with the divisions of McLaws, Anderson, and Early, was
slightly stronger. The attack was delayed, for the Federals held
strong ground, difficult to reconnoitre; but once begun the issue
was soon decided. Assailed in front and flanks, with no help coming
from Hooker, and only a single bridge at Banks’ Ford in rear, the
Federals rapidly gave ground.
Darkness, however, intensified by a thick fog, made pursuit
difficult, and Sedgwick re-crossed the river with many casualties
but in good order. During these operations, that is, from four
o’clock on Sunday afternoon until after midnight on Monday, Hooker
had not moved a single man to his subordinate’s assistance.1
So extraordinary a situation has seldom been seen in war: an army of
60,000 men, strongly fortified, was held in check for six-and-thirty
hours by 20,000; while not seven miles away raged a battle on which
the whole fate of the campaign depended.
Lee and Jackson had made no false estimate of Hooker’s incapacity.
Sedgwick’s army corps had suffered so severely in men and in
moral that it was not available for immediate service, even had
it been transferred to Chancellorsville; and Lee was now free to
concentrate his whole force against the main body of the Federal
army. His men, notwithstanding their extraordinary exertions, were
confident of victory. ”As I sheltered myself,” says an
1 It is but fair, however, to state that Hooker, during the
cannonade which preceded the final assault at Chancellorsville, had
been severely bruised by a fall of masonry.
THE FEDERALS RETREAT 464
May 5 eye-witness, “in a little farmhouse on the plank road
the brigades of Anderson’s division came splashing through the mud,
in wild tumultuous spirits, singing, shouting, jesting, heedless of
soaking rags, drenched to the skin, and burning again to mingle in
the mad revelry of battle.”1 But it was impossible to
push forward, for a violent rain-storm burst upon the Wilderness,
and the spongy soil, saturated with the deluge, absolutely precluded
all movement across country. Hooker, who had already made
preparations for retreat, took advantage of the weather, and as soon
as darkness set in put his army in motion for the bridges.
May 6 By eight o’clock on the morning of the 6th the whole
force had crossed; and when the Confederate patrols pushed forward,
Lee found that his victim had escaped.
The Army of the Potomac returned to its old camp on the hills above
Fredericksburg, and Lee reoccupied his position on the opposite
ridge.
Stoneman, who had scoured the whole country to within a few
miles of Richmond, returned to Kelly’s Ford on May 8. The raid had
effected nothing. The damage done to the railroads and canals was
repaired by the time the raiders had regained the Rappahannock.
Lee’s operations at Chancellorsville had not been affected in the
very slightest degree by their presence in his rear, while
Stoneman’s absence had proved the ruin of the Federal army. Jackson,
who had been removed by the Commander-in-Chief’s order to Mr.
Chandler’s house, near Gurney’s Station, on the morning of May 5,
was asked what he thought of Hooker’s plan of campaign. His reply
was: “It was in the main a good conception, an excellent plan. But
he should not have sent away his cavalry; that was his great
blunder. It was that which enabled me to turn him without his being
aware of it, and to take him in the rear. Had he kept his cavalry
with him, his plan would have been a very good one.” This was not
his only comment on the great battle. Among other things, he said
that he intended to cut the Federals off from the United States
Ford, and, taking a position between them and the
1 Hon. Francis Lawley, the Times, June 16, 1863.
COMMENTS 465
river, oblige them to attack him, adding, with a smile, “My men
sometimes fail to drive the enemy from a position, but they always
fail to drive us away.” He spoke of General Rodes, and alluded in
high terms to his splendid behaviour in the attack on Howard. He
hoped he would be promoted, and he said that promotion should be
made at once, upon the field, so as to act as an incentive to
gallantry in others. He spoke of Colonel Willis, who had commanded
the skirmishers, and praised him very highly, and referred most
feelingly to the death of Paxton, the commander of the Stonewall
Brigade, and of Captain Boswell, his chief engineer. In speaking of
his own share in the victory he said: “Our movement was a great
success; I think the most successful military movement of my life.
But I expect to receive far more credit for it than I deserve. Most
men will think I planned it all from the first; but it was not so. I
simply took advantage of circumstances as they were presented to me
in the providence of God. I feel that His hand led me—let us give
Him the glory.” It must always be
an interesting matter of speculation what the result would have been
had Jackson accomplished his design, on the night he fell, of moving
a large part of his command up the White House road, and barring the
only line of retreat left open to the Federals.
Hooker, it is argued, had two corps in position which had been
hardly engaged, the Second and the Fifth; and another, the First,
under Reynolds, was coming up. Of these, 25,000 men might possibly,
could they have been manœuvred in the forest, have been sent to
drive Jackson back. And, undoubtedly, to those who think more of
numbers than of human nature, of the momentum of the mass rather
than the mental equilibrium of the general, the fact that a superior
force of comparatively fresh troops was at Hooker’s disposal will be
sufficient to put the success of the Confederates out of court. Yet
the question will always suggest itself, would not the report that a
victorious enemy, of unknown strength, was pressing forward, in the
darkness of the night, towards the only line of retreat,
COMMENTS 466
have so demoralised the Federal commander and the Federal soldiers,
already shaken by the overthrow of the Eleventh Army Corps, that
they would have thought only of securing their own safety? Would
Hooker, whose tactics the next day, after he had had the night given
him in which to recover his senses, were so inadequate, have done
better if he had received no respite? Would the soldiers of the
three army corps not yet engaged, who had been witnesses of the rout
of Howard’s divisions, have fared better, when they heard the
triumphant yells of the advancing Confederates, than the hapless
Germans? “The wounding of Jackson,” says a most careful historian of
the battle, himself a participator in the Union disaster, was a most
fortunate circumstance for the Army of the Potomac. At nine o’clock
the capture or destruction of a large part of the army seemed
inevitable. There was, at the time, great uncertainty and a feeling
akin to panic prevailing among the Union forces round
Chancellorsville; and when we consider the position of the troops at
this moment, and how many important battles have been won by trivial
flank attacks—how Richepanse (attacking through the forest) with a
single brigade ruined the Austrians at Hohenlinden—we must admit
that the Northern army was in great peril when Jackson arrived
within one thousand yards of its vital point (the White House) with
20,000 men and 50 cannon.”1 He must be a great leader
indeed who, when his flank is suddenly rolled up and his line of
retreat threatened, preserves sufficient coolness to devise a
general counterstroke. Jackson had proved himself equal to such a
situation at Cedar Run, but it is seldom in these circumstances that
Providence sides with the “big battalions.”
The Federal losses in the six days’ battles were heavy: over 12,000
at Chancellorsville, and 4,700 at Fredericksburg, Salem Church, and
Banks’ Ford; a total of 17,287. The army lost 13 guns, and nearly
6,000 officers and men were reported either captured or missing.
The casualties were distributed as follows:—
1 Chancellorsville, Lt.-Colonel A. C. Hamlin.
THE LOSSES 467
First Army Corps
Second Army Corps
Third Army Corps
Fifth Army Corps
Sixth Army Corps
Eleventh Army Corps
Twelfth Army Corps
Pleasonton’s Cavalry Brigade |
135
1,925
4,119
700
4,590
2,412
2,822
141
———
16,844 |
The Confederate losses were hardly less severe. The killed and
wounded were as under:—
SECOND ARMY CORPS
A. P. Hill’s Division
Rodes” Division
Colston’s Division
Early’s Division
Anderson’s Division
McLaws” Division
Artillery
Cavalry
Prisoners (estimated) |
2,583
2,178
1,868
851
1,180
1,379
227
11
2,000
———
12,227 |
But a mere statement of the casualties by no means represents the
comparative loss of the opposing forces. Victory does not consist in
merely killing and maiming a few thousand men. This is the visible
result; it is the invisible that tells. The Army of the Potomac,
when it retreated across the Rappahannock, was far stronger in mere
numbers than the Army of Northern Virginia; but in reality it was
far weaker, for the moral of the survivors, and of the general who
led them, was terribly affected. That of the Confederates, on the
other hand, had been sensibly elevated, and it is moral, not
numbers, which is the strength of armies. What, after all, was the
loss of 12,200 soldiers to the Confederacy? In that first week of
May there were probably 20,000 conscripts in different camps of
instruction, more than enough to recruit the depleted regiments to
full strength. Nor did the slaughter of Chancellorsville diminish to
any appreciable degree the vast hosts of the Union.
THE LOSSES 468
And yet the Army of the Potomac had lost more than all the efforts
of the Government could replace. The Army of Virginia, on the other
hand, had acquired a superiority of spirit which was ample
compensation for the sacrifice which had been made. It is hardly too
much to say that Lee’s force had gained from the victory an increase
of strength equivalent to a whole army corps of 80,000 men, while
that of his opponent had been proportionately diminished. Why, then,
was there no pursuit? It has been
asserted that Lee was so crippled by his losses at Chancellorsville
that he was unable to resume operations against Hooker for a whole
month. This explanation of his inactivity can hardly be accepted.
On June 16 and 18, 1815, at Quatre-Bras and Waterloo, the
Anglo-Dutch army, little larger than that of Northern Virginia, lost
17,000 men; and yet on the 19th Wellington was marching in pursuit
of the French; nor did he halt until he arrived within sight of
Paris. And on August 28, 29, and 30, 1862, at Groveton and the
Second Manassas, Stonewall Jackson lost 4,000 officers and men,
one-fifth of his force, but he was not left in rear when Lee invaded
Maryland. Moreover, after he had defeated Sedgwick, on the same
night that Hooker was recrossing the Rappahannock, Lee was planning
a final attack on the Federal intrenchments, and his disappointment
was bitter when he learned that his enemy had escaped. If his men
were capable of further efforts on the night of May 5, they were
capable of them the next day; and it was neither the ravages of
battle nor the disorganisation of the army that held the
Confederates fast, but the deficiency of supplies, the damage done
to the railways by Stoneman’s horsemen, the weakness of the cavalry,
and, principally, the hesitation of the Government. After the
victory of Chancellorsville, strong hopes of peace were entertained
in the South. Before Hooker advanced, a large section of the
Northern Democrats, despairing of ultimate success, had once more
raised the cry that immediate separation was better, than a hopeless
contest, involving such awful sacrifices, and it needed all
Lincoln’s strength to stem the tide of disaffection.
THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 469
The existence of this despondent feeling was well known to the
Southern statesmen; and to such an extent did they count upon its
growth and increase that they had overlooked altogether the
importance of improving a victory, should the army be successful; so
now, when the chance had come, they were neither ready to forward
such an enterprise, nor could they make up their minds to depart
from their passive attitude. But to postpone all idea of
counterstroke until some indefinite period is as fatal in strategy
as in tactics. By no means an uncommon policy, it has been
responsible for the loss of a thousand opportunities.
Had not politics intervened, a vigorous pursuit—not necessarily
involving an immediate attack, but drawing Hooker, as
Pope had been drawn in the
preceding August, into an unfavourable situation, before his army
had had time to recover—would have probably been initiated. It may
be questioned, however, whether General Lee, even when Longstreet
and his divisions joined him, would have been so strong as he had
been at the end of April. None felt more deeply than the
Commander-in-Chief that the absence of Jackson was an irreparable
misfortune. “Give him my affectionate regards,” he said to an
aide-de-camp who was riding to the hospital; “tell him to make haste
and get well, and come back to me as soon as he can. He has lost his
left arm, but I have lost my right.” “Any victory,” he wrote
privately, “would be dear at such a price. I know not how to replace
him.” His words were prophetic.
Exactly two months after Chancellorsville the armies met once more
in the clash of battle. During the first two days, on the rolling
plain round Gettysburg, a village of Pennsylvania, four Federal army
corps were beaten in succession, but ere the sun set on the third
Lee had to admit defeat. And yet
his soldiers had displayed the same fiery courage and stubborn
persistence which had carried them victorious through the
Wilderness. But his “right arm” had not yet been replaced. “If,” he
said after the war, with unaccustomed emphasis, “I had had Jackson
at JACKSON’S LAST
WORDS 470
Gettysburg I should have won the battle, and a complete victory
there would have resulted in the establishment of Southern
independence.” It was not to be.
Chancellorsville, where 130,000 men were defeated by 60,000, is up
to a certain point as much the tactical masterpiece of the
nineteenth century as was Leuthen of the eighteenth. But, splendid
triumph as it was, the battle bore no abiding fruits, and the reason
seems very clear. The voice that would have urged pursuit was
silent. Jackson’s fall left Lee alone, bereft of his alter ego; with
none, save Stuart, to whom he could entrust the execution of those
daring and delicate manœuvres his inferior numbers rendered
necessary; with none on whose resource and energy he could
implicitly rely. Who shall say how far his own resolution had been
animated and confirmed at other crises by the prompting and presence
of the kindred spirit? “They supplemented each other,” said Davis,
“and together, with any fair opportunity, they were absolutely
invincible.” Many a fierce battle
still lay before the Army of Northern Virginia; marvellous was the
skill and audacity with which Lee manœuvred his ragged regiments in
the face of overwhelming odds; fierce and unyielding were the
soldiers, but with Stonewall Jackson’s death the impulse of victory
died away. May
7 It is needless to linger over the closing scene at
Gurney’s Station. For some days there was hope that the patient
would recover; pneumonia, attributed to his fall from the litter as
he was borne from the field, supervened, and he gradually began to
sink. On the Thursday his wife and child arrived from Richmond; but
he was then almost too weak for conversation, and on Sunday morning
it was evident that the end was near.
May 10 As yet he had scarcely realised his condition. If,
he said, it was God’s will, he was ready to go, but he believed that
there was still work for him to do, and that his life would be
preserved to do it. At eleven o’clock Mrs. Jackson knelt by his
side, and told him that he could not live beyond the evening. “You
are frightened, my
JACKSON’S LAST WORDS 471
child,” he replied, “death is not so near; I may yet get well.” She
fell upon the bed, weeping bitterly, and told him again that there
was no hope. After a moment’s pause, he asked her to call Dr.
McGuire. “Doctor,” he said, “Anna tells me I am to die to-day; is it
so?” When he was answered, he remained silent for a moment or two,
as if in intense thought, and then quietly replied, “Very good, very
good; it is all right.” About noon, when Major Pendleton came into
the room, he asked, “Who is preaching at headquarters to-day?” He
was told that Mr. Lacy was, and that the whole army was praying for
him. “Thank God,” he said; “they are very kind to me.” Already his
strength was fast ebbing, and although his face brightened when his
baby was brought to him, his mind had begun to wander. Now he was on
the battle-field, giving orders to his men; now at home in
Lexington; now at prayers in the camp, Occasionally his senses came
back to him, and about half-past one he was told that he had but two
hours to live. Again he answered, feebly but firmly, “Very good; it
is all right. These were almost his last coherent words. For some
time he lay unconscious, and then suddenly he cried out: “Order A.P.
Hill to prepare for action! Pass the infantry to the front! Tell
Major Hawks “then stopped, leaving the sentence unfinished. Once
more he was silent; but a little while after he said very quietly
and clearly, “Let us cross over the river, and rest under the shade
of the trees,” and the soul of the great captain passed into the
peace of God. 472
NOTE I
[From General Lee’s letter-book.]
Lexington, Virginia, 25th January, 1866.
MRS. T. J. JACKSON:—
MY DEAR MRS. JACKSON,—Dr.
Brown handed me your note of the 9th, when in Richmond on business
connected with Washington College. I have delayed replying since my
return, hoping to have sufficient time to comply with your request.
Last night I received a note from Mrs. Brown, enclosing one from Dr.
Dabney, stating that the immediate return of his manuscript was
necessary. I have not been able to open it; and when I read it when
you were here, it was for the pleasure of the narrative, with no
view of remark or correction; and I took no memoranda of what seemed
to be errors. I have not thought of them since, and do not know that
I can now recall them; and certainly have no desire that my opinions
should be adopted in preference to Dr. Dabney’s. . . . I am,
however, unable at this time to specify the battles to which my
remark particularly refers. The opinion of General Jackson, in
reference to the propriety of attacking the Federal army under
General McClellan
at Harrison’s Landing, is not, I think, correctly stated. Upon my
arrival there, the day after General Longstreet and himself, I was
disappointed that no opportunity for striking
General McClellan,
on the retreat, or in his then position, had occurred, and went
forward with General Jackson alone, on foot; and after a careful
reconnaissance of the whole line and position, he certainly stated
to me, at that time, the impropriety of attacking. I am
misrepresented at the battle of Chancellorsville in proposing an
attack in front, the first evening of our arrival. On the contrary,
I decided against it, and stated to General Jackson, we must attack
on our left as soon as practicable; and the necessary movement of
the troops began immediately. In consequence of a report received
about that time, from General Fitzhugh Lee, describing the position
of the Federal army, and the roads which he held with his cavalry
leading to its rear, General Jackson, after some inquiry concerning
the roads leading to the Furnace, undertook to throw his command
entirely in Hooker’s rear, which he accomplished with equal skill
and boldness; the rest of the army being moved to the left flank to
connect with him as he advanced. I think there is some mistake, too,
of a regiment of infantry being sent by him to the ford on the
Rapidan, as described by Dr. Dabney. The cavalry was ordered to make
such a demonstration. General Stuart had proceeded to that part of
the field to co-operate in General Jackson’s movement, and I always
supposed it was his dismounted cavalry. As well as I now recollect,
something is said by
NOTE I 473
Dr. Dabney as to General Jackson’s opinion as to the propriety of
delivering battle at Sharpsburg. When he came upon the field, having
preceded his troops, and learned my reasons for offering battle, he
emphatically concurred with me. When I determined to withdraw across
the Potomac, he also concurred; but said then, in view of all the
circumstances, it was better to have fought the battle in Maryland
than to have left it without a struggle. After crossing the Potomac,
General Jackson was charged with the command of the rear, and he
designated the brigades of infantry to support Pendleton’s
batteries. I believed General McClellan had been so crippled at
Sharpsburg that he could not follow the Confederate army into
Virginia immediately; but General Stuart was ordered, after crossing
the Potomac, to recross at once at
Williamsport,
threaten his right flank, and observe his movements. Near daylight
the next, morning, General Pendleton reported to me the occurrence
at Shepherdstown the previous evening, and stated that he had made a
similar report to General Jackson, who was lying near me on the same
field. From his statement, I thought it possible that the Federal
army might be attempting to follow us; and I sent at once to General
Jackson to say that, in that event, I would attack it; that he must
return with his whole command if necessary; that I had sent to
Longstreet to countermarch the rest of the army; and that upon his
joining me, unless I heard from him to the contrary, I should move
with it to his support. General Jackson went back with Hill’s
division, General Pendleton accompanying him, and soon drove the
Federals into Maryland with loss. His report, which I received on my
way towards the river, relieved my anxiety, and the order of the
march of the troops was again resumed. I have endeavoured to be as
brief as possible in my statement, and with the single object of
calling Dr. Dabney’s attention to the points referred to, that he
may satisfy himself as to the correctness of his own statements; and
this has been done solely in compliance with your request. Other
points may have attracted my attention in the perusal of the
narrative; but I cannot now recall them, and do not know that those
which have occurred to me are of importance. I wish I could do
anything to give real assistance, for I am very anxious that his
work should be perfect.
With feelings of great esteem and regard, I am,
Very truly yours,
(Signed) R. E. LEE.
The production of this letter is due to the kindness of Dr. Henry A.
White, and of R. E. Lee, Esquire, of Washington, youngest son of
General Lee.
NOTE II
The
following details, communicated to the author by one of Lee’s
generals, as to the formations of the Confederate infantry, will be
found interesting:— NOTE
II 474
“Our brigades were usually formed of four or five regiments, each
regiment composed of ten companies. Troops furnished by the same
State were, as far as possible, brigaded together, in order to
stimulate State pride, and a spirit of healthy emulation.
“The regiment was formed for attack in line two-deep, covered by
skirmishers. “The
number of skirmishers, and the intervals between the men on the
skirmish line, depended altogether on the situation. Sometimes two
companies were extended as skirmishers; sometimes one company;
sometimes a certain number of men from several companies. In rear of
the skirmishers, at a distance ranging from three hundred to one
hundred and fifty paces, came the remainder of the regiment.
“When a regiment or a brigade advanced through a heavily wooded
country, such as the Wilderness, the point of direction was
established, and the officers instructed to conform to the movements
of the ‘guide company’ or ‘guide regiment’ as the case might be, the
‘guide’ company or regiment governing both direction and alignment.
“The maintenance of direction under such circumstances was a very
difficult matter. Our officers, however, were greatly assisted by
the rank and file, as many of the latter were accomplished woodsmen,
and accustomed to hunt and shoot in the dense forests of the South.
Each regiment, moreover, was provided with a right and a left
‘general guide,’ men selected for their special aptitudes, being
good judges of distance, and noted for their steadiness and skill in
maintaining the direction.
“Then, again, the line of battle was greatly aided in maintaining
the direction by the fire of the skirmishers, and frequently the
line would be formed with a flank resting on a trail or woods-road,
a ravine or watercourse, the flank regiment in such cases acting as
the guide: (at Chancellorsville, Jackson’s divisions kept direction
by the turnpike, both wings looking to the centre.) In advancing
through thick woods the skirmish line was almost invariably
strengthened, and while the ‘line of battle,’ covered by the
skirmishers, advanced in two-deep line, bodies in rear usually
marched in columns of fours, prepared to come, by a ‘forward into
line,’ to the point where their assistance might be desired. I never
saw the compass used in wood-fighting. In all movements to attack it
was the universal custom for the brigade commander to assemble both
field and company officers to the ‘front and centre,’ and instruct
them particularly as to the purpose of the movement, the method in
which it was to be carried out, the point of direction, the guide
regiment, the position of other brigades, etc., etc. Like action was
also taken by the regimental commander when a regiment was alone.
“This precaution, I venture to think, is absolutely indispensable to
an orderly and combined advance over any ground whatever, and, so
far as my knowledge goes, was seldom omitted, except when haste was
imperative, in the Army of Northern Virginia. Practical experience
taught us that no movement should be permitted until every
NOTE III 475
officer was acquainted with the object in view, and had received his
instructions. I may add that brigade and regimental commanders were
most particular to secure their flanks and to keep contact with
other troops by means of patrols; and, also, that in thick woods it
was found to be of very great advantage if a few trustworthy men
were detailed as orderlies to the regimental commander, for by this
means he could most easily control the advance of his skirmishers
and of his line of battle.
“N. H. HARRIS,
General, late Army of Northern Virginia.”
NOTE III
Before the campaign of 1864, the theatre of which embraced the
region between the Rappahannock and
Petersburg, including the
Wilderness, corps of sharp-shooters, each 180 strong, were organised
in many of the brigades of Lee’s army. These “light” troops
undertook the outpost, advanced, flank, and rear guard duties. The
men were carefully selected; they were trained judges of distance,
skilful and enterprising on patrol, and first-rate marksmen, and
their rifles were often fitted with telescopic sights. In order to
increase their confidence in each other they were subdivided into
groups of fours, which messed and slept together, and were never
separated in action. These corps did excellent service during the
campaign of 1864. |